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Abstract:  
 
This research investigated whether engineers, graduating from universities 
more than a decade after the introduction new occupational health and safety 
(OHS) legislation in Australia, were being equipped with the knowledge and 
skills to fulfil their professional, legal and moral responsibilities in relation to 
occupational health and safety. The study focussed on engineering students as 
future business leaders and designers of  working environments.  An instrument 
was designed to examine the ability of OH&S education to affect decision-
making and problem solving competence in engineering students and 
graduates. The study found that engineering graduates in the 1990’s were 
departing their academic institutions with superficial knowledge of 
occupational health and safety responsibilities and accountability in the 
workplace.  The evaluative tool identified an absence of safety management 
skills and knowledge within graduate and student engineer groups and an 
extensive urge to blame and discipline the victim or blame a government 
regulatory authority.  The research found that although occupational health and 
safety professionals adopt a strategy of a safe work place rather than place 
emphasis on individual workers the engineers did not adopt the safe place 
approach and focussed on the person.  It is recommended that the evaluative 
tool or a derivative of it should be used to evaluate the extent to which our 
community progresses in developing the vital OHS decision-making skills of 
the people who will manage and design workplaces.     
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Definition of terms: 
The following specific terms are used throughout this thesis: 
Accident prevention: the application of countermeasures designed to forestall 
accidents within a system or workplace, such as designing a safe system of 
work, and training employees in procedures relating to health and safety to 
alert them to hazards and the hazard control measures available, and informing 
them about deterrent legislation, etc.   
Accountability: responsibility or obligation, especially to provide certain 
information or perform certain functions, such as may be dictated or implied by 
law, regulation, agreement, management policy, standard, etc.  Management 
policy should include measures of expected performance to achieve effective 
accountability. 
Common law:  1. originally, the common law of England, that is, the general 
rules made applicable to the whole country, as distinct from local customs. 
2. subsequently, the body of legal principles, offences, remedies, etc., evolved 
through the practice of English courts.  Hence in comparative law, a common 
law system is one derived from the English legal system, as opposed to a civil 
law system.  3. law evolved through judicial decision and practice, i.e. case law 
establishing and following precedents, as distinct from statute law. 
Controls: A hierarchy of controls ranks measures taken to prevent or reduce 
hazard exposure according to effectiveness, eg, from the most effective 
measures (that eliminate hazards) to the least satisfactory (that achieve only 
impermanent protection and require ongoing vigilance and hazard 
accommodation).  In practice, hazard control often requires a combination of 
several measures of different ranking. 
Occupational health and safety (OHS): the general area of concern in 
employment which spans the physiological and psychological needs and well-
being of persons engaged in occupations, work-related trauma and death, the 
protection of persons from, or from risk of, work-related trauma or death, and 
the rehabilitation and retraining of persons who have suffered work-related 
trauma.  Employers have a common-law duty to take reasonable care to guard 
their employees’ health and safety at work and cannot contract out of this 
liability. 
Risk management:  the identification and control of those risks which threaten 
the profitability or viability of an organisation. It embraces all areas of an 
organisation, because every decision made entails some degree of risk, be it 
financial, physical or operational.  The risks include such occurrences as fire 
and other occupational health and safety risks, and financial risks such as 
changes in exchange or interest rates and changes in commodity prices.  Risk 
management involves identifying, assessing and quantifying the degree of risk 
associated with identified hazards, designing viable programs to limit exposure 
to the hazards (risk avoidance), accepting certain levels of risk and adopting 
funding techniques (such as the use of insurance) to protect the financial 
position of the organisation from risks above the accepted levels (risk 
acceptance), and monitoring, maintaining and adjusting the risk management 
 
 xii
programs as required.  The processes of hazard identification and assessment 
are scientific and/or technical activities which should be carried out by 
individuals with relevant expertise.  The processes of risk control and 
evaluation are ‘trans-scientific’ political and/or social activities which should 
be carried out by consultation between all affected individuals and, in some 
cases, by society as a whole. 
Safe place:  Safe place is a term used to describe a workplace that operates 
after accurate analysis of all design engineering strategies has been undertaken 
to ensure safe working practices.  It is the principal control measure and the 
opposite to providing personal protective equipment to the worker (often 
referred to as a behavioural control measure as ‘safe person’) 
Safe system of work: a common-law obligation (i.e. generally applicable) 
resting on employers to provide methods, systems and organisation of work 
(including hazard recognition and control procedures, the appropriate training, 
tools and equipment, etc) to ensure the safety of all persons involved in doing 
the work.  What is safe is assessed by reference to a reasonable standard as 
understood by a reasonably well-informed person.  A safe system extends to 
assuring that all employees performing the work are sufficiently competent so 
that the safety of fellow workers is not jeopardised.   
Workplace:  any premises or place in which persons are employed or engaged 
in industry.  It includes sites away from the main workplace.  An employer has 
the same responsibility to ensure the safety of employees in temporary and 
transient or ‘on the road’ workplaces (e.g. construction sites) as in permanently 
established workplaces.  
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Chapter One 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
1.0 Introduction: 
 
The matter of occupational health and safety is one that has been given 
increasing prominence worldwide, and particularly in Australia in the past two 
decades. In 1995 when describing the crucial importance that occupational 
health and safety has in Australian industry the Industry Commission stated that 
the cost to Australia in workers’ compensation costs in 1990-1 for injury and 
disease was twenty-seven billion dollars (Industry Commission, 1995).  
Maiden, (1993) when commenting on the cost noted that this loss through 
occupational injury and disease represented 7.2 million working days. This 
contrasts with 1.6 million working days lost to industrial disputes in 1992.   
 
Whilst emphasising the magnitude of the problem of workplace deaths and 
injuries the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) 
Chairman, Mr Jerry Ellis, in October 2003  estimated 2,200 Australians died as 
a result of their work, compared with 1,750 people killed on the roads.  The 
figure is in the NOHSC Annual Report for 2002–03 recently tabled in Federal 
Parliament (NOHSC, 2003). Of the 2,200 deaths cited by Mr Ellis, 198 were 
traumatic fatalities, while the rest were disease related.  The cost of work 
related injury and diseases was estimated to be in excess of $31 billion per 
year.  Mr Ellis reported,  
“It is appalling for a country of Australia's prosperity to suffer the 
consequences of work related deaths and injuries to hundreds of 
thousands of people every year.  No-one should be complacent. We need 
everyone to get behind the national effort to improve performance.”  
 
The report indicated a continued improvement in Australia’s OHS performance 
over the past six years, from an injury rate of 23 claims per 1,000 employees in 
1996–97 to 17 in 2001–02. In the same period traumatic fatality claims fell 
from 3.8 per 100,000 employees in 1996–97 to 2.4 in 2001–02.  
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While the rate of injuries on the job is declining, the report said it has not been 
enough to close the gap between Australia’s performance and those of the best 
performing countries in the world.  
By any measure, loss of this magnitude seriously affects the nation’s 
productivity. On a personal dimension, the payment of money to workers 
disabled through unsafe or inadequate working conditions, while seeming to 
compensate for loss, is really an unacceptable and inadequate remedy for what 
in many cases was avoidable had the application of sound safety management 
procedures been undertaken.  It must be of concern to all sections of Australian 
society that knowledge of a workforce of approximately seven million persons, 
five hundred and seventy-seven compensable work-related deaths and six 
hundred thousand are injured each year (National Occupational Health and 
Safety Commission, 1994) with little public or media comment.   Whilst in 
human terms losses through work related death and injury are of concern, from 
an economic perspective their effects on Australian development are 
considerable.   
 
During 1992, 1.21 percent of Australia’s non-farm gross domestic product was 
expended on workers’ compensation claims.  A clarification of the national 
perspective is that one in forty workers sustained a work-related injury or 
disease in 1991-2 that required at least five days off work, an equivalent to 2.4 
percent of Australia’s labour costs. These data on the economic toll were 
brought together by the Industry Commission in their 1995 report on health and 
safety in Australia and are summarised in Appendix 1 (Industry Commission 
1995).   
 
Taking into account that many work injuries result in an absence of less than 
five days and that coverage of employed persons is incomplete; many statistical 
data are a conservative estimate.  The Review of Occupational Health and 
Safety in Australia (1990) reported a comparison of Australia with several 
other countries: 77 fatal injuries per million workers compared with USA 27, 
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United Kingdom 24, Sweden 22, and Japan 20.  Evidence therefore, indicated 
that the record in Australia was humble in comparison with most other 
developed countries. 
 
At about that time the  Executive Director of the National Occupational Health 
and Safety Commission’s Research and Science Division reported that (Stacey, 
1994):  
“Australia’s national expenditure on education in occupational health 
and safety was appalling in comparison to other countries.” 
 
Table 1.0 provides a comparison of national expenditure on OHS education.   
 
Table 1.0 
National OH&S Education Expenditure Comparison   -Image removed
 for copyright reasons 
 
 
  
   
  
   
 
Source: Stacey, (1994) National Occupational Health and Safety Commission. 
 
The above statistics indicate that Australian expenditure per head of population 
was one tenth that of Finland expenditure on OHS education.  One Canadian 
province with only one third of Australia’s population expended more in total 
than Australia. 
 
NOSHC which had been set up in 1985 moved quickly to develop a National 
Training and Education Strategy, which was published in 1987.  The principles 
underlying the national strategy were (NOHSC, 1987): 
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“(a) contribute to ensuring that all people whose decisions and 
actions affect the Australian workplace are equipped with appropriate 
knowledge and expertise in occupational health and safety. 
 (b) to co-ordinate national development of high-quality, cost-
effective training and education programs in occupational health and 
safety which meet the needs of the workplace and the community.” 
 
Of the target groups identified in the strategy the first two groups were: 
• Those who make organisational, financial and managerial decisions  
• Those who make technical and design decisions. 
 
As an example of the innovative initiative of the National OHS Commission it 
is interesting to note that almost twenty years later the Italian President of the 
European Council in the Rome Declaration on Mainstreaming Occupational 
Health and Safety into Education and Training in October 2003 was calling for 
the setting of national goals and development of coherent strategies for 
preparing future decision makers with adequate OHS knowledge. In particular 
the declaration encouraged:- 
• Setting qualified and quantified goals for improvement of the working 
environment in schools and other educational establishments.  
• Exchanging good practices of mainstreaming OSH in education & 
training in an enlarged European network group of OSH and education 
training experts.  
 
Participants of the Rome seminar anticipated that this declaration would serve 
as impetus towards the development of coherent European occupational health 
and safety education and training policies as a major contribution towards the 
development of a European prevention culture and thus the improvement of the 
quality of work and education in the European Union. 
 
1.1 Aim: 
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This study therefore aims to: 
To contribute to our understanding of whether key decision-
makers are being equipped with the knowledge and skills to 
fulfil their professional, legal and moral responsibilities in 
relation to occupational health and safety. 
 
1.2 Engineers as a Focus for Exploration 
 
Many decision-makers affect the environments in which people work. OH&S 
is a multi-disciplinary and highly dynamic area of practical and scientific 
activity.  The need to improve constantly the knowledge of physicians, 
engineers, technologists, managers and workers derives from modern 
production developments such as industrial and agricultural use of recent 
scientific and technical innovations.  Those modern production developments 
are often accompanied by chemical, physical and biological risks to health and 
safety of workers.  Recognition of the need to eliminate the latent effects of 
occupational exposure to mutagenic, teratogenic, embryotoxic and 
carcinogenic agents are becoming increasingly important.  Their effects may be 
long in manifesting themselves and may also appear in subsequent generations.  
The example of asbestosis and noise induced hearing loss are poignant 
examples of such exposures. 
 
The task of building in safety and health at the design stage of new equipment 
and technology depends on the engineers’, designers’, and decision-makers’ 
perception of their safety responsibility and their technical knowledge of 
ergonomics and occupational health and safety.   
 
Provision of a safe workplace is an all-pervading requirement under Common 
and Statute law, and in effect what society values.  Simply put this means that 
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key decision-makers must control the workplace, the design of machines within 
it and the environment rather than focusing solely on individual behaviour.  It 
is necessary for workplace managers and supervisors to control their work 
environment.  This necessitates their being educated in how to systematically 
identify and control existing occupational hazards.  That is retrospective 
control.  However, the most efficient method of control is during preliminary 
planning and design stage of any enterprise.  Effective design of industrial 
plant can minimise hazards by the use of less hazardous materials, processes 
and operations. 
 
If the designers and industrial decision-makers of tomorrow are going to 
exercise moral choices then the principles and concepts of occupational health 
and safety must be understood by those key decision-makers.  
 
Cowley and Murray, (1991) in their review of engineering education advocated 
that engineers should be specifically targeted because of the key role they play 
in the design and operation of workplaces, processes and equipment used in 
today’s society.  Their responsibility to the community and the nation’s 
economic progress is substantial and legal liability often rests with them in the 
event of a failure. 
 
However, as King, Coles, & Kerbel, (1983) identified in their study of 
occupational health and safety education in Ontario, that different educational 
objectives of academic and professional programmes hinder the identification 
of a single approach to promoting OH&S education.  Consequently, priorities 
have to be identified. 
 
Accordingly engineers as key decision-makers are central to the creation and 
control of all associated health risks.  However, as Hanes and Rossignol, 
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(1986) in citing NIOSH recommendations for improving engineering practice, 
education and research, pointed out: 
“A great deal of the OH&S engineering  control 
work, if not most of it, is performed by engineers 
with an inadequate understanding of safety and 
health matters or by industrial hygienists lacking a 
formal engineering education.” 
 
The social responsibility of engineers as key decision-makers was recognised 
within the broader community and Butler, (1984) commenting on engineering 
education in the  Newcastle Herald stated that: 
“Student engineers undertook a course where the only subjects 
taught were the problems and solutions of engineering projects.  
Engineers were not taught to think of people; their minds were 
occupied solely with construction.  Yet, since engineers exerted 
more permanent influence on the course of society than any other 
group, even politicians, it was essential that they should be given 
a grounding in ethics so that they would think through the total 
effects of projects.” 
 
Stamm(1987) as President of the Institution of Engineers, Australia 
emphatically stated, 
“The aim of the engineering profession must be to decrease inherent 
risk through more considered design of the risk features of products, 
projects and the environment.” 
 
The workplaces, facilities, equipment, processes and environment of modern 
society are conceived, designed, approved or commissioned by engineers.   
Engineers play a key role in the design and operation of safe and healthy 
workplaces, processes and equipment.  In recognition of this in 1988 the Code 
of Ethics of the Institution of Engineers, Australia emphasised:  
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“The responsibility of engineers for the safety, health and welfare of the 
community which shall at all times come before their responsibilities to 
the profession, to sectional or private interests, or to other engineers.”  
(Institution of Engineers, Australia, p.1, 1988) 
 
A subordinate document to their Code of Ethics, the Institution’s ‘Policy on 
Occupational Health and Safety’ (Institution of Engineers, Australia, 1990) 
explained these responsibilities in more detail and were reproduced in the 
Resource for Engineering Education published by NOSHC and endorsed by 
Institution of Engineers.  Education of engineers is of course, essential to 
enable responsibilities to be met and the Institution’s policy stated that formal 
occupational health and safety studies should be included in both 
undergraduate and postgraduate courses. 
 
In the United States the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH, 1984) supported the belief that the talent and ability of the 
engineering profession should be applied to reduce accident problems, in 1980 
launching Project SHAPE (Safety and Health Awareness for Preventative 
Engineering).  The project aimed to encourage engineering educators to focus 
on OH&S.  It recommended that all engineering curricula should include a 
required course that instructs students on the responsibility of engineers and 
creates an awareness of occupational health and safety engineering problems 
and solutions. 
 
In conjunction with the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology 
(ABET), Talty, (1986) reported that NIOSH undertook a survey of institutes 
teaching engineering to assess the current level of occupational health and 
safety input.  It was found that many accredited engineering courses made no 
claim to cover OH&S thus eliminating their understanding of hierarchy of 
control.  Robust programmes arose only when the Department Head or 
Curriculum Development Committee Members initiated them. 
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In Australia continued support from engineering associations continued in 1990 
when NOHSC produced the guidelines ‘Occupational Health and Safety for 
Engineers - A Resource for Engineering Education’ (NOHSC, 1990).  This 
resource supported the teaching of OHS in programs across Australia by 
educators and increased the awareness of the place of OHS as an essential 
element of graduate training.  The materials in this teaching resource contained 
introductions to occupational health and safety, an overview of case study 
teaching and a collection of case studies to assist integration of occupational 
health and safety into courses. The materials also provide flexibility for 
presenting in a variety of ways.  The resource was endorsed by The Institution 
of Engineers, Australia, the Association of Professional Engineers, Australia 
(APEA) and the Association of Consulting Engineers, Australia (ACEA). 
 
The responsibilities of engineers and their need for effective education and 
training, especially at undergraduate level were widely recognised.  Hanes and 
Rossignol, (1986) hypothesised that engineers are more likely to think of safety 
at the critical time if educational exposure is associated with basic engineering 
subject matter that is used in later practice.  However, a survey undertaken by 
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Education and Training 
Committee (1989) revealed a vast range of levels of OH&S education at 
undergraduate level.  This survey indicated that inputs to undergraduate 
courses ranged from compulsory one-year units covering OH&S principles and 
practice, through the provision of one or two semester electives and ad hoc 
input to various course units, to virtually no coverage whatsoever.  Appendix 
Three provides insight into the growing availability of occupational health and 
safety education in courses and electives in Australian Universities over a six-
year period (1989-1995).   
 
Engineers have been given prominence because their tasks as key decision-
makers bring about a profound and lasting change in society.  Engineers were 
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specifically targeted because of the key role they play in design and operation 
of the workplaces, processes and equipment used in today’s society.  An 
example of this key role was identified by Sweet (1994) in his discussion of the 
1988 engineering discipline review.  This review commented on Australian 
engineering schools’ relative lack of interest in the human side of technology - 
in the motivation of the workforce, their mental skills, and ways in which these 
are brought together into productive systems - and on the negative impact that 
this had upon rates of technological change and innovation.  Sweet concluded 
that a combination of technicians had not been taught to be innovative and 
engineers also fail to understand and respect the skills of those they work with.   
 
Such discrepancies are not an effective recipe for the development of a 
productive workplace culture.  Engineers’ responsibilities are therefore 
substantial and legal liability often rests with them in event of a failure. 
 
This thesis therefore studies the extent to which engineering students, more 
than a decade after the introduction of demanding OHS legislation in Australia,  
were being equipped with the knowledge and skills to fulfil their professional, 
legal and moral responsibilities in relation to occupational health and safety.  
 
 
 11
1.3 Hypothesis 
 
To examine the ability of occupational health and safety education to affect key 
decision-making and problem solving competence the thesis tests the 
hypothesis: 
“Engineers were not being equipped with the occupational 
health and safety knowledge and skills to fulfil their 
professional, legal and moral responsibilities more than a 
decade after the introduction of OHS legislation.” 
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Chapter Two 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.0 Overview of the Study: 
 
This research has been directed at identifying the need for occupational health 
and safety education into secondary, post-secondary and tertiary curricula.  So 
that students in all disciplines will consider engineering design strategies in 
their work environment rather than behavioural controls which will contribute 
significantly to the health and well-being of society.  To examine the ability of 
occupational health and safety education to affect decision-making and 
problem solving competence of non-specialists it was paramount to discuss the 
hypothesis: 
“Engineers are not being equipped with the occupational health 
and safety knowledge and skills to fulfil their professional, legal 
and moral responsibilities.” 
 
A definition of ‘non-specialists’ is students who have undertaken a discipline 
or trade qualification who are not studying specialist occupational health and 
safety education.  As identified in Chapter one and four that the occupation 
group of engineers have an influence on the design of the workplace.  This 
influence is later repeated in a small part within this chapter to emphasise that 
control. 
 
In recent years considerable progress has been in establishing the appropriate 
environment for improving occupational health and safety in the workplace. 
Business, unions and government have all participated together in creating this 
environment.  The common goal has been to make all workplaces safe and 
healthy.  This involves the systematic identification, assessment and control of 
occupational hazards that currently exist in the workplace and ensuring that 
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best practices are implemented during the establishment of new workplaces or 
new activities. 
Clearly the most cost-effective time to improve health and safety is during the 
planning, design and purchase stages of new business ventures, when extensive 
changes are being made to existing plant, processes and equipment, or when 
new people, including managers and engineers are employed or new 
contractors engaged.  If we do not take the opportunity to ‘turn off the tap’ our 
workplaces will continue to fill with hazards that will have to be tackled 
retrospectively and expensively. 
 
2.1 Principles that underpin the management of OHS: 
 
Consistent principles for tackling health and safety have evolved in Australia 
that are consistent with our culture. In a review of practices throughout 
Australia in 1991, Else, (1992) found considerable agreement throughout the 
states and between business and unions about the principles that should 
underpin our attempts to improve health and safety within Australia.  These can 
be broadly summarised in Table 2.0. 
 
Prevention • Identification, assessment and control 
• Hierarchy of preferred control options 
Consultation • Consultation at the design, planning and purchase stages 
• Consultative problem solving for tackling existing hazards 
Integration • Integration of OHS into management systems 
• Questioning and auditing of robustness of systems 
  
Table 2.0: Consistent Principles for Tackling Occupational Health and 
Safety (Else, 1992) 
 
Prevention principles now underpin the approaches taken by most occupational 
health and safety regulatory authorities in Australia. The hierarchy places 
greater value on controls, which rely on removing or controlling hazards at 
source rather than those that rely on behaviour modification of the people 
exposed to the hazards.  Although the hierarchy of preferred control options is 
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not specifically referred to in any Australian legislation the hierarchy of 
controls is a consistent framework embodies in codes of practice and guidance 
documents provided to clarify the requirements in respect of specific hazards.  
The National OHS Commission set up in 1985 moved quickly to develop a 
National Training and Education Strategy, which was published in 1987. The 
principles underlying the national strategy were: 
• contribute to ensuring that all people whose decisions and 
actions affect the Australian workplace are equipped with 
appropriate knowledge and expertise in occupational health and 
safety. 
• to co-ordinate national development of high-quality, cost-
effective training and education programs in occupational health 
and safety which meet the needs of the workplace and the 
community.” 
 
More specific objectives were derived from the above and more pertinent to 
this research was the objective: 
“To promote the provision of high quality, cost-effective, 
integrated occupational health and safety training and education 
programmes.” 
 
Within target groups identified in the strategy the first two groups were: 
• Those who make organisational, financial and managerial decisions  
• Those who make technical and design decisions. 
 
2.2 The importance of safe design: 
 
Engineers play a key role in the design and operation of safe and healthy 
workplaces, processes and equipment.  In recognition of this key role the Code 
of Ethics of the Institution of Engineers, Australia emphasises:  
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‘The responsibility of engineers for the safety, health and welfare 
of the community shall at all times come before their 
responsibilities to the profession, to sectional or private interests, 
or to other engineers.’ 
A secondary document to the Code of Ethics, the Institution’s ‘Policy on 
Occupational Health and Safety’ (1981) explains these responsibilities in more 
detail.  Education of engineers is of course, essential to enable responsibilities 
to be met and the Institution’s policy states that formal occupational health and 
safety studies should be included in both undergraduate and postgraduate 
courses. 
 
Engineers have unmistakable opportunities to decrease or eliminated accidents 
through application of user-friendly designs, that is designs that will contribute 
to safe work place practices rather than opportunities to harm the worker.  
Kletz, (1990) observed,  
“Designers have a second chance, opportunities to go over their designs 
again, but not the operators…Plants therefore should be designed, 
whenever possible, so that they are user-friendly…so that they can 
tolerate departures from ideal performance from operators.” 
 
Hale, (1990) when investigating the possibilities and limitations in behavioural 
safety strategies stated, 
“…behavioural rules cannot be used to patch over bad design 
decisions.” 
 
Such examination is supported by Terry, (1991) who noted, 
“Nearly all accidents are caused by some event or physical phenomenon 
that was entirely predictable at the design stage…However, all too often 
the reason is ‘we didn’t think of it’.” 
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The responsibilities of engineers and their need for effective education and 
training, especially at undergraduate level, are widely recognised.  Hanes and 
Rossignol (1986) whilst studying American engineering programme 
development hypothesised that engineers are more likely to think of safety at 
the critical time if educational exposure is associated with basic engineering 
subject matter that is used in later practice.  However, a survey undertaken by 
Worksafe Australia Education and Training Committee (1989) revealed a 
diverse range of levels of OH&S education at undergraduate level.  The survey 
indicated that inputs to undergraduate courses ranged from compulsory one-
year units covering OH&S principles and practice, through the provision of one 
or two semester electives and ad hoc input to various course units, to virtually 
no coverage whatsoever.  
 
Appendix Three illustrates data collected during this study to summarises the 
growth of occupational health and safety educational courses and electives over 
a six-year period (1989-1995).   
 
Engineers were specifically targeted because of the key role they play in the 
design and operation of the workplaces, processes and equipment used in 
today’s society. Cowley & Murray, (1991) identified that engineer’s 
responsibilities are substantial and legal liability often rests with them in the 
event of a failure.  Accordingly engineers are central to the creation and control 
of all associated health risks.  Hanes & Rossignol, (1986) in citing American 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
recommendations for improving engineering practice, education and research, 
also pointed out: 
“A great deal of the OH&S engineering control work, if not most 
of it, is performed by engineers with an inadequate 
understanding of safety and health matters or by industrial 
hygienists lacking a formal engineering education.” 
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Consequently engineers are targeted as a priority: 
• because of the impact of poor engineering design on the community, and 
• because many engineers adopt a management role within a few years of 
graduation. 
 
Stamm, (1987) as President of the Institution of Engineers, Australia 
emphatically stated, 
“The aim of the engineering profession must be to decrease inherent 
risk through more considered design of the risk features of products, 
projects and the environment.” 
 
By the late 1980’s the engineering profession was clearly articulating the 
important role and requirements of occupational health and safety legislation 
and had underpinned their requirements in the code of ethics.  The code of 
ethics clearly indicates that there is a willingness to act, however, the capacity 
to act is dependent on engineers’ vulnerability and perception of their 
responsibilities.  If they do not know their legislative safety responsibilities it 
may hinder the vital role they can play in controlling risks. 
 
Bryan, (1999) when researching engineer’s education recognised that safety 
awareness is an ongoing activity that starts during the formal educational 
process.  Engineers must recognize these realities during all phases of 
engineering design and work management.  People do not always follow 
instructions; any job that can be done wrong will eventually be done wrong by 
someone, sometime.  People often imagine themselves immune to accidents or 
think that accidents happen only to other people.  Designers cannot presume 
that people will use common sense.  Starting with formal engineering education 
and continuing through lifelong learning, safety analysis, safety awareness and 
risk control must be built into the engineering thought process. 
 
Bryan reports that Winston Churchill said,  
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“Nothing is so exhilarating as being shot at—and missed.”  
 
That logic does not fit today’s work environment; nor does it describe the 
philosophy of most workers.  Bryan, (1999) continues while on the job, most 
workers do not want to play Russian roulette with their eyes, fingers or lives.  
The elimination of hazards in and around the workplace should always begin 
with engineering design.  It is Bryan’s view that safety and health issues must 
be brought into the engineering classroom. 
 
2.3 What is the perception of safety knowledge and the key occupational 
health and safety knowledge and skills that engineers need to demonstrate 
in order to fulfil their legal and moral responsibilities?  
 
Smith, McCoy, & Layton, (1997) in the study of design systems and problem 
solving discussed the inability of designers to consider all scenarios which 
could arise during the use of systems and they express concern that part of the 
problem is,  
"…a deliberate decision by the designer to use an oversimplified model 
of the decision task (due to cost, time or technological limitations), a 
failure of the designer to correctly anticipate the behaviour of the system 
in certain situations, or a failure to correctly implement the intended 
design" 
Toft, Howard & Jorgensen (2003) in their study on engineering practice and 
safe design reported engineers have a duty of care to end users of the systems 
they design under current statutes and at common law. Considerations such as 
cognitive compatibility and usability of equipment and system design are 
becoming issues of increasing importance, as society becomes more reliant on 
information technology and automation. That engineers contribute to human 
error in these systems through latent design error and poor management 
decision-making is well documented. Therefore, the role of engineers can be 
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considered integral to positive outcomes in workplace safety.   Their research 
identifies why engineering design work may be contributing to human error on 
part of the operator, and offered hope toward a future when engineers will 
embrace safe design principles.  Their cross sectional study examines the 
relationship between professional engineering education and ergonomics. This 
research specifically addresses the attitudes of engineers to the inclusion of 
ergonomic principles in engineering practice and in undergraduate engineering 
curriculum. 
The previous rationale for selection of engineers identified that engineers 
require occupational health and safety knowledge and skills.  The Institution of 
Engineers Australia has identified that the primary aim of the engineering 
profession must be to decrease inherent risk through considered design of 
products, projects and the environment.  Therefore, it is important that 
engineers: 
Accept that engineers who design systems have a high legal and moral 
responsibility in relation to occupational health and safety. 
 
Control of a safe workplace is an all-pervading requirement under Common 
and Statute Law, and in effect, what society values.  Therefore, it is important 
that engineers: 
Recognise that management have specific legal occupational health and 
safety obligations. 
 
The OHS legislation, regulations, codes of practice and guidance documents 
throughout Australia, irrespective of the hazard type, adopt a hierarchy of 
control as a framework for encouraging preventive efforts to be directed as 
close to the source or origin of the hazard as can be practically achieved. 
Therefore, it is important that engineers:  
Recognise and utilise the hierarchy of control. 
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Australian Federal and State occupational health and safety legislation place 
responsibilities on manufacturers, importers and suppliers of equipment to 
ensure that the equipment is safe and healthy when properly used. It is 
therefore, important that engineers:  
Recognise that manufactures have a responsibility to incorporate safety 
controls. 
 
In Australian Common Law the interpretation of who is responsible is shown in  
past case law where it demonstrated the victim cannot be blamed beyond their 
level of control.  Contributory negligence is measured but the excuse of 
delegation is unacceptable. Therefore, engineers should:  
Not apply blame to victims beyond the level of their control. 
 
2.4 Case Studies as a methodology for allowing engineers to 
demonstrate their occupational health and safety knowledge and skills: 
 
The Victorian Post-Secondary Education Committee (VPSEC) established a 
Working Party on 22 November 1984 to investigate the introduction of 
occupational health and safety courses within education.  One of the terms of 
reference was: 
“To advise the Commission on a comprehensive policy on 
occupational health and safety education, in particular to advise 
on the means which post-secondary educational institutions can 
meet the needs of the community in the light of government 
policy.”  
 
The Victorian Working Party recommended development of case study 
materials as it was considered an effective method of inter-disciplinary 
education.  MacLennan, (1974); Gerhardsson, (1980); Yorke, (1981); Cowley, 
(1986); Brown and Atkins (1991) and Bryan, (1999) expressed the merits of 
case studies: 
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• They build up and revive motivation and help students to see 
meaning and purpose in studies which may otherwise appear 
mainly theoretical. 
• They help to integrate and assimilate information before it is 
forgotten, and prepare it for use in the real world. 
• They help foster investigatory skills and the developments of 
insight, both of which may otherwise be acquired only in the 
types of situations were case studies depict. 
• By placing students in the position of people confronted with 
live problems, uncertainty and sometimes risk, they show how it 
is possible to learn from a situation more than can be learned 
from a lecture. 
 
The procedure for this study therefore attempted to utilise case studies 
depicting accidents of differing causes and severity in order to explore the five 
major areas of OHS knowledge outlined in Section 2.3.  The case studies 
would be chosen to identify respondents’ OHS decision-making and problem 
solving capability. 
 
2.5  Selection of specific case studies: 
 
An obvious corollary for the use of case studies for the education of engineers 
is the use of them to surface the thinking that underpins their decision-making 
and to provide an opportunity for the engineers to not only demonstrate their 
occupational health and safety knowledge and skills but a perception of their 
responsibilities. 
 
Cowley, (1986) had employed case studies drawn from pertinent 
incidents/accidents to explore knowledge and problem solving skills of elected 
occupational health and safety representatives. Cowley maintained these case 
studies would enable respondents to visualise a situation and respond, as they 
believe they would in similar ‘real life’ circumstances. The case studies were 
derived from particular incident/accidents and abridged to preserve anonymity 
of victims.  The evaluative tool for this research was based on the same case 
studies.   
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The wide range of case studies were explored to see which would provide the 
best opportunity to surface perceptions, knowledge and skills in the five key 
areas:  
• The responsibility that engineers who design systems have a legal and 
moral responsibility in relation to occupational health and safety. 
• Recognise that management have specific legal occupational health and 
safety obligations.  
• Recognise and utilise the hierarchy of control.  
• Recognise that manufactures have a responsibility to incorporate safety 
controls. 
• Not to apply blame to victims beyond the level of their control. 
 
 
The following five case studies were chosen for their ability to provide 
scenarios that would allow the key occupational health and safety knowledge 
and skills and their perceptions of safety responsibility to be demonstrated.  
There are multiple international, Australian and State legislative, codes of 
practices, regulations and standards that encompass the control of airborne 
contaminants, the responsibilities of workplace supervision, refusal to wear 
personal protective equipment and machine guarding.  All of which are 
influential  in the following case studies. 
 
2.5.1 The Darkroom Case Study: 
 
SMITH a photographer was developing negative film in a small darkroom.  
The process required the film to be placed in a mixture of potassium cyanide, 
iodine solution and water.  SMITH had to decant the potassium cyanide 
powder from a forty-litre container into a glass bottle.  This is a dangerous 
procedure as dusts from solid compound can be readily absorbed through the 
skin and also inhaled.  Death can occur.  A ducted air conditioning vent was 
provided and SMITH had been provided with a respirator and protective 
gloves, but had stopped using them several months before because they were 
‘hot, sweaty and uncomfortable.’  SMITH became confused and collapsed.  
Later transferred to the intensive care ward, SMITH was only resuscitated by 
electric shock as the heart had stopped.  SMITH later remembered, “I got 
giddy, but it didn't bother me as it happens two or three times a week.” 
 
In this case study the respondent is asked to identify who is responsible for 
SMITH’s collapse, and whether SMITH should be disciplined for working 
incorrectly? 
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2.5.2 The Power Press Case Study: 
 
BROWN was a power press operator of a 400 tonnes power press.  The press 
was designed that it was guarded to ensure safe working practices.  Only when 
the machine guard was down could a foot treadle activate the press.  Should the 
machine guard be raised during the press operation, the die would immediately 
return to the raised position and stop.  BROWN’S hand was crushed severely 
during an operation of the press.  On inspection it was discovered that the press 
could operate with the machine guard up by BROWN as the safety micro 
switch had been tampered with and jammed in the active mode. 
 
In this case study the respondent is asked: to identify who is responsible for 
BROWN’s injuries; what measures could have been undertaken to prevent the 
accident reoccurring; should BROWN be disciplined for working incorrectly; 
and was the manufacturer or inspectorate responsible? 
 
 
2.5.3 The Woodworking Machine Case Study: 
 
BLACK was a toolmaker employed in a large foundry. BLACK was making 
repairs after-hours to the family caravan using the company’s circular saw.  
The guard on the saw was too low so BLACK adjusted it out of the way.  
When pushing a piece of timber through the saw BLACK could not locate the 
pushing blocks so BLACK used his hand.  The hand was severely lacerated. 
 
In this case study the respondent is asked to identify who is responsible for 
BLACK’s injuries; what measures could have been undertaken to prevent the 
accident reoccurring; should BLACK be disciplined for working incorrectly; 
and was the manufacturer or inspectorate responsible? 
 
 
2.5.4 The Bakery Case Study: 
 
GREEN was a baker who was filling a sifter with maize for a dough-dividing 
machine, which would divide bread dough into pre-determined shapes and 
sizes.  The conveyer, which housed a spinning drive shaft, had some dough 
flicked onto it.  The machine-guarding had been removed by the bakery 
maintenance staff two days earlier and it had not been replaced.  On reaching in 
to recover the dough, GREEN’S overalls became entangled on a spinning 
hexagonal nut and the drive shaft removed GREEN’S arm. 
 
In this case study the respondent is asked to identify who is responsible for 
GREEN’s injuries; what measures could have been undertaken to prevent the 
accident reoccurring; should GREEN be disciplined for working incorrectly; 
and was the manufacturer, inspectorate or the maintenance crew responsible? 
 
 
The following table highlights how the concepts of each case study are related 
to the key areas of occupational health and safety knowledge, skill and 
perceptions. 
 
 24
 
 
What do the case studies attempt to explore? 
 Darkroom Power press Woodworking Bakery 
Accept that engineers who 
design systems have a high 
legal and moral 
responsibility in relation to 
occupational health and 
safety 
Inadequate 
Ventilation 
design 
Obligation to 
design failsafe 
machine 
Machine had 
capacity to 
operate without 
machine guard 
Machine had 
capacity to 
operate without 
machine guard 
Recognise that management 
have specific legal 
occupational health and 
safety obligations. 
Inadequate 
supervision 
Inappropriate 
work practices 
Inadequate 
supervision 
 
No pushing 
blocks 
Inadequate 
supervision 
Recognise that manufactures 
have a responsibility to 
incorporate safety controls. 
 
 Press could be 
operated without 
cut offs 
Guard on saw 
removed to 
increase capacity 
of saw 
Mixer could be 
operated 
without guard 
Not to apply blame to 
victims beyond the level of 
their control. 
 
Refusing to wear 
PPE/failure to 
heed prior 
warnings 
Complicity in 
sabotaging 
failsafe system 
Rejected use of 
pushing block.  
Victim should not 
have been there 
Predictable that 
operator would 
reach in 
 
Table 2.1 Key Areas of Knowledge, Skill and Perceptions Explored by the First Four Case Studies. 
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2.5.5 The Fruit Puree Explosion Case Study: 
 
WHITE was working on a fruit-blanching machine which heats and pulps, or 
purees, the fruit.  At the time of the accident the machine was being cleaned to 
remove burnt fruit.  This was done by filling the machine with water approx 
950 litres and approx 60 kilos of caustic soda flakes.  After the process had 
been heating for 90 minutes the substance exploded and severely burnt WHITE 
and ten workers.  It was discovered that the caustic soda had been delivered ten 
years ago and approx 25% of it was solid, therefore, unable to have been 
distributed and dissolved throughout the water.  The uneven reaction, and 
uncontrolled temperature led to the violent explosion. 
 
In this case study the respondent is asked to Rank the following 1-9 according 
to your preferred option; Change the cleaning process? Use a different 
chemical?    Have the mixture mechanically mixed?  Use a fail safe 
temperature gauge?    Employ a supervisor to ensure safe workpractices?  Train 
WHITE to test the caustic mix?     Signpost the danger area in different 
languages?   Issue protective clothing/equipment?     Implement training to 
prevent this? 
 
This the final fifth case study, ‘the fruit puree explosion’, was used to explore 
the respondent’s perception of the control hierarchy and to explore the 
preferred order in which they would select alternative controls. 
         
 
2.6 Target groups:  
 
The instrument assessed engineering groups at three levels.  The first group 
were engineering students in their first year tertiary academic education before:  
• they had attained professional realisation of the need for 
occupational safety within their proposed discipline;   
• they had understood the dictates of their professional 
association; and before 
• they were exposed to views of academic engineers that may not 
have been exposed to the current industrial needs of OH&S. 
 
It might be considered that the occupational health and safety knowledge of 
first year engineering students would be lower in the survey than final year 
students or graduate engineers.  However, first year engineering students were 
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selected as possibly having more exposure to the emerging nature of 
occupational health and safety by their secondary or post-secondary education. 
 
The second group of engineer students was before graduation after three or 
more years of academic exposure to solving scientific and technical problems.  
This group were the recipients of an innovative interweaving of occupational 
health and safety with the encouragement of enthusiastic senior academics and 
exposure to six one and a half hour lectures from an OH&S practitioner 
orientated towards occupational health and safety legislative responsibilities.  
In addition, emphasis was placed that the engineer’s responsibility could be 
substantial and legal liability often rests with them in the event of a failure and 
the financial consequences of that liability.  Both these groups were studying at 
the same university with an established history of the discipline of engineering.  
The senior staff had international reputations and the head of department had 
been awarded multiple national honours for lecturing. 
 
The third group were graduate engineers.  Experienced in all disciplines of 
engineering who after utilising their academic engineering skills in the 
workplace and experiencing the practical aspect of employing those skills and 
knowledge would have been exposed to the framework of OH&S legislation 
and State and Federal building regulations and codes of practice. 
 
A fourth group was introduced to test responses of OH&S practitioners.  A 
group of final year Graduate Diploma Occupational Hazard Management 
students was selected so a comparison could be ascertained with students who 
had been exposed to theories of occupational health and safety education.  One 
prerequisite of course selection was at least three years previous safety 
management experience.  These students’ educational exposure was over a 
two-year period they attended four three week on-campus periods and all 
students spent non-study time completing assignments and a dissertation.   
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Finally a fifth group, final year engineering students, who had been exposed to 
specialised occupational health and safety education within their curriculum by 
selecting electives from the School of Safety.  The School undertakes research 
and provides programs in areas related to Occupational and Health Safety, 
Ergonomics, and Environmental studies.  The University, also well established, 
had eight full time academic staff who were specialists in Safety Engineering, 
Occupational Health and Safety, Chemical Safety and Toxicology, 
Ergonomics, Human Behaviour, Risk Management and Occupational Health 
and Safety Law.  This group was chosen on the presumption that if specialised 
safety education could not influence this group, then immediate interpretation 
would have to be undertaken.   
 
Distribution of the evaluative tool was undertaken over a three-year period with 
the occupational health and safety post-graduates students. Capturing responses 
in the final year of their studies.  First year engineering student respondents 
were captured within their first week of university orientation.  Fourth year 
engineering students responded in the middle of their final year before their 
examinations.  Fourth year engineering students that had received specialised 
occupational health and safety education within their curriculum responded in 
the first semester of their final year.   
 
2.7 Construction of the evaluative tool: 
 
Consistent data-collection techniques and the factor of all respondents being 
from a similar profession, enabled the study to overcome many of the 
methodological difficulties outlined by Kahn, (1964) and Earl, (1985).  
 
While the use of evaluative tools has been criticised by some writers, Gay, 
(1990) sees that they have definite advantages over other methods of collecting 
data in studies of this nature that are not available from other sources.  
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Educational evaluators such as Patton, (1978) state that methodological rigour 
did not guarantee clarity.  He argued that,  
“The epitome of the evaluation challenge is the finding of feasible 
solutions to enormously complex areas of education research.” 
 
The questions were designed without complex technical evaluation terms and 
exclusive terminology because research by Patton, (1982) identified that simple 
clear and practical questions delivered more impressive results.  This practice 
supported Mitchell’s, (1979) findings that clarity resulted from careful 
deliberation of the structure of the questions.  The length of questions was 
deliberately kept short to solicit more information on the respondent’s 
perceptions and knowledge and have a forced definite response, although 
Dillman, (1978) argues that lengthy questionnaire methods can achieve high 
response rates.  
 
To support this research an evaluative tool was developed to seek responses 
from engineers and test the differences between those responses from student 
and graduate engineers to ascertain whether they employ the philosophies of 
occupational health and safety students to solving problems.  Especially those 
philosophies which set engineering and environmental controls above 
behavioural controls in the workplace.  Such responses could identify and 
allow insight, which could lead to better understanding to mirror the need of 
students with that of the occupational health and safety community.  As a 
comparison: two consecutive final year post-graduate occupational health and 
safety course student intakes were surveyed; plus a final fourth year engineer 
student intake who had been exposed to a specialised occupational health and 
safety content within their curriculum. 
 
To achieve the characteristics of brevity, clarity and attractiveness the questions 
were restricted to a single concept.  Every effort was made to avoid questions 
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that were likely to offend respondents and that could have prevented from 
offering honest responses.  The initial evaluative tool was subject to scrutiny by 
fellow occupational health and safety professionals, statisticians and 
experienced lecturers and modified on the basis of their comments on clarity 
and purpose.  The feed back from pre-testing enabled a review of the evaluative 
tool.  It was then trialled with a group of twenty-eight post-graduate 
occupational health and safety students and minor changes were made by 
academic mentors to instructions to clarify scoring and to avoid any possibility 
of ambiguity.  Respondents were able to complete their evaluation within 
fifteen minutes.  The evaluative tool was composed around the five case studies 
that had been previously used by Cowley, (1986) and questions were developed 
to identify key areas of respondents’ knowledge, skill and perceptions and is 
reproduced in Appendix One.   
 
2.8 Administration of the evaluative tool: 
 
The three relevant Heads of Department of Engineering or Safety Science of 
each university involved gave approval for the study. 483 respondents 
participating in the study were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality of 
results obtained.  The postal survey which was sent to five hundred and twenty-
five graduate engineers, was given a four week time limit for responses and a 
high rate of return was attempted by provision of pre-stamped and addressed 
envelopes for the return of responses. With exception of those requesting 
results, the returns did not indicate who had replied. No follow-up procedures 
were necessary following expiry of the four-week period. 
 
The study was given approval by each Head of Department at each of the 
universities and authorised by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Ballarat.  The high rate of responses from engineering students 
and post-graduate occupational health and safety students may be that they 
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were a captive audience at the commencement of a lecturing sessions in 1993.  
Their participation was guaranteed anonymity.  The respondents were also 
assured that results of the study, once completed, would be published. 
 
Respondents from the five hundred and twenty-five postal surveys were given a 
four-week time limit in 1993 for responses and a rate of return of 13.3% was 
achieved. This was much lower than was achieved (70.0%) with the smaller 
postal survey in 1991-2 to the more distinct grouping of 4th year engineers who 
had taken an elective in health and safety.  Such a high rate of responses was 
supported by Cohen & Manion, (1980) who suggested that, 
“Frequently, the postal questionnaire is the best form of survey in 
carrying out an educational enquires.” 
 
With the exception of those asking for the results, the returns did not indicate 
who had replied so no follow-up procedures were initiated following the expiry 
of the four-week period. 
 
The distribution of evaluative tool to occupational health and safety 
postgraduate students was undertaken over a three-year period from 1991-3. 
Responses of first year engineering students were collected in their first week 
of university study in 1992.  Fourth year engineering students, who although 
had not received specialised occupational health and safety education but who 
had been exposed to a single unit containing basic safe place philosophy, 
responded in the middle of their final year in 1994.  Fourth year engineering 
students who received specialised occupational health and safety education 
within their courses responded in the first semester of their final year in 1994. 
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Group Distributed Replies % 
returned
Incomplete Total 
Analysed 
% 
Analysed
1st year 
Eng 
students 
300 
in class 
251 83.6% 27 224 74.7% 
4th year 
Eng 
students 
75 
in class 
73 97.3% 5 68 90.7% 
Graduate 
Engineers 
525 posted 109 20.7% 39 
17 returned 
address unknown 
70 13.3% 
OH&S 
students 
100 
in class 
91 91% 5 86 6% 
4th yr Eng 
students-
with OHS 
electives 
50 posted 37 74% 2 35 70.0% 
Total 1050 561 53% 96 483 46.0% 
 
Table 2.2  Return Rates from distributed questionnaire 
 
2.9 Analysis of data: 
 
Analysis of data from the case studies is described in Chapter Three.  Appendix 
Two provides an analysis of the general views of the engineering groups 
regarding the inclusion of health and safety in engineering education.  
 
2.10 Summary: 
 
 
The National OHS Commission developed a National Training and Education 
Strategy that desired contribution to ensure that all people whose decisions and 
actions affect the Australian workplace are equipped with appropriate 
knowledge and expertise in occupational health and safety.  In addition, to co-
ordinate national development of high-quality, cost-effective training and 
education programs in occupational health and safety which meet the needs of 
the workplace and the community. 
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To examine the ability of occupational health and safety programs to affect 
decision-making and problem solving it was necessary to examine responses to 
particular incident/accident case studies that would allow the respondent’s their 
own perception of safety responsibility and their occupational health and safety 
knowledge and skill to be demonstrated. 
 
The evaluative tool based around five case studies provided an opportunity to 
surface perceptions, knowledge and skills of student engineers and graduate 
engineers in the five key areas to establish whether they:  
 
• Accept that engineers who design systems have a high legal and moral 
responsibility in relation to occupational health and safety. 
• Recognise that management have specific legal occupational health and 
safety obligations.  
• Recognise and utilise the hierarchy of control.  
• Require that manufactures have a responsibility to incorporate safety 
controls. 
• Do not apply blame to victims beyond the level of their control. 
 
 
The following chapter investigates, by the instrument of an evaluative tool, 
how engineers in three stages of their development, specialist OH&S 
engineering students and OH&S professionals perceive the concept of 
occupational health and safety and how they attribute a degree of responsibility 
in a variety of accidents. 
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Chapter Three 
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES FROM EVALUATIVE TOOL 
 
3.0 Introduction: 
 
This survey of graduate and student engineer groups and post-graduate 
occupational health and safety students was exploratory and descriptive; the 
analysis of data has sought to discover the degree of responsibility that 
respondents attributed to each participant in the case studies.  A major aim of 
this thesis was to identify critical influences impeding the development of 
Australian occupational health and safety education.  The survey approach 
adopted provided a means of suggesting strategies to combat those negative 
influences.  Data obtained from a previous VIOHS case study questionnaire 
instigated by Cowley (1986) provided a range of demographic characteristics 
of the sample population.  Various statistical analyses of data were undertaken.  
These included analysis of variance tests, Chi-square analysis.  These enabled 
an understanding of the degree of responsibility attributed by a percentage of 
participants in the case studies. 
 
Several unsolicited telephone discussions with non-respondents indicated that 
work commitments, lack of time before cut off dates, and not lack of interest, 
was a reason for failing to complete the evaluative tool. 
 
The VIOSH evaluative tool identified many safety decision-making 
deficiencies in choosing a strategy to eliminate accidents. The number of 
deficiencies reported demonstrated respondents’ occupational health and safety 
management and problem solving incompetence.  The results were converted to 
graphs.  Each graph follows specific case study interpretation allowing for ease 
of reference.  Each case study was isolated to facilitate and clarify referencing.  
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Some questions were mirrored in each case study; others had a different 
regulatory or management authority to which responsibility was allocated. 
 
3.1 The Darkroom Case Study:  
 
The Darkroom case study involved a photographer who survived being 
asphyxiated by toxic fumes that were the result of poor work practices and 
inadequate ventilation design.  Evidence was presented that ‘giddiness had 
been experienced before but nothing was done.’  
 
A consistent response from engineers was that little or no blame should be 
attached to the engineer who designed the photography facility’s ventilation 
system. The first year student response, which is indicated in red, clearly 
indicates a lesser perception of responsibilities by respondents on the part of 
engineers in workplace design.  The fourth year student about to embark into 
society and the workforce has a different appreciation of the influence of 
engineers, however, to lesser degree it indicates an inability to comprehend the 
responsibility and accountability that engineers must possess.  Respondents 
were asked to rank (1, 2 or 3) the degrees of responsibility of various characters 
in the case studies.  A reply of 1 indicated most responsible, 3 the least 
responsible. The following diagrams pertain to individual case studies, 
however, interspersed are data from other case studies to facilitate comparison. 
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Figure 3.0   Degree of Responsibility Placed on
Engineer who Designed System in each Case Study
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Darkroom Case Study
Power Press Case Study
Woodworking Machine Case
Study
Bakery Case Study
Eng Stud with OHS Elective
Post Graduate OH&S Students
Graduate Engineers
4th Year Engineering Students
1st Year Engineering Students
 
It should be observed that the pattern of post-graduate OH&S student responses 
in all four case studies gives a lower ranking to the engineer’s responsibility, 
indicating they consider that engineers have greater responsibility than they 
themselves are willing to accept. 
 
The following histogram shows the percentage of people from each group who 
placed a high responsibility on the engineer in the Darkroom Case Study. 
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Figure 3.1 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed high 
responsibility on the Engineer in Darkroom Case Study 
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Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
 
Table 3.1 DARKROOM CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF ENGINEER’S 
RESPONSIBILITY  by  GROUP         
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 22 
9.85% 
22
32.4%
5
7.1%
56
65.1%
3 
8.6% 
108
22.4%
 2 22 
9.8% 
31
45.6%
13
18.6%
23
26.7%
7 
20.0% 
96
19.9%
Least 
Responsible 
3 180 
80.4% 
15
22.1%
52
74.3%
7
8.1%
25 
71.4% 
279
57.8%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 211.3; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).  
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Post-graduate occupational health and safety students placed a much higher 
responsibility on engineers than other student or engineer groups who 
presented an opposite view.  This is consistent with contemporary educational 
philosophies of occupational health and safety indicating that a degree of 
responsibility was directed towards a design engineering strategy of a ‘safe 
place’ rather than a behaviour change strategy of ‘safe person.’  
 
The following figure provides evidence, represented in graph form, enabling 
clarification of the degree of high, medium and low responsibility attributed to 
the employee by respondents across each case study.  A lower value response 
indicates the allocation of a greater degree of perceived responsibility. 
Figure 3.2   Degree of Responsibility Placed on
Employee in each Case Study
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Darkroom Case Study
Power Press Case Study
Woodworking Machine Case
Study
Bakery Case Study
Eng Stud with OHS Elective
Post Graduate OH&S Students
Graduate Engineers
4th Year Engineering Students
1st Year Engineering Students
 
 
Post-graduate students educated in occupational health and safety again appear 
to show marked differences from engineer and student engineer groups with 
respect to the amount of responsibility attributed to employees. 
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Figure 3.3 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed high 
responsibility on the Employee in Darkroom Case Study 
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Table 3.2 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
 
Table 3.2  DARKROOM CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF 
EMPLOYEE’S RESPONSIBILITY  by  GROUP 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 148 
66.1% 
22
32.4%
39
55.7%
2
2.3%
18 
51.4% 
229
47.4%
 2 57 
25.4% 
16
23.5%
22
34.1%
33
38.4%
11 
31.4% 
139
28.8%
Least 
Responsible 
3 19 
8.5% 
30
44.1%
9
12.9%
51
59.3%
6 
17.1% 
115
23.8%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
employee. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 145.7; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).  Attention must be drawn to 
the response of graduate engineers, indicated in blue; these were similar to 
responses of inexperienced first year students. 
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Engineers overwhelmingly stated that the photographic employee should be 
disciplined.  Concern must be given to that judgement to discipline the 
employee/victim.  The fact that this group considered disciplining a victim is 
consistent with the mentality of blaming an employee, which is a historical 
problem with occupational health and safety management.  (Glennon, 1982; 
Hale, 1984; Cowley & Murray, 1991).  
 
Respondents were asked to assess the degrees of responsibility of various 
characters in the case studies.  A ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer was required. 
Figure 3.4 Histogram Identifying Percentage of Respondents' 
Desire to Discipline Victim in each Case Study.
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Reflecting on the construction wording of all case study sheds little light on 
why the majority of engineer students and graduates respondents are inclined to 
discipline the employee/victim.  Table 3.3 below shows the distribution of 
responses between most responsible and least responsible for all groups. 
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Table 3.3  DARKROOM CASE STUDY ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING 
WHETHER EMPLOYEE SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED  BY  GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
177 
79.0% 
46
67.6%
66
94.3%
25
29.1%
30 
85.7% 
344
71.2%
No 
% 
47 
21.0% 
22
34.2%
4
5.7%
61
70.9%
5 
14.3% 
139
28.8%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups whether employee photographer should be 
disciplined. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 103.3; 
degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00001).  Twenty-nine percent of 
postgraduate occupational health and safety students considered the 
photographer should be disciplined.  Data would suggest that these students 
have acknowledged such a demanding profession would also demand a precise 
knowledge of the dangers of all hazardous substances and safe methods of 
eliminating them. 
 
The following figure provides evidence, represented in graph form, enabling 
clarification of the degree of high, medium and low responsibility attributed to 
management by respondents across each case study.  A lower value response 
indicates the allocation of a greater degree of perceived 
responsibility.
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Figure 3.5   Degree of Responsibility Placed on
Management in each Case Study
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Darkroom Case Study
Power Press Case Study
Woodworking Machine Case
Study
Bakery Case Study
Eng Stud with OHS Elective
Post Graduate OHS Students
Graduate Engineers
4th Year Engineering Students
1st Year Engineering Students
 
Figure 3.6 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed high 
responsibility on Management in Darkroom Case Study 
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Table 3.4 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
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Table 3.4  DARKROOM CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT’S 
RESPONSIBILITY  by  GROUP 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 53 
23.7% 
24
35.3%
26
37.1%
28
32.6%
14 
40.0% 
145
30.0%
 2 146 
65.2% 
21
30.9%
35
50.0%
30
34.9%
17 
48.6% 
249
51.6%
Least 
Responsible 
3 25 
11.2% 
23
33.8%
9
12.9%
28
32.6%
4 
11.4% 
89
18.4%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows variation over 
the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to management. Chi-
Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 51.2; degrees of freedom = 
8; probability = <.00001).  
 
3.4 Summary of Analysis of Darkroom Case Study: 
 
Responses from the initial Darkroom case study demonstrate that each various 
levels of engineering students and graduate engineers do not employ the 
philosophy that places engineering and environmental controls above 
behavioural controls.  In comparison with engineer student and graduate groups 
the responses of postgraduate occupational health and safety students do 
employ a philosophy that engineers should have accountability and 
responsibility for appropriate ventilation design. Therefore, results from this 
case study would imply that occupational health and safety post-graduate 
students are adopting the contemporary philosophy of ‘safe place’ solutions.  It 
would appear that such specialised education does influence decision-making 
and competence to solve safety problems. 
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The Darkroom case study revealed a significant contrast between responses of 
postgraduate occupational health and safety students and other graduate and 
student engineer groups; where postgraduate occupational health and safety 
students preferred a ‘safe place’ option rather than other groups that showed a 
strong preference for a ‘safe person’ option. 
 
3.5 The Power Press Case Study:  
 
In the Power Press Case Study an employee (the victim) has a hand crushed 
whilst operating a power press the safety mechanisms of which has been 
tampered with.  The same rationale is offered as previous case studies; had an 
engineering design been implemented to close power press operation in the 
occurrence of tampering, the accident would not have occurred.   
 
Three other variations were introduced: 
 
* the first being the emotive dread of envisioning a hand being crushed by 
 400 tonnes of power against the previous case study where an internal 
 organ (the heart) had ceased for a while, then restarted without the 
 dramatic visual damage of a crushed hand; 
* the second variation was the offering of the power press manufacturer as 
a scapegoat for blame; and,  
* thirdly, offering another avenue of blame to the government 
inspectorate. 
 
The power press case study responses indicated nearly a doubling of blame 
attached to the engineer.  It should be noted, however, approximately fifty 
percent of first year engineering students and graduate engineers stated that the 
engineer was still not responsible for the incident occurring. Graduate 
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engineers overwhelmingly were of an opinion that the employee was not 
responsible, yet, sixty percent of the same group wanted the victim disciplined. 
Sixty-six percent of postgraduate occupational health and safety students 
assumed the liability for the power press’s safety mechanisms to be able to be 
tampered with lay with engineering design.  Such a response has greater 
significance when many engineers take their technical skills into administrative 
or executive appointments and would be responsible for safety management.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on the Engineer in Power Press Case Study 
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Table 3.5 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
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Table 3.5 Identifying Responsibility placed on Engineer 
in Power Press Case Study 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 70 
31.3% 
32
47.1%
15
21.4%
57
66.3%
8 
22.9% 
182
37.7%
 2 46 
20.5% 
22
32.4%
16
22.9%
26
30.2%
8 
22.9% 
118
24.4%
Least 
Responsible 
3 108 
48.2% 
14
20.6%
39
55.7%
3
3.5%
19 
54.3% 
183
37.9%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 80.9; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).  
 
Figure 3.8 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed high 
responsibility on the Employee in each Case Study 
 
0 .0 0 %
1 0 .0 0 %
2 0 .0 0 %
3 0 .0 0 %
4 0 .0 0 %
5 0 .0 0 %
6 0 .0 0 %
7 0 .0 0 %
8 0 .0 0 %
P o w e r P re s s  C a s e  S tu d y W o o d w o rk in g  M a c h in e
C a s e  S tu d y
B a k e ry  A c c id e n t  C a s e
S tu d y
F irs t  Y e a r E n g in e e rin g  S tu d e n ts
F o u rth  Y e a r  E n g in e e r in g  S tu d e n ts
G ra d u a te  E n g in e e rs
P o s t  G ra d u a te  O H S  S tu d e n ts
E n g in e e rin g  S tu d e n ts  w ith  O H S
E le c t iv e
 
The above figure indicates a marked difference in perceptions of post-graduate 
occupational health and safety students as compared to those of engineer 
student and graduate groups.  Indeed, there appears to be congruence in 
perceptions of the other four groups.  Data strongly suggests those views of 
 
 46
post-graduate occupational health and safety students are opposite to those of 
other groups with respect to ‘safe place’ verses ‘safe person’ approaches.   
 
Figure3.9 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed high 
responsibility on the Employee in Power Press Case Study 
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It is probable that difference in the respondent’s perception implies that 
occupational health and safety post-graduate students are adopting the 
contemporary philosophy of ‘safe place’ solutions.  Table 3.6 below shows the 
distribution of responses between most responsible and least responsible for all 
groups. 
 
Table 3.6  POWER PRESS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE’S 
RESPONSIBILITY  by  GROUP 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 63 
28.1% 
14
20.6%
13
18.6%
2
2.3%
12 
34.3% 
104
21.5%
 2 81 
36.2% 
28
41.2%
47
67.1%
30
34.9%
14 
40.0% 
200
41.4%
Least 
Responsible 
3 80 
35.7% 
26
38.2%
10
14.3%
54
62.8%
9 
25.7% 
179
37.1%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
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Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
employee. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 62.3; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001). 
 
This study could not ascertain any retrospective rationale for an observation 
that the employee/victim should be disciplined, as the employee suffered an 
extensive limb crushing and now intent is for administrative or legislative 
discipline.  Table 3.7 below shows the distribution of responses between most 
responsible and least responsible for all groups. 
 
Table 3.7  POWER PRESS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING 
SHOULD EMPLOYEE BE DISCIPLINED  BY  GROUP 
           
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
88 
39.3% 
45
66.2%
45
64.3%
25
29.1%
28 
80.0% 
231
47.8%
No 
% 
136 
60.7% 
23
33.8%
25
35.7%
61
70.9%
7 
20.0% 
252
52.2%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility should the 
employee be disciplined. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x 
= 49.6; degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00001).  
 
Post-graduate occupational health and safety students attributed less 
responsibility to workers than any other student or graduate group.   This group 
also attributed greater responsibility to engineers who designed the workplace 
than any other student or graduate group in all case studies.  Post-graduate 
occupational health and safety students who placed a much higher 
responsibility on engineers than other groups presented a very different view.  
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This would be consistent with contemporary educational philosophies of 
occupational health and safety as suggested by Harms-Ringdahl, (1990); 
Cowley, & Murray, (1991), indicating that a degree of responsibility was 
directed towards a design engineering strategy rather than a ‘safe person’ 
response. 
Figure 3.10 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on Management in Power Press Case Study 
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Graduate engineers placed great emphasis on managements’ responsibility 
above their own legal obligations. Such a rebuttal has greater significance when 
many engineers take their technical skills into administrative or executive 
appointments.    
Table 3.8 POWER PRESS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT’S 
RESPONSIBILITY  by  GROUP 
 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 92 
41.1% 
21
30.9%
42
60.0%
27
34.1%
15 
42.9% 
197
40.8%
 2 96 
42.9% 
19
27.9%
7
10.0%
30
34.9%
13 
37.1% 
165
34.2%
Least 
Responsible 
3 36 
16.1% 
28
41.2%
21
30.0%
29
33.7%
7 
20.0% 
121
25.1%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
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Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
management. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 45.5; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001. 
 
Data concerning responsibility of the inspectorate suggests that between sixty 
and seventy percent of engineering students and engineer graduates blamed the 
government inspectorate, whereas only one percent of post-graduate 
occupational health and safety students stated that response. 
 
Figure 3.11  Histogram Identifying High Responsibility placed by 
Respondents on Government Inspectorate in each Case Study.
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
Power Press Case Study Woodworking Machine Case Study Bakery Case Study
1st Year Engineering Students
4th Year Engineering Students
Graduate Engineers
Post Graduate OHS Students
Eng Stud with OHS Elective
 
Data presents evidence that student and graduate engineers, irrespective of their 
knowledge base, education or experience, do not associate their control of the 
workplace an influence on the cause for accidents.  Various student and 
graduate engineer groups did not adopt a strategy of providing a safe workplace 
at the power press, whereas occupational health and safety students perceived 
that an engineering control procedure would eliminate or reduce workplace 
accidents.  Table 3.9 below shows the distribution of responses between most 
responsible and least responsible for all groups. 
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Table 3.9   POWER PRESS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF 
GOVERNMENT INSPECTORATE’S RESPONSIBILITY by GROUP 
                    
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
158 
70.5% 
42
61.8%
44
62.9%
1
1.2%
21 
60.0% 
266
55.1%
No 
% 
66 
29.5% 
26
38.2%
26
37.1%
85
98.8%
14 
40.0% 
217
44.9%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
The above analysis demonstrated a significant variation. Statistical analysis of 
data summarised on the above table shows significant variation over the five 
groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the government 
inspectorate. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 125.9; 
degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00001).   
 
Another group to blame introduced in the Power Press Case Study was on to 
the manufacturer of the power press machine. Australian Trade Practice 
legislation requires that manufacturers have legal obligations about the product 
they produce and distribute, and that product must be used safely in the 
workplace.   
Figure 3.12 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
responsibility on the Manufacturer in all Case Studies 
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All post-graduate occupational health and safety students placed responsibility 
on the manufacturer of the power press; whereas half the student and engineer 
graduates placed lessor responsibility on the manufacturer.  This is a disturbing 
finding given that engineers are the people responsible for design and 
manufacture of new equipment.  Engineers are often interpreted as the litigant 
should a fault in engineering design damages property, maims or causes death.  
Table 3.10 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
 
Table 3.10   POWER PRESS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF    
 MANUFACTURER’S  RESPONSIBILITY  by  GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
127 
56.7% 
21
30.9%
34
48.6%
86
100.0%
18 
51.4% 
286
59.2%
No 
% 
97 
43.3% 
47
69.1%
36
51.4%
17 
48.6% 
197
40.8%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
manufacturer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 86.5; 
degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00001.  
 
3.6 Summary of Analysis of Power Press Case Study: 
 
Responses from the power press case study indicate that specialised 
occupational health and safety education would appear to be influencing the 
attribution of responsibility by post-graduate occupational health and safety 
students.  It is hoped that this attitude would flow through their decision-
making and safety problem solving competence.   
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Whereas; each of the various levels of engineering students and graduate 
engineers do not employ the philosophy which places engineering and 
environmental controls above behavioural controls.  In comparison, responses 
of post-graduate occupational health and safety students do employ a 
philosophy that engineers should have accountability and responsibility for the 
lack of design engineering counter-measures. This is consistent with the 
contention that a ‘safe place’ solution is preferable to a ‘safe person’ solution 
to safety problems.  
  
3.7 The Woodworking Machine Case Study:  
 
This third case study typified previous case study examples to the extent that an 
employee was injured because adequate engineering design should have 
incapacitated the machine as a countermeasure if the saw guard was removed.  
A notable change was the victim was using company equipment after hours.  
Such a change affected the respondents’ apportionment of blame.   
 
Once again four other elements were introduced to influence the responses: 
* first being a mental image of a hand being mutilated by a spinning saw 
 blade; 
* the second influence was the offering of the woodworking machine  
 manufacturer as a scapegoat for blame;  
* thirdly offering another avenue of blame to the government inspectorate; 
 and finally, 
* Should the management prevent workers from using company machines 
 after hours? 
 
To commence analysis of the woodworking machine case study it is interesting 
to note that there was slight commonality in responses from all groups 
concerning agreement to cease after hour-work practices using company 
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equipment.  Almost twenty-seven percent more post-graduate occupational 
health and safety students saw that decision making as practical. In addition, 
commonality of responses from all groups was achieved in responses to 
discipline the employee.   
Figure 3.13 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on the Engineer in Woodworking Machine Case Study 
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Table 3.11 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
 
Table 3.11  Identifying Responsibility placed on Engineer 
in Woodworking Machine Case Study 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 32 
14.3% 
20
29.4%
7
10.0%
28
32.6%
2 
5.7% 
89
14.4%
 2 60 
26.8% 
25
36.8%
18
25.7%
21
24.1%
10 
28.6% 
134
27.7%
Least 
Responsible 
3 132 
58.9% 
23
33.8%
45
64.3%
37
43.0%
23 
65.7% 
260
53.8%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
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engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 34.4; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00003).  
 
Post-graduate occupational health and safety students attributed less 
responsibility to the workers than any other student or graduate group.   This 
group also attributed greater responsibility to engineers who designed the 
woodworking machine workplace than any other student or graduate group. 
This very different view presented by post-graduate occupational health and 
safety students who place a much higher responsibility on engineers than other 
groups. 
Figure 3.14 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on the Employee in Woodworking Machine Case Study 
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Table 3.12 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
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Table 3.12  WOODWORKING MACHINE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF 
EMPLOYEE’S RESPONSIBILITY by GROUP 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 162 
72.3% 
19
27.9%
56
80.0%
24
27.9%
23 
65.7% 
284
58.8%
 2 41 
18.3% 
17
25.0%
13
18.6%
33
38.4%
11 
34.1% 
115
23.8%
Least 
Responsible 
3 21 
9.4% 
32
47.1%
1
1.4%
29
33.7%
1 
2.9% 
84
17.4%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
employee. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 120.1; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).  Table 3.13 below shows the 
distribution of responses between those who agree or disagree. 
 
Table 3.13  WOODWORKING MACHINE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD EMPLOYEE BE DISCIPLINED BY GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
165 
73.7% 
40
58.8%
65
92.9%
49
57.0%
29 
82.9% 
348
72.0%
No 
% 
59 
26.3% 
28
41.2%
5
7.1%
37
43.0%
6 
17.1% 
135
28.0%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility should employee 
be disciplined. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x =32.9; 
degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00001).   
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Data identifies a significant change from post-graduate occupational health and 
safety students who in other case studies had removed disciplinary measures 
against the employee.  A rationale for this variance was there was an 
assumption of illegality about work being performed after hours.  However, 
most of that group did not apportion high responsibility to the employee for the 
accident.   
 
First and fourth year engineering students and graduate engineers allocated a 
low responsibility to management to resolve occupational health and safety 
issues.   Such a poor result could be expected when the outcome is compared to 
the following information that clearly identifies the majority of these 
respondents were ignorant of Australian occupational health and safety 
legislative demands.  Such a conclusion strengthens an appeal for specialised 
occupational health and safety education to be introduced into curricula.    
 
Figure 3.15 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on Management in Woodworking Machine Case Study 
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Table 3.14 below shows the distribution of responses between most responsible 
and least responsible for all groups. 
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Table 3.14  WOODWORKING MACHINE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF                
MANAGEMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY by GROUP 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 31 
13.8% 
29
42.6%
7
10.0%
34
39.5%
10 
28.6% 
111
23.0%
 2 123 
54.9% 
26
38.2%
39
55.7%
32
37.2%
14 
40.0% 
234
48.4%
Least 
Responsible 
3 70 
31.3% 
13
19.1%
24
34.3%
20
23.3%
11 
34.1% 
138
28.6%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
management. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 46.8; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).   All postgraduate 
occupational health and safety students exonerated the government inspectorate 
as being held responsible, however, approximately forty percent of the 
engineering groups allocated blame to the external regulatory authorities.  
Table 3.15 below shows the distribution of responses between those who agree 
or disagree. 
 
Table 3.15  WOODWORKING MACHINE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF 
GOVERNMENT INSPECTORATE’S RESPONSIBILITY by GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
79 
35.3% 
25
36.8%
28
40.0%
8 
22.9% 
140
29.0%
No 
% 
145 
64.7% 
43
63.2%
42
60.0%
86
100.0%
27 
77.1% 
343
71.0%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
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Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
government inspectorate. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x 
= 46.1; degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00001).  In regard to 
responses concerning responsibility of the inspectorate in the woodworking 
machine case study, over thirty-five percent of engineering students and 
engineer graduates blamed the government inspectorate, whereas none of post-
graduate occupational health and safety students stated that response.  Table 
3.16 below shows the distribution of responses between those who agree or 
disagree. 
 
Table 3.16  WOODWORKING MACHINE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF 
MANUFACTURER’S RESPONSIBILITY by GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
66 
29.5% 
29
42.6%
17
24.3%
49
57.0%
10 
28.6% 
171
35.4%
No 
% 
158 
70.5% 
39
57.4%
53
75.7%
37
43.0%
25 
71.4% 
312
64.6%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
manufacturer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 28.0; 
degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00047).  
 
Fourth year engineering students, who although had not received specialised 
occupational health and safety education but had been exposed to units 
containing basic ‘safe place’ philosophy, and post-graduate occupational health 
and safety students perceived the manufacturer’s responsibility as higher.   
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Such a consideration might be understandable as those groups had been 
exposed to specialised occupational health and safety education that enforces 
the principles that had safe management work practices (for example, secure 
close down procedures etc.) been in place the employee could not have 
operated equipment after hours.  Table 3.17 below shows the distribution of 
responses between those who agree or disagree. 
 
Table 3.17 WOODWORKING MACHINE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF  
UNAUTHORISED WORK by GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
79 
35.3% 
29
42.6%
29
41.45
61
70.9%
21 
60.0% 
219
45.3%
No 
% 
145 
64.7% 
39
57.4%
41
58.6%
25
29.1%
14 
40.0% 
264
54.6%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in whether unauthorised work be condoned. Chi-
Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 37.2; degrees of freedom = 
4; probability = <.00001).   It identifies that many respondents believed that a 
strategy of ceasing unauthorised work practices could have saved injury to the 
victim. 
 
3.8    Summary of Analysis of Woodworking Machine Case Study: 
 
The responsibility of resolving safety issues by the engineer, management or 
the manufacturer in the woodworking machine case study was dismissed by 
first and fourth year engineering students and graduate engineers.   Such a poor 
result could be expected when the outcome is compared to responses that 
clearly identifies the majority of these respondents were also ignorant of 
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Australian occupational health and safety legislative demands. In addition to 
extensive exposure to Federal and State occupational health and safety 
legislation contemporary educational philosophies of occupational health and 
safety persevere that a degree of responsibility should be directed towards a 
design engineering strategy rather than a ‘safe person’ response.  Such a 
conclusion strengthens an appeal for specialised occupational health and safety 
education to be introduced into curricula.    
 
Once again the woodworking case study demonstrated that occupational health 
and safety is not seriously taken on board or even considered as a strategy in 
safety problem solving. Emphasis was evident that a victim be blamed and 
punished whilst engineering groups continued to transfer their responsibility 
anywhere.  Post-graduate occupational health and safety students demonstrated 
consistency in their responses with the exception of wishing to see this 
particular victim penalised for illegal work activities.  Therefore, this case 
study continues to identify the ability of having specialised occupational health 
and safety education does affect decision-making and the competence to solve 
safety problems. 
 
3.9 The Bakery Accident Case Study:  
 
This fourth case study follows a similar pattern to the others; a baker employee 
reaches into a bread-dough mixing machine conveyer, clothing is entangled and 
an arm is wrenched from the body.  This is not an uncommon accident (for 
example, two deaths recorded in Western Australia in 1994 from entrapment of 
clothing by moving machinery where machine guarding was absent).  It was 
included as other case study incidents also demonstrated severe accidents, but it 
would be interesting to investigate if the removal of a limb would affect 
decision-making.   
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Once again other elements were introduced to influence the responses: 
* the first being the appalling imagination of an arm being torn from its 
 socket; 
* the second influence was the offering of the bread-dough machine  
 manufacturer as a scapegoat for blame;  
* thirdly, offering another avenue of blame to the government     
inspectorate;  
* last, could responsibility be attached to the maintenance crew; and, 
* should the machine be replaced with a failsafe machine? 
 
Responses from all engineering students and graduate engineers followed the 
same pattern of limited blame or responsibility attached to the engineer, whilst, 
as now identified, post-graduate occupational health and safety students 
vigorously opposed that view.   
 
Figure 3.16 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on the Engineer in Bakery Case Study 
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The same engineering groups stated there was high to middle responsibility 
attached to the victim, whereas post-graduate occupational health and safety 
students disagreed.   Data from the Bakery case study example also identified 
for the first time fourth year engineering students recognising and accepting 
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where safety responsibility should be attributed.  Table 3.18 below shows the 
distribution of responses between most responsible and least responsible for all 
groups. 
Table 3.18  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBILITY PLACED ON  
ENGINEER IN BAKERY CASE STUDY 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 21 
9.4% 
27
39.7%
11
15.7%
31
36.0%
6 
17.1% 
96
19.9%
 2 37 
16.5% 
20
29.4%
10
14.3%
49
57.0%
3 
8.6% 
119
24.6%
Least 
Responsible 
3 166 
74.1% 
21
30.9%
49
70.0%
6
7.0%
26 
74.3% 
268
55.5%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 150.5; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).  
Figure 3.17 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on the Employee in Bakery Case Study 
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Data from this case study presents that post-graduate occupational health and 
safety students attributed less responsibility to workers than any other student 
or graduate group.   This group also attributed greater responsibility to 
engineers who designed the bread-dough mixing machine than any other 
student or graduate group. This very different view presented by post-graduate 
occupational health and safety students places a much higher responsibility on 
engineers than other groups. 
 
Fourth year engineering students who had accurately attributed blame onto the 
engineer responsible for designing the bread-dough mixing machine in the 
previous analysis now revert to a common mistake of blaming the employee 
who placed an arm into the machine.  Table 3.19 below shows the distribution 
of responses between most responsible and least responsible for all groups. 
 
Table 3.19  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBILITY PLACED ON 
EMPLOYEE IN BAKERY CASE STUDY 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year Degree of 
Responsibility 
Graduate Postgrad Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
 
Engineers Engineers OH&S  
  
 Row 
Total Rank Electives 
Most 
Responsible 
1 7637 22 12 1 4 
15.7%16.5% 32.4% 17.1% 1.2% 11.4% 
 2 286150 35 48 28 25 
59.2%67.0% 51.5% 68.6% 32.6% 71.4% 
Least 
Responsible 
3 37 
16.5% 
11
16.2%
10
14.3%
57
66.3%
6 
17.1% 
121
25.1%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
employee. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 110.4; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).   Table 3.20 below shows the 
distribution of responses between those who agree or disagree. 
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Table 3.20  BAKERY CASE STUDY ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING SHOULD  
EMPLOYEE BE DISCIPLINED BY GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
79 
35.3% 
23
33.8%
30
42.9%
16
18.6%
22 
62.9% 
170
35.2%
No 
% 
145 
64.7% 
45
66.2%
40
57.1%
70
81.4%
13 
37.1% 
313
64.8%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups should the employee be disciplined. Chi-Square 
test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 23.9; degrees of freedom = 4; 
probability = <.00008).    Repetition of results occurs in this fourth case study 
where post-graduate occupational health and safety students reject any 
disciplinary action against the victim. As with other case studies other student 
and graduate engineering groups all presented the intent for blame and 
disciplinary measures to be attributed to the employee/victim. 
Figure 3.18 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility on the Management in Bakery Case Study 
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With the exception of fourth year engineering students, all other groups of 
respondents perceived management’s responsibility as higher.  With the 
responsibility of management as a prevailing dictate by Australian safety 
legislation two other actions were offered to respondents. The following 
histogram demonstrates responses to the two observations. 
 
Figure 3.19 Histogram identifying percentage of respondents who placed 
high responsibility  on Management in Bakery and Woodworking Case Study 
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 Table 3.21 below shows the distribution of responses between most 
responsible and least responsible for all groups. 
Table 3.21  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBILITY PLACED ON  
MANAGEMENT IN BAKERY CASE STUDY 
Degree of 
Responsibility 
 
 
Rank 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with 
OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Most 
Responsible 
1 166 
74.1% 
19
27.9%
48
68.6%
54
62.8%
25 
71.4% 
312
64.6%
 2 37 
16.5% 
13
19.1%
11
15.7%
9
10.5%
7 
20.0% 
77
15.9%
Least 
Responsible 
3 21 
9.4% 
36
52.9%
11
15.7%
23
26.7%
3 
8.6% 
94
19.5%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
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Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
management. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 3 levels of responsibility, x = 76.0; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001).  
 
Data suggests that the government inspectorate was exonerated by all post-
graduate occupational health and safety students as being responsible, however, 
approximately forty percent of other engineering groups allocated blame to the 
external government regulatory authorities.  Table 3.22 below shows the 
distribution of responses between those who agree or disagree. 
 
Table 3.22  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBILITY PLACED ON  
GOVERNMENT INSPECTORATE IN BAKERY CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
97 
43.3% 
23
33.8%
30
42.9%
1
1.2%
12 
34.3% 
163
33.7%
No 
% 
127 
56.7% 
45
66.2%
40
57.1%
85
98.8%
23 
65.7% 
320
66.3%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
government inspectorate. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x 
= 52.5; degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.00001).   Post-graduate 
occupational health and safety students response to the responsibility of the 
manufacturer was forty percent; not a significant difference from other groups.   
As for the severity of the accident, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
horror of the accident caused any different responses.  Table 3.23 below shows 
the distribution of responses between those who agree or disagree. 
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Table 3.23 ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBILITY PLACED ON 
MANUFACTURER IN BAKERY CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
48 
21.4% 
15
22.1%
18
25.7%
 
34
39.5%
9 
25.75 
124
25.7%
No 
% 
176 
78.6% 
53
77.9%
52
74.3%
52
60.5%
26 
74.3% 
359
74.3%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
manufacturer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 11.2; 
degrees of freedom = 4; probability = <.02399).   Table 3.24 below shows the 
distribution of responses between those who agree or disagree. 
 
Table 3.24  BAKERY CASE STUDY ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING SHOULD 
THE MIXING MACHINE BE DESIGNED FAILSAFE 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
173 
77.2% 
55
80.9%
53
75.7%
76
88.4%
31 
88.6% 
388
80.3%
No 
% 
51 
22.8% 
13
19.1%
17
24.3%
10
11.6%
4 
11.4% 
95
19.7%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table fails to show 
variation over the five groups in should the mixing machine be designed as 
failsafe. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 7.34; degrees 
of freedom = 4; probability = <.11886).   Table 3.25 below shows the 
distribution of responses between those who agree or disagree. 
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Table 3.25  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING RESPONSIBILITY PLACED ON  
MAINTENANCE CREW IN BAKERY CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
191 
85.3% 
62
91.2%
53
75.7%
61
70.9%
28 
80.0% 
395
81.8%
No 
% 
33 
14.7% 
6
8.8%
17
24.3%
25
29.1%
7 
20.0% 
88
18.2%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows variation over 
the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the maintenance 
crew. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 14.4; degrees of 
freedom = 4; probability = <.00597).   Table 3.26 below shows the distribution 
of responses between those who agree or disagree. 
 
Table 3.26  BAKERY CASE STUDY ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING SHOULD  
EMPLOYEE BE DISCIPLINED BY GROUP 
 
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
79 
35.3% 
23
33.8%
30
42.9%
16
18.6%
22 
62.9% 
170
35.2%
No 
% 
145 
64.7% 
45
66.2%
40
57.1%
70
81.4%
13 
37.1% 
313
64.8%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in should employee be disciplined. Chi-Square 
test, 5 groups, 2 levels of responsibility, x = 23.0; degrees of freedom = 4; 
probability = <.00008).  
 
 
 
 69
3.10 Summary of Analysis of Bakery Case Study: 
 
There are minor increases stating the employee was not responsible by 
engineering groups.  Excepting data identifying significant different responses 
in regard to the maintenance crew, all groups gained a commonality of 
responses when it was perceived that if management implemented sound safe 
work practices in regard to maintenance and had purchased failsafe machinery 
the incident might have been adverted.   Each response falls into the hierarchy 
of controls which is the lead into the final case study which envelopes those 
very principles to determine the difference between sound safe management 
strategies, such as a ‘safe place,’ and the less preferred strategy of just 
providing protective equipment or behavioural control measures on the worker.   
 
3.11 Fruit Puree Explosion Case Study:  
 
The Fruit Puree Explosion case study involves an employee who is tasked to 
clean a large vat containing waste with chemicals that scour the waste.   The 
mix is incorrect, an explosion occurs injuring numerous employees.  This case 
study differs from preceding case studies, as the emphasis was to identify what 
method of control measure would respondents put in place.  
 
Data received from the evaluative tool identified how respondents perceived 
their values and views on occupational accident causation and responsibility.  It 
also demanded a level of competency in resolving safety problems through 
identifying control hierarchy and measures.  Data suggests that responses to 
safety issues by engineer graduate and engineer student groups tended to favour 
use of personal protective equipment rather than engineering design strategies 
or emergency procedures.  The main precautions were directed to protection 
from the explosive substance.  This emphasis could be expected from first year 
engineering students who may have been unfamiliar with such a critical 
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incident. However, their knowledge and skill base, although rudimentary, could 
be assessed, as they would have been exposed to some form of laboratory 
safety training at secondary school.   
 
Another trend from engineer graduates and student group respondents was for 
responsibility to be attributed to a supervisor.  Data indicates that student 
engineer and engineer graduates are of the opinion that safety issues should not 
impinge on themselves, but transferred responsibility for safety to the 
managerial province of employers and supervisors in the workplace.  On each 
response in this final case study engineering students who had received 
specialised occupational health and safety education decided for ‘safe person’ 
control measures, (for example, train employee to test the mixture; employ a 
supervisor; signpost the problem; issue protective equipment) rather than ‘safe 
place’ an engineering design strategy.   
 
Evidence of such failure to consider engineering control strategies was further 
analysed between these two groups.  It was identified that 97.6% of 
occupational health and safety students directed their control measures toward 
engineering control whilst only 25.7% of graduate engineers considered this 
control measure.  This significant difference in data responses identifies that 
there are discrepancies in the occupational health and safety philosophies and 
safety educational curricula being offered at particular education institutions.    
 
Such difference has serious implications as engineer responses indicated that 
their philosophy was not only in opposition to the safety legislative direction in 
Australia, but also the antithesis to contemporary rational occupational health 
and safety concepts.   
 
Analysis of the case studies identified that responses from various engineer 
student and engineer graduate groups did not adopt the strategy of providing a 
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safe workplace.  Whereas, occupational health and safety students perceived 
that an environmental control procedure ‘safe place’ would eliminate or reduce 
workplace accidents. 
 
The following figure 3.20 provides evidence, represented in graph form, 
enabling clarification and prediction of the hierarchy of control measures 
adopted by post-graduate occupational health and safety student respondents 
across each control measure in the Fruit Puree case study.  A lower value 
response indicates the allocation of a greater degree of perceived responsibility.    
Figure 3.20  Overview of OH&S Graduates' average
rank of each control measure.
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The following figure 3.21 provides evidence, represented in graph form, of an 
overview of all respondent groups’ average rank of each control measure 
adopted by engineering students and graduate engineer respondents control in 
the Fruit Puree case study.  A lower value response indicates the allocation of a 
greater degree of perceived responsibility.   
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Figure 3.21  Overview of all respondent groups' average 
rank of each control measure.
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To extract additional critique from the evaluative tool, data analysis was 
conducted on the variance between groups of respondents and their attribution 
of responsibility, and also against each of the four case study scenarios.  This 
examination identified significant variance.  Post-graduate occupational health 
and safety students attributed less responsibility to the workers than any other 
student or graduate group.   This group also attributed greater responsibility to 
the engineers who designed the workplace than any other student or graduate 
group in all of the scenarios.   
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Figure 3.21  Change Cleaning Process 
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Data indicates the first three preferences of occupational health and safety 
students (colour yellow) identifies they are following a ‘safe place’ strategy 
rather than personal protection.   This is consistent with responses from 
previous case studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should the cleaning process be 
changed control measure responses given by various groups.  
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Table 3.27  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD CLEANING PROCESS BE  
CHANGED BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
Change 
Cleaning 
Process 
28 
12.5 
17 
25.0 
8 
11.4 
36 
41.9 
7 
20.0 
96 
19.9% 
Use Differing 
Chemicals 
19 
8.5 
11 
16.2 
7 
10.0 
33 
38.4 
2 
5.7 
72 
14.9% 
Have 
Mixture 
Mechanically 
Mixed 
23 
10.3 
8 
11.8 
15 
21.4 
15 
17.4 
 61 
12.6 
Use Failsafe 
Temperature 
Gauge 
31 
13.8 
8 
11.8 
6 
8.6 
 5 
14.3 
50 
10.4% 
Employ a 
Supervisor 
26 
11.6 
 
6 
11.8 
3 
4.3 
1 
1.2 
6 
17.1 
44 
9.1% 
Train 
Employees to 
Test Mix 
20 
8.9 
7 
10.3 
3 
4.3 
 3 
8.6 
33 
6.8% 
Signpost in 
Different 
Languages 
19 
8.5 
2 
2.9 
1 
1.4 
 5 
14.3 
27 
5.6% 
Implement 
Preventative 
Training 
30 
13.4 
1 
1.5 
17 
24.3 
 3 
8.6 
51 
10.6% 
Issue 
Protective 
Clothing 
28 
12.5 
6 
8.8 
10 
14.3 
11 
1.2 
4 
11.4 
49 
10.1% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 171.0; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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Figure 3.22  Use a Different Chemical
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The data indicates the first and second rankings (95%) of occupational health 
and safety students (colour yellow) identifies they are following a ‘safe place’ 
strategy rather than personal protection.   This is consistent with responses from 
previous case studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should the chemical be changed 
control measure responses given by various groups.  
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Table 3.28  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD CHEMICAL BE 
CHANGED BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 23 
10.3 
8. 
11.8 
14 
20.0 
34 
39.5 
2 
5.7 
81 
16.8% 
2nd 22 
9.8 
15 
22.1 
6 
8.6 
39 
45.3 
6 
17.1 
88 
18.2% 
3rd 23 
10.3 
7 
10.3 
13 
18.6 
8 
9.3 
5 
14.3 
56 
11.6% 
4th 22 
9.8 
8 
11.8 
3 
4.3 
4 
4.7 
4 
11.4 
41 
8.5% 
5th 35 
15.6 
6 
8.8 
10 
14.3 
1 
1.2 
4 
11.4 
56 
11.6% 
6th 22 
9.8 
6 
8.8 
  3 
8.6 
31 
6.4% 
7th 32 
14.3 
5 
7.4 
12 
17.1 
 3 
8.6 
52 
10.8% 
8th 31 
13.8 
9 
13.2 
9 
12.9 
 7 
20.0 
56 
11.6% 
9th 14 
6.3 
4 
5.9 
3 
4.3 
 1 
2.9 
22 
4.6% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
 
Statistical analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 153.9; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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Figure 3.23  Have Mixture Mechanically Mixed
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Data indicates the third option (51%) of occupational health and safety students 
(colour yellow) identifies they are following a ‘safe place’ strategy rather than 
personal protection.   This is consistent with responses from previous case 
studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should the mixture be mechanically 
mixed control measure responses given by various groups.  
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Table 3.29  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD MIXTURE BE MECHANICALLY  
MIXED BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 24 
10.7 
2 
2.9 
12 
17.1 
5 
5.8 
4 
11.4 
47 
9.7% 
2nd 31 
13.8 
5 
7.4 
9 
12.9 
11 
12.8 
6 
17.1 
62 
12.8% 
3rd 40 
17.9 
5 
7.4 
9 
12.9 
44 
51..2 
5 
14.3 
103 
21.3% 
4th 23 
10.3 
16 
23.5 
8 
11.4 
25 
29.1 
5 
14.3 
77 
15.9% 
5th 22 
9.8 
14 
20.6 
2 
2.9 
 2 
5.7 
40 
8.3% 
6th 28 
12.5 
11 
16.2 
3 
4.3 
1 
1.2 
3 
8.6 
46 
9.5% 
7th 30 
13.4 
9 
13.2 
15 
21.4 
 7 
20.0 
61 
12.6% 
8th 14 
6.3 
4 
5.9 
4 
5.7 
 1 
2.9 
23 
4.8% 
9th 12 
5.4 
2 
2.9 
8 
11.4 
 2 
5.7 
24 
5.0% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 144.8; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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Figure 3.24  Use Failsafe Temperature Gauge
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Data indicates the fourth option (32%) of occupational health and safety 
students (colour yellow) identifies they are following a ‘safe place’ strategy 
rather than personal protection.   This is consistent with responses from 
previous case studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should failsafe temperature gauge be 
used control measure responses given by various groups.  
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Table 3.30  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD FAILSAFE TEMPERATURE GAUGE BE 
USED BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 19 
8.5 
5 
7.4 
3 
4.3 
3 
3.5 
5 
14.3 
35 
7.2% 
2nd 34 
15.2 
8 
11.8 
19 
27.1 
1 
1.2 
2 
5.7 
64 
13.3% 
3rd 18 
8.0 
9 
13.2 
2 
2.9 
18 
20.9 
4 
11.4 
51 
10.6% 
4th 29 
12.9 
3 
4.3 
28 
40.0 
28 
32.6 
5 
14.3 
93 
19.3% 
5th 26 
11.6 
11 
16.2 
 12 
14.0 
2 
5.7 
51 
10.6% 
6th 33 
14.7 
7 
10.3 
7 
10.0 
8 
9.3 
5 
14.3 
60 
12.4% 
7th 32 
14.3 
10 
14.7 
8 
11.4 
15 
17.5 
3 
8.6 
68 
14.1% 
8th 24 
10.7 
6 
8.8 
3 
4.3 
 4 
11.4 
37 
7.7% 
9th 9 
4.0 
9 
13.2 
 1 
1.2 
5 
14.3 
24 
5.0% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 126.7; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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Figure 3.25  Employ A Supervisor
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Data indicates the fourth, fifth and sixth option (62%) of occupational health 
and safety students (colour yellow) identifies they are following a ‘safe place’ 
strategy rather than a supervisory strategy.   This is consistent with responses 
from previous case studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should a supervisor be employed 
control measure responses given by various groups.  
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Table 3.31  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD A SUPERVISOR BE  
EMPLOYED BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 44 
19.6 
5 
7.4 
16 
22.9 
6 
7.0 
3 
8.6 
74 
15.3% 
2nd 30 
13.4 
7 
10.3 
5 
7.1 
1 
1.2 
3 
8.6 
46 
9.5% 
3rd 21 
9.4 
11 
16.2 
10 
14.3 
 7 
20.0 
49 
10.1% 
4th 15 
6.7 
6 
8.8 
 22 
25.6 
5 
14.3 
48 
9.9% 
5th 33 
14.7 
4 
5.9 
6 
8.6 
19 
22.1 
8 
22.9 
70 
14.5% 
6th 29 
12.9 
15 
22.1 
12 
17.1 
21 
24.4 
2 
5.7 
79 
16.4% 
7th 14 
6.3 
6 
8.8 
5 
7.1 
5 
5..8 
4 
11.4 
34 
7.0% 
8th 19 
8.5 
10 
14.7 
2 
2.9 
11 
12.8 
1 
2.9 
43 
8.9% 
9th 19 
8.5 
4 
5.9 
14 
20.0 
1 
1.2 
2 
5.7 
40 
8.3% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 117.2; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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Figure 3.26  Train Employee to Test Mix
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Data indicates the sixth option (29%) of occupational health and safety students 
(colour yellow) identifies they are following a ‘safe place’ strategy rather than 
a training strategy.   This is consistent with responses from previous case 
studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should employee be trained control 
measure responses given by various groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84
Table 3.32  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD EMPLOYEE BE TRAINED TO  
TEST MIX BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 46 
20.5 
16 
23.5 
3 
4.3 
1 
1.2 
3 
8.6 
69 
14.3% 
2nd 35 
15.6 
8 
11.8 
7 
10.0 
 3 
8.6 
53 
11.0% 
3rd 25 
11.2 
8 
11.8 
 1 
1.2 
2 
5.7 
36 
7.5% 
4th 29 
12.9 
3 
4.4 
10 
14.3 
 5 
14.3 
47 
9.7% 
5th 26 
11.6 
3 
4.4 
25 
35.7 
15 
17.4 
2 
5.7 
71 
14.7% 
6th 19 
8.5 
8 
11.8 
12 
17.1 
29 
33.7 
10 
28.6 
78 
16.1% 
7th 15 
6.7 
11 
16.2 
12 
17.1 
22 
25.6 
4 
11.4 
64 
13.3% 
8th 15 
6.7 
4 
5.9 
 15 
17.4 
5 
14.3 
39 
8.1% 
9th 14 
6.3 
7 
10.3 
1 
1.4 
3 
3.5 
1 
2.9 
26 
5.4% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 172.0; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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Figure 3.27  Signpost in Different Languages
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Data indicates the seventh option (20%) of occupational health and safety 
students (colour yellow) identifies they are following a ‘safe place’ strategy 
rather than an educational strategy.   This is consistent with responses from 
previous case studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should process be signposted in 
different languages control measure responses given by various groups.  
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Table 3.33  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD PROCESS BE SIGNPOSTED IN  
DIFFERENT LANGUAGES BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 3 
1.3 
1 
1.5 
  1 
2.9 
5 
1.0% 
2nd 6 
2.7 
 
 3 
4.3 
 1 
2.9 
10 
2.1% 
3rd 7 
3.1 
2 
2.9 
3 
4.3 
 2 
5.7 
14 
2.9% 
4th 13 
5.8 
3 
4.4 
4 
5.7 
   2 
5.7 
22 
4.6% 
5th 14 
6.3 
7 
10.3 
4 
5.7 
14 
16.3 
2 
5.7 
41 
8.5% 
6th 24 
10.7 
6 
8.8 
14 
20.0 
10 
11.6 
3 
8.6 
57 
11.8% 
7th 30 
13.4 
9 
13.2 
2 
2.9 
18 
20.9 
4 
11.4 
63 
13.0% 
8th 22 
9.8 
13 
19.1 
6 
8.6 
12 
14.0 
5 
14.3 
58 
12.0% 
9th 105 
46.9 
27 
39.7 
34 
48.6 
32 
37.2 
15 
42.9 
213 
44.1% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows variation over 
the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the engineer. Chi-
Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control,, x = 47.6; degrees of freedom = 31; 
probability = <.03698).  
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Figure 3.28  Implement Preventative Training.
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Data indicates the final option (16%) of occupational health and safety students 
(colour yellow) identifies a training strategy. This is consistent with responses 
from previous case studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should preventative training control 
measure responses given by various groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88
Table 3.34  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD PREVENTATIVE TRAINING BE 
IMPLEMENTED BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 21 
9.4 
13 
19.1 
14 
20.0 
1 
2.1 
6 
17.1 
55 
11.4% 
2nd 27 
11.5 
8 
11.8 
10 
14.3 
1 
1.2 
8 
22.9 
53 
11.0% 
3rd 27 
12.1 
10 
14.7 
5 
8.5 
 5 
14.3 
48 
9.9% 
4th 36 
16.1 
11 
16.2 
 
5 
7.1 
7 
8.1 
1 
2.9 
60 
12.4% 
5th 19 
8.5 
4 
5.9 
6 
8.6 
24 
27.9 
4 
11.4 
57 
11.8% 
6th 28 
12.5 
5 
7.4 
18 
25.7 
3 
3.5 
4 
11.4 
58 
12.0% 
7th 26 
11.6 
8 
11.8 
6 
8.6 
25 
29.1 
1 
2.9 
66 
13.7% 
8th 26 
11.6 
5 
7.4 
5 
7.1 
11 
12.8 
2 
5.7 
49 
10.1% 
9th 15 
6.7 
4 
5.9 
 14 
6.3 
4 
11.4 
37 
7.7% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 130.1; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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Figure 3.29  Issue Protective Clothing
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Data indicates the eighth option (43%) of occupational health and safety 
students (colour yellow) identifies a protection strategy. This is consistent with 
responses from previous case studies.   
 
The following table sets out a summary of should protective clothing be issued 
control measure responses given by various groups.  
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Table 3.35  FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
IDENTIFYING SHOULD PROTECTIVE CLOTHING BE  
ISSUED BY GROUP 
 
Control 
Measure 
Preference 
1st  yr 
Eng 
4th yr 
Eng 
Graduate 
Engineers
Postgrad 
OHS 
Engineering 
Students 
with OHS 
Elective 
Row 
1st 16 
7.1 
1. 
1.5 
  4 
11.4 
21 
4.3% 
2nd 21 
9.4 
7 
10.3 
4 
5.7 
 4 
11.4 
36 
7.5% 
3rd 41 
18.3 
8 
11.8 
12 
17.1 
 5 
14.3 
66 
13.7% 
4th 26 
11.6 
10 
14.7 
6 
8.6 
 3 
8.6 
45 
9.3% 
5th 22 
9..8 
10 
14.7 
14 
20.0 
 5 
14.3 
51 
10.6% 
6th 21 
9.4 
3 
4.4 
1 
1.4 
14 
16.3 
2 
5.7 
41 
8.5% 
7th 27 
12.1 
8 
11.8 
9 
12.9 
1 
1.2 
4 
11.4 
49 
10.1% 
8th 42 
18.8 
16 
23.5 
24 
34.3 
37 
43.0 
7 
20.0 
126 
26.1% 
9th 8 
3.6 
5 
7.4 
 34 
39.5 
1 
2.9 
48 
9.9% 
Column 224 68 70 86 35 483 
Total 46.4 14.1 14.5 17.8 7.2 100% 
 
 
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 5 groups, 9 options of control, x = 200.8; degrees of 
freedom = 31; probability = <.00001).  
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3.12  Summary: 
 
When all the scenarios were considered in tandem there was significant 
apportioning of blame to management. 
 
When analysing the four case studies to identify any variance in occupational 
health and safety students response it was observed that in the woodworking 
machine case study these students had attributed a slightly greater degree of 
responsibility to the worker.  This slight change in attributing the degree of 
responsibility may have been because the case study was designed to indicate 
the worker was operating illegally, out of hours, on company equipment. 
 
Statistical comparison identified that the student and graduate engineer groups 
all attributed a requirement for punishment on the worker victim, whereas 
occupational health and safety students offered an opposite response.  A 
disconcerting issue that statistical analysis identified was the variance between 
the attribution of blame by fourth year engineering students that had received 
specialised occupational health and safety education and the occupational 
health and safety students.  More engineers rejected that they have a high 
degree of responsibility. 
 
On examination of data where significance was identified, the occupational 
health and safety students’ response always gave a lower value, indicating a 
greater degree of responsibility was directed towards a design engineering 
strategy rather than a ‘safe person’ response.  
 
Data from the Fruit Puree Case Study identifies that all responses from the 
postgraduate occupational health and safety students follow principles of sound 
safe management strategies such as a ‘safe place’ rather than the less preferred 
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strategy of just providing protective equipment or behavioural control measures 
on the worker. 
 
The data identifies that all the engineering groups offered a conflicting 
appreciation of those laws than those of the occupational health and safety 
community and the Federal and State governments.  The evaluative tool 
identified numerous skill sets that were absent from the respondent’s replies.  
Thus defeating the aim of the engineering profession to decrease inherent risk 
through more considered design of the risk features of products, projects and 
the environment and failing to acknowledge or understood the dictates or 
influence of the ethics of their professional association. 
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Chapter Four 
DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this study was: To contribute to our understanding of whether key 
decision-makers are being equipped with the knowledge and skills to fulfil 
their professional, legal and moral responsibilities in relation to occupational 
health and safety. 
 
This project is consistent with a 1987 major thrust of the NOHSC Education 
and Training Strategy widespread and consistent calls for occupational health 
and safety to be introduced into secondary, post secondary and tertiary 
education has occurred.  In 1989 the Australian Federal Minister for Labour 
Relations endorsed co-ordination of introducing high-quality, cost-effective 
training and education programs in occupational health and safety for a national 
strategy for training and education at all levels to encompass occupational 
health and safety. A specific objective of the National Education and Training 
Strategy was to thoroughly evaluate current training and educational methods 
and programs.  Tools for evaluating occupational health and safety are 
however, unavailable.  This research responds to those calls by developing an 
instrument for evaluating occupational health and safety education.  By 
applying this evaluative tool to a key occupational group that has significant 
influence on occupational health and safety in society has enabled effective 
evaluation to occur.  This professional organisation, the Institution of 
Engineers, Australia (IEAust) in 1981 committed its membership to recognise 
the importance of occupational health and safety by implementing and 
developing codes of ethics to address their responsibilities. 
  
Education has a powerful influence on social attitudes and values, on the way 
matters are perceived in the community, and within general culture, including 
that of work.  There is a widespread need to have occupational health and 
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safety understanding drawn into non-occupational health and safety decision-
making.  Managers and technicians should be able to experience occupational 
health and safety themes echoed internationally.  However, Cowley and 
Murray (1991) also identified that introducing an occupational health and 
safety subject into curricula of another discipline is resisted because of 
saturated information previously designated as vital. 
 
The Victorian Post-Secondary Education Committee (VPSEC) in 1985 
investigated introduction of a wide range of specific, short work-based training 
programmes in occupational health and safety training. VPSEC recognised that 
comprehensive advice was required on training needs for the post-secondary 
educational system to contribute with the most benefit to the community. The 
Working Party strongly supported the provision and further development of 
opportunities for research-based higher degrees in OH&S, for the purpose of 
training researchers, high-level practitioners, and teaching staff for tertiary 
courses. 
 
Given the diversity of occupations, roles and functions in the Australian 
workforce, there was a wide range of different educational and training needs 
in occupational health and safety.  The ACTU Specialist Education Standing 
Committee called for greater research into how to introduce OH&S education 
into all levels of education.   
 
The list in Appendix three of Australian developments in tertiary, secondary 
and post-secondary education by 1995 indicate there have been very few 
evaluations of achievement, and evidence seems to have pointed at 
considerable resistance to turning these calls into substantial change in 
curricula. A later concise investigation was conducted by Leggat, 2001 and 
Winder and Abdulla 2004.  At secondary level the 1991 Victorian (Australia) 
Certificate of Education, covering years eleven and twelve, was the first step in 
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secondary education that included occupational health and safety into fifteen 
diverse subject areas.   
 
At undergraduate level studies by Cowley and Murray (1989) identified the 
necessity for engineers to be targeted as one discipline requiring introduction of 
occupational health and safety education within its curricula. Engineers were 
specifically targeted because of the key role they play in design and operation 
of the workplaces, processes and equipment used in today’s society.  
Accordingly engineers are central to the creation and control of most associated 
health risks.   
 
Engineers were given prominence because their tasks bring about a profound 
and lasting change in society. Analysis of accident causes by the ABS in 1988 
still identifies machine and workplace design as reasons for injury and 
fatalities.  Such data indicates that controls designed by engineers are still 
inadequate measures to meet expectations of occupational health and safety 
professionals.  Bradley, (1989) observed that engineers often fail to understand 
the use of equipment by workers or their perception of safety responsibility and 
the factors which influence their behaviours, decision-making, errors, lapses 
etc. when making deliberate decisions on work practices.  This study utilised 
case studies in its investigation methodology, which is aligned with similar 
case studies designed by Cowley in 1986 whilst testing education and training 
knowledge of occupational health and safety representatives. 
 
To test this hypothesis an evaluative tool was developed to identify if 
respondent’s employ a philosophy that engineers should have accountability 
and responsibility for inappropriate engineering design and to identify their 
perception of safety responsibility. This is consistent with the contention that a 
‘safe place’ solution is preferred rather than a ‘safe person’ solution to safety 
problems. Therefore, this study used mainstream engineering education as a 
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discipline in comparison with post-graduate occupational health and safety 
students in which to explore the extent to which such implementation was 
occurring more than a decade after the introduction of OHS legislation. 
 
Consequently engineers were targeted in this study:   
• because of the impact of engineering design on the community;  
• because many engineers become managers within a few years of 
graduation;  
• OH&S was specifically included in the ethics code for Institution of 
Engineers, Australia.   
 
The evaluation was applied to four specific engineering groups: practicing 
graduate engineers; first year engineering students; fourth (final) year 
engineering students; fourth (final) year engineering students who had received 
specialist occupational health and safety education throughout their course, and 
post-graduate occupational health and safety students. 
 
The evaluation required responses from four differing levels of engineering 
ability and experience from which it was possible to compare their responses 
with those responses of occupational health and safety specialists. In addition, 
the evaluative tool allowed scrutiny of occupational health and safety measures 
in the form of effective management methodology and the attribution of blame 
on the victims.  Respondents were required to make judgments where 
responsibility lay for preventing such accidents including consideration to 
prioritise alternative risk control measures in terms of their likely effectiveness. 
 
4.1.0   Differences between practicing engineers and OHS specialists: 
 
The analysis of the five case studies in Chapter 3 provides the opportunity to 
explore whether practicing engineers differ in their perceptions of the safety 
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responsibilities of managers from those held by practicing OHS specialists.  It 
is also possible to assess whether the approaches to the control of occupational 
risks differ between the two professional groups and in particular whether the 
concept of the hierarchy of control informs the preferences made by each 
group. 
 
4.1.1 Responsibility of engineers who design systems: 
 
It would appear that in a wide range of scenarios the practising engineers were 
far less likely than OHS practitioners to recognise the role and responsibility of 
the engineer who designed the system.  The propensity of OHS practitioners 
ascribing responsibility to the designers of the system with between 33% and 
66% of the OHS practitioners identifying the design engineers as “most 
responsible”.  In contrast in every case study far fewer of the practising 
engineers considered the design engineers as “most responsible” (between 5% 
and 21%). 
 
In the power press case study, woodworking case study and the bakery case 
study, which had very clear and direct contributions of poor design, the OHS 
practitioners were two to three times more likely than graduate engineers to 
ascribe responsibility to the design engineers.  In the darkroom case study the 
graduate engineers were even less likely to perceive the responsibility of the 
design engineers.  This may have been because respondents may have accepted 
that the contribution of the victim was elevated because “previous occurrences 
of giddiness was experienced before” indicated prior knowledge that had been 
rejected and the photographer’s actions contributed to the asphyxiation.  
However, this indicates an inability to comprehend the responsibility and 
accountability placed on engineers by their ethical code and legislation.  In all 
case studies the engineer responses followed the same pattern of limited blame 
or responsibility attached to the engineer, whilst OHS practitioners vigorously 
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opposed that view.  Table 4.0 below contrasts the responses from the graduate 
engineers and the OHS practitioners in the four case studies designed to 
explore their perceptions of appropriate apportionment of responsibilities in the 
four incidents. 
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Comparison of OH&S practitioner and engineers responses 
 Darkroom 
    Case study 
Power press 
Case study 
Woodworking 
Case study 
Bakery 
Case study 
Accept that engineers who 
design systems have a high 
legal and moral responsibility 
in relation to occupational 
health and safety 
65% of OHS identified 
engineers as most 
responsible, whereas 
68% of engineers 
considered them most 
responsible 
66% of OHS identified 
engineers as most 
responsible, whereas 50% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
33% of OHS identified 
engineers as most 
responsible, whereas 9% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
7% of OHS identified 
engineers as most responsible, 
whereas 65% of engineers 
considered them most 
responsible 
Require that manufactures 
have a responsibility to 
incorporate safety controls. 
 
 100% of OHS identified 
manufacturers responsible, 
whereas 46% of engineers 
considered them responsible 
57% of OHS identified 
manufacturers 
responsible, whereas 
30% of engineers 
considered them 
responsible 
40% of OHS identified 
manufacturers responsible, 
whereas 22% of engineers 
considered them responsible 
Not to apply blame to victims 
beyond the level of their 
control. 
 
60% of OHS identified 
victims least responsible, 
whereas 57% of 
engineers considered 
victim most responsible 
63% of OHS identified 
victims least responsible, 
whereas engineers 
considerations were 10 
times most responsible 
28% of OHS identified 
victims least responsible, 
whereas 65% of 
engineers considered 
victim most responsible 
1% of OHS identified victims 
least responsible, whereas 18% 
of engineers considered victim 
most responsible 
It is imperative that recognition 
of duty of care cannot be 
delegated to a third party. 
 99% of OHS identified 
inspectorate not 
responsible, whereas 6 times 
of engineers blamed 
inspectorate 
100% of OHS identified 
inspectorate not 
responsible, whereas 
35% of engineers blamed 
inspectorate 
99% of OHS identified 
inspectorate not responsible, 
whereas 40% of engineers 
blamed inspectorate 
Table 4.0 Comparison of OH&S practitioner and engineers responses 
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4.1.2 Responsibility of manufacturers to incorporate risk control: 
 
It would appear that in a wide range of scenarios the practising engineers were 
far less likely to recognise the role and safety responsibilities of the 
manufacturer to incorporate risk control.  Whereas OHS practitioners were 
more than twice as likely to identify that manufacturers have a distinct 
responsibility while to the contrary graduate engineers placed lesser 
responsibility on the manufacturer.  This is a disturbing finding given that 
engineers are the people responsible for the design and manufacture of new 
equipment.  Although in the woodworking case study only 50% placed 
responsibility on the manufacturers they were still twice as likely as engineers. 
This result may have been that should the employers instigated secure close 
down procedures had been set in place the machine could not have been 
operated irrespective if the victim had removed the machine guarding.  Once 
again in the woodworking case study risk management was not seriously taken 
on board by graduate engineers or considered as a strategy in safety problem 
solving. 
 
4.1.3  Blaming the victim: 
 
In all four case studies the graduate engineer group were far more likely to 
consider the victim most responsible for the causation of the accident.  Whereas 
the OHS practitioner group were unlikely to place most responsibility on the 
victims with somewhere between 1% and 2% considering the victim most 
responsible in the darkroom, power press and bakery case studies graduate 
engineers were between 17 and 18 times more likely to blame the victim. 
Throughout all case studies there is a trend for graduate engineers to blame the 
victim.   
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When examining the power press case study only 21.4% of the graduate 
engineers considered the engineer most responsible with OHS practitioners 
responding three times that amount.  However, a more sympathetic response 
was directed at the employee being responsible with only 18.6% of the opinion 
that the employee was most responsible.  Such sympathy was short lived as 
more than 60% of graduate engineers wanted the victim punished dismissing 
their obligation to design a failsafe machine.  Alternatively this group may have 
attributed responsibility to the victim as the case study scenario indicated 
complicity in sabotaging the failsafe system.  This study could not ascertain 
any retrospective rationale for the perception that the victim be disciplined, as 
the employee suffered an extensive limb crushing and responses from 64.3% of 
graduate engineers indicate intent for administrative or legislative discipline. 
 
The woodworking case study was framed around an employee working on their 
own outside of normal working hours using company equipment and not 
surprising in this case study this change affected the respondent’s 
apportionment of blame.  A rationale for this variance could be there was an 
assumption of illegality about work being performed after hours.  Many more 
OHS practitioners held the victim most responsible (28%) than any other case 
study but even in this case the graduate engineers had a far greater propensity 
(nearly three times more) to blame the victim with almost 80% maintaining the 
victim was responsible.  Therefore, the OH&S practitioners can probably 
perceive the responsibility of engineers to design interlocked guarding.  In 
addition, over 92% of graduate engineer responses indicated the victim should 
also be disciplined.  
 
In the bakery case study where OHS practitioner responses indicated only 1.2% 
considered the employee who placed an arm in the machine as responsible a 
very different view was presented by the graduate engineers who were 20 to 30 
times more likely to blame the victim.   
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OH&S legislation interpretation indicates that victims cannot be blamed 
beyond their level of control.  Given engineers are responsible for design of 
failsafe machinery it is disturbing that they do not understand the dictates of 
their professional association nor associate their control of the workplace an 
influence on the cause for accidents. 
 
4.1.4  Holding the Inspectorate responsible: 
 
Almost all OHS practitioners considered the Inspectorate were least responsible 
for the incidents (99% to 100% over the three case studies), whereas on 
average the graduate engineers perceived the inspectors were forty times more 
likely to place responsibility on the inspectorate.  Triangulation with data from 
other case studies (Table 4.2) indicates that graduate engineers perceive they 
have little responsibility and place a great deal of responsibility on the 
inspectorate.  Such perception of the Inspectorate by the OHS practitioners 
indicate that they identify the recognition of duty of care and that current 
legislation places responsibility on workplace incidents not on external 
government agencies as was easily done by the graduate engineer respondents. 
 
4.1.5  Hierarchy of control: 
 
Data from case study 5, the fruit puree explosion, identified that engineer 
groups tended to favour use of personal protective equipment rather than 
engineering design.  Most of the engineer responses were directed to protection 
from the explosive substance and transferred safety responsibility to the 
managerial province of employers and supervisors in the workplace.  To extract 
additional critique from the evaluative tool, data analysis was conducted on the 
variance between groups of respondents and their attribution of responsibility, 
and also against each of the four case study scenarios.  This examination 
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identified significant variance.  OHS practitioners attributed less responsibility 
to the workers than any other student or graduate group.   This group also 
attributed greater responsibility to the engineers who designed the workplace 
than any other student or graduate group in all of the scenarios.   
 
Evidence of such failure to consider engineering control strategies was further 
analysed between these two groups.  It was identified that 97.6% of 
occupational health and safety students directed their control measures toward 
engineering control whilst only 25.7% of graduate engineers considered this 
control measure.  This significant difference in data responses identifies that 
there were discrepancies in the occupational health and safety philosophies and 
safety educational curricula being offered at particular education institutions.    
 
4.1.6  Was there a gap between what practicing OHS and engineers 
understood to be safety responsibilities of the various parties? 
 
Evidence from analysis is offered as an overview in the matrix Table 4.0 
indicating there was a noticeable gap between what OHS practitioners and 
engineers understood to be safety responsibilities in occupational accident 
causation. Data identifies that graduate engineers who after experiencing the 
practical aspect of employing their skills and knowledge and having been 
exposed to the framework of OH&S legislation and State and Federal building 
regulations and codes of practice had a conflicting appreciation of those laws 
than the OH&S practitioners.  This conflict of appreciation between OH&S 
practitioners and engineers in their perception of safety responsibility 
emphasises that engineers failed to recognise Federal and State legislative 
demands and their own code of ethics. Little wonder that their perceptions were 
inaccurate and that they demonstrated little understanding of the hierarchy of 
control. 
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4.2  Can input of OHS education of engineers bridge the gap between 
engineers and OH&S practitioners? 
 
Having established a conflict of appreciation between OH&S practitioners and 
graduate engineers and the dangers such perceptions can deliver to an 
unsuspecting workforce it became important to investigate any differences in 
perception from those who will become the practising engineers of tomorrow. 
 
Previous analysis of data identified many graduate engineer safety decision-
making deficiencies in their choice of strategy to eliminate accidents.  These 
deficiencies also demonstrated the respondent’s occupational health and safety 
management and problem solving ineffectiveness.  The consistent response 
from engineer groups that little or no blame should be attributed to engineers in 
workplace design was in opposition to responses from OHS practitioners 
whose perception of safety strategy was to a ‘safe place’ rather than ‘safe 
person’.  Table 4.2 offers a comparison of engineering students and Graduate 
Engineers responses. 
 
4.2.1 Responsibility of engineers who design systems: 
 
In every case study the degree of responsibility placed on engineers who design 
systems, responses of engineering students were much closer to those of 
practising engineers than those responses of OH&S practitioners.  For example, 
in the darkroom case study the OH&S practitioners were four times more likely 
to place responsibility on the engineers. 
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Table 4.2 Comparison of engineering students and Graduate Engineers responses 
 Darkroom 
    Case study 
Power press 
Case study 
Woodworking 
Case study 
Bakery 
Case study 
Accept that engineers who 
design systems have a high 
legal and moral responsibility 
in relation to occupational 
health and safety 
On average 16% of 
engineering students 
consider engineers most 
responsible which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (7%) 
On average 30% of 
engineering students 
consider engineers most 
responsible which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (41%) 
On average 16% of 
engineering students 
consider engineers most 
responsible which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (10%) 
On average 22% of 
engineering students 
consider engineers most 
responsible which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (15%) 
Require that manufacturers 
have a responsibility to 
incorporate safety controls. 
 
 On average 46% of 
engineering students 
consider manufacturers 
most responsible which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (48%) 
On average 33% of 
engineering students 
consider manufacturers 
most responsible which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (24%) 
On average 23% of 
engineering students 
consider manufacturers most 
responsible which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (25%) 
Not to apply blame to victims 
beyond the level of their 
control. 
 
On average 50% of 
engineering students 
identified victims most 
responsible, which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (55%) 
On average 27% of 
engineering students 
identified victims most 
responsible, which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (18%) 
On average 55% of 
engineering students 
identified victims most 
responsible, which is not 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (80%) 
On average 20% of 
engineering students 
identified victims most 
responsible, which is 
comparable to graduate 
engineers responses (17%) 
It is imperative that 
recognition of duty of care 
cannot be delegated to a third 
party. 
 On average 63% of 
engineering students 
identified the inspectorate, 
which is comparable to 
graduate engineers 
responses (62%) 
On average 31% of 
engineering students 
identified the inspectorate, 
which is comparable to 
graduate engineers 
responses (40%) 
On average 37% of 
engineering students 
identified the inspectorate, 
which is comparable to 
graduate engineers 
responses (42%) 
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Almost all of the OHS practitioners directed their control measures towards 
engineering controls whilst only 25% of engineers and 22% of engineering 
students perceive this as a control procedure.  Such a noticeable gap in safety 
philosophy indicates an opposition to safety legislation direction in Australia 
and internationally and an antithesis to contemporary occupational health and 
safety concepts.  Thus defeating the aim of the engineering profession to 
decrease inherent risk through considered design of products, projects and the 
environment. 
 
4.2.2 Responsibility of manufacturers to incorporate risk control: 
 
Once again commonality was evident in each case study between the responses 
of the engineering students and the graduate engineers indicating a shared 
opinion to place lesser responsibility on the manufacturers whereas all the 
OH&S practitioners placed responsibility directly on manufacturers.  A 
disturbing finding given those engineers are the people responsible for the 
design and manufacture of new equipment. 
 
4.2.3 Blaming the victim: 
 
Analysis of responses from the darkroom, power press and bakery case studies 
identified a mirrored response from the graduate engineers and engineering 
students.  However, in the woodworking case study a division of responses was 
recorded yet still design engineering strategies were dismissed.  OH&S 
practitioners demonstrated a consistency in their responses thoughout the case 
studies and using the bakery case study as an example only 1% considered 
attachment of blame on the victim. 
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4.2.4 Holding the Inspectorate responsible: 
 
Responses in all case studies from the graduate engineer and engineering 
students directed most responsibility to the inspectorate.  This sharing of 
fundamental principles reflects an eagerness to transfer blame to an external 
regulatory authority whereas using the woodworking case study as an example 
100% of OH&S practitioners exonerated blame from the inspectorate.  
 
4.2.5 Hierarchy of control: 
 
Data from analysis of case study 5, the fruit puree explosion, indicated that 
engineers and engineering students did not perceive control measures that 
would have eliminated the risk of an explosion but preferred control measures 
against the explosive substance.  Such inaccurate perceptions and limited 
understanding of the hierarchy of control underpins the need to have safety 
awareness into non-occupational health and safety decision-making. As would 
be expected the analysis demonstrated differences in responses, however, in the 
5th case study, the fruit puree explosion case study, which highlighted the 
various groups response to consider engineering control methods the student 
groups still adjudge engineering control methods above what the graduate 
engineer group responses indicate. 
 
Comparison identified that graduate engineers groups all attributed a 
requirement for punishment on the worker victim, whereas occupational health 
and safety students offered an opposite response.  A disconcerting issue that 
statistical analysis identified was the variance between the attribution of blame 
by fourth year engineering students that had received specialised occupational 
health and safety education and the occupational health and safety students.  
More engineers rejected that they have a high degree of responsibility in 
relation to safety problems than do postgraduate occupational health and safety 
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students. Unfortunately the evidence identified an extensive urge to blame the 
injured employee or management or the government regulatory authority.  This 
research is not intended to analyse the psychology of such distancing of 
responsibility. 
 
4.3 Is integration of OHS as specialist subject more effective in bridging 
the gap? 
 
Analysis of data established noticeable commonality between the responses of 
graduate engineers and engineering students, however it is important to 
investigate if it was the saturation of OH&S education or the integration of 
OH&S as a specialist subject that influenced the students’ responses.   
 
As the data allowed the evaluation of respondents’ perception of safety 
responsibility and their OHS knowledge base it also allowed evaluation of the 
current training and educational methods and programs.  One significant factor 
supporting the introduction of OHS education into engineering curricula was 
the difference between the two 4th year engineering student groups. 
 
This research was not designed to test differences between the groups.  
However, as the experiment progressed one conspicuous issue emerged when it 
was discovered that the 4th year engineering student group, who only had 
exposure to six 90 minutes (9 hours) of occupational health and safety lectures, 
offered a perception of safety responsibility that overshadowed those responses 
of graduate engineers.  Such a noticeable gap, even from the overview offered 
in Table 4.3, indicates a greater knowledge base and a heightened perception of 
the correct attribution of responsibility in a variety of accidents.  Here was an 
engineering student group that would not have fully understood the dictates of 
their professional association.  Nor would they have utilised their academic 
engineering skills in the workplace or experienced the practical aspect of 
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employing those skills yet they had attained professional realisation of the need 
for OHS education within their discipline.  The results suggest that an 
innovative interweaving of OHS education with the encouragement of senior 
academics lessened the noticeable gap. 
 
4.3.1 Responsibility of engineers who design systems: 
 
Responses from all case studies identified that the 4th year engineering students 
who had not received specialised occupational health and safety education were 
two and three times most likely to place responsibility on the engineers than 
were the graduate engineers.  Throughout all the case studies the 4th year 
engineering student responses were closer to the responses of the OH&S 
practitioners than any other group. 
 
4.3.2 Responsibility of manufacturers to incorporate risk control: 
 
With the exception of the darkroom case study responses in all other case 
studies identified that the 4th year engineering student responses were closer to 
those perceived by the OH&S practitioners.  Using the woodworking case 
study responses as an example 4th year engineering students were twice as 
likely to attribute most responsibility on the manufacturers than the graduate 
engineers.   
 
4.3.3 Blaming the victim: 
 
A disconcerting issue that statistical analysis identified was the variation 
between the attribution of blame by fourth year engineering students that had 
received specialised occupational health and safety education and the 
occupational health and safety students.  More of this group rejected that they 
have a high degree of responsibility in relation to safety problems than do 
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postgraduate occupational health and safety students. Table 4.3 offers a  
comparison of 4th year engineering students and Graduate Engineers responses. 
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Table 4.3 Comparison of 4th year engineering students and Graduate Engineers responses 
 Darkroom 
    Case study 
Power press 
Case study 
Woodworking 
Case study 
Bakery 
Case study 
Accept that engineers 
who design systems have 
a high legal and moral 
responsibility in relation 
to occupational health and 
safety 
32% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
engineers as most 
responsible, whereas 7% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
47% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
engineers as most 
responsible, whereas 21% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
30% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
engineers as most 
responsible, whereas 10% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
39% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
engineers as most 
responsible, whereas 15% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
Require that 
manufacturers have a 
responsibility to 
incorporate safety 
controls. 
 
 30% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
manufacturers as most 
responsible, whereas 48% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
42% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
manufacturers as most 
responsible, whereas 24% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
22% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
manufacturers as most 
responsible, whereas 25% 
of engineers considered 
them most responsible 
Not to apply blame to 
victims beyond the level 
of their control. 
 
32% of 4th year engineer 
students identified 
victims most responsible, 
whereas 55% of 
engineers considered 
victim most responsible 
38% of 4th year engineer 
students identified victims 
most responsible, whereas 
14% of engineers 
considered victim most 
responsible 
27% of 4th year engineer 
students identified victims 
most responsible, whereas 
80% of engineers 
considered victim most 
responsible 
32% of 4th year engineer 
students identified victims 
most responsible, whereas 
17% of engineers 
considered victim most 
responsible 
It is imperative that 
recognition of duty of 
care cannot be delegated 
to a third party. 
 62% of 4th year engineer 
students identified the 
inspectorate most 
responsible, 62% of 
engineers also blamed 
inspectorate 
36% of 4th year engineer 
students identified the 
inspectorate most 
responsible, 40% of 
engineers also blamed 
inspectorate 
33% of 4th year engineer 
students identified the 
inspectorate most 
responsible, 42% of 
engineers also blamed 
inspectorate 
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4th year engineering students who had not received specialised occupational 
health and safety education having received only a brief introduction to 
occupational health and safety education with support from senior academics 
were half as likely to blame victims as other engineering groups.  Although the 
brevity of occupational health and safety educational exposure between the two 
groups was obvious the commonality of responses between these two groups 
offers evidence to suggest that the interweaving of occupational health and 
safety education with the backing of senior academics as their opinion leaders 
altered their perceptions of safety responsibility and passed on the safety 
philosophy of OH&S practitioners. 
 
4.3.4 Holding the Inspectorate responsible: 
 
Data from the case studies verified that responses from the 4th year engineering 
student group did not mirror those from the graduate engineer, in addition, their 
responses were closer to those from the OH&S practitioners. 
 
4.3.5 Hierarchy of control: 
 
To support the above evidence in the 5th case study, the fruit puree explosion, 
once again the variance between the two groups demonstrated that this student 
group continually achieved responses that were directed to design engineering 
strategies rather than a ‘safe person’ response. 
 
The 5th case study, the fruit puree explosion, the graduate engineer responses 
identified their perception of the control hierarchy was absent and they failed 
when exploring the preferred order to select alternative controls.  Such a 
response identifies the noticeable gap between the 4th year engineering students 
and engineers in their perception of safety responsibility. 
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With reference to responses from the final year engineering students, who had 
been exposed to specialised occupational health and safety education within 
their curriculum, data from their responses indicated that specialised OHS 
education had not influenced this group in comparison with the other 4th year 
engineering student group.  Interpretation of these comparisons indicate that 
further effort is required to target not simply the apparatus of engineering 
mathematical and technical knowledge within their curricula but to emphasise 
their perception of safety responsibility encouraged by senior members of their 
profession.  Data illustrated a failure of these fourth year engineering students 
who were receiving specialised occupational health and safety education, to 
identify and problem-solve safety issues suggests that although the thrust of 
their education was to produce occupational health and safety specialist 
engineers there was no change of their initial vision that they had limited safety 
responsibility. 
 
Data exposed the disadvantages of not having an underpinning of occupational 
health and safety education. It is important that engineers, irrespective of their 
knowledge base, education or experience, must connect their control of the 
workplace as an influence that could cause accidents.   In emphasising the 
engineers’ vulnerability it reiterates that engineer’s responsibilities could be 
substantial and legal liability often rests with them in the event of a failure and 
the financial consequences of that liability.  It is important that engineers, 
irrespective of their knowledge base, education or experience, must connect 
their control of the workplace as an influence that could cause accidents.    
 
Previous discussion noted that curriculum is an idea of society, a statement of 
what society values.  Consequently decisions by government legislation, public 
instrumentalities, special interest groups and employer and trade unions all 
contribute to what determines curriculum.  Therefore, as demonstrated by the 
4th year engineering students’ response the integration of occupational health 
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and safety education by infusing safety management considerations with others 
rather than as an extra subject has proved beneficial.   
 
Such integration of OHS education in other disciplines must occur where 
graduates will make decisions ultimately reducing the toll of injuries and deaths 
in the workplace. 
 
Table 2.0.1 and Table 2.0.2 related to the introduction of OHS education within 
engineering curricula.  This 4th year engineering student group once again 
emphasised a perception that OHS education should be introduced and taught 
by OHS qualified lecturers whereas graduate engineer responses did not mirror 
such a need. 
 
Finally, Table 2.0.5 analysis identified that 95.6% of this group responded that 
IEAE ethics is introduced within their curricula whereas only 40% of graduate 
engineers perceived this as a benefit.  Even the 1st year engineering students 
responded with 72.3%, which indicates they were more in tune with the needs 
of their profession and society than graduate engineers.  Such a response could 
be due to the fact that society has changed through greater public education in 
the past two decades. 
 
The results also imply that occupational health and safety post-graduate 
students were adopting the contemporary philosophy of ‘safe place’ solutions.  
The evaluation instrument could now be used to monitor the success of all of 
occupational health and safety education courses throughout Australia, at 
elected occupational health and safety representatives, post-secondary and 
tertiary level.  
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4.4    Limitations of the Study: 
 
In this study it was not possible to differentiate between students from various 
disciplines and it is possible that some disciplines of engineering, such as 
chemical or mining engineering will have graduates and students who have 
greater understanding than implied by this study.  Another important area that 
was not included in the initial design of the questionnaire was the age and 
length of practice of the graduate engineer respondents.  This would have 
enabled exploration of whether the attribution of blame to the victim was more 
prevalent in the responses of the engineers most removed from their 
engineering studies.  Such demographic information was not included in an 
effort to keep the questionnaire concise.   
 
Not surprisingly higher response rates were achieved from students attending 
courses from graduates was extremely low.  The use of professional journals to 
advertise the questionnaire and its purpose might have increased the response 
rate as compared with using a mailing list which could be construed as cold or 
detached. 
 
This study provided a picture of engineers that were moving from their 
educational base to a profession with limited understanding of occupational 
health and safety more than a decade after the introduction of a new generation 
of OHS legislation. The study cannot claim to represent a picture of what is 
happening in Australia almost two decades after the introduction of the new 
legislation. Many of the students in this study are now practicing engineers, 
making decisions affecting the workplace of Australia.  However, the 
curriculum of engineers responds to the importance placed on occupational 
health and safety by the community. This will change with time.  Recent 
initiatives provide insight/hope for change.  But it would appear that even 
though recent research from Toft, Howard & Jorgensen (2003) identifies why 
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engineering design work may be contributing to human error on part of the 
operator, and offered hope toward a future when engineers will embrace safe 
design principles.   
The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Strategy (2002-
2012) eliminating hazards at the design stage (this applies to all sources of 
hazards) places the responsibility on a wide range of parties, including those 
external to the workplace such as designers, manufacturers, constructors and 
suppliers.  It also heralds the fact that the Government is prepared to influence 
the outcomes of occupational health and safety.  
 
Bryan, (1999) recognised that engineers must recognize these realities during 
all phases of engineering design and work management.  The elimination of 
hazards in and around the workplace should always begin with engineering 
design.  Safety and health issues must be brought into the engineering 
classroom, during and after the formal education experience.  The following 
year the Australian Association for Engineering Education discovered that 
eighty percent of engineering educators identified that engineers contribute to 
human error in systems through latent design error and poor management 
decision-making and that the role of engineers is integral to workplace safety. 
 
Researchers have found that the high rate of human error was related to design 
error (Rasmussen, (1998) and Reason, (1990)).  Toft, Howard & Jorgensen 
(2003) reported engineers have a duty of care to end users of the systems they 
design under current statutes and at common law.  In their research they 
identified that the participants, at that time, suggested that safety was a 
‘distraction’ and would not be a successful argument to convince engineers that 
ergonomics was important.  Ergonomics underpins the notion of ‘safe design’. 
They concluded until practicing engineers develop a basic understanding of 
ergonomic principles, the relationship between these principles and human 
error, it is unlikely that safe design can be achieved. 
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The research of Culvenor, Cowley and Hardy’s (2003) proved many safety 
representatives still think ‘safe person’ instead of ‘safe place’, therefore, little 
change in occupational health and safety philosophy has occurred.  Yet to 
emerge is evidence that the growing awareness of occupational health and 
safety in the community, and the efforts of the National Strategy, and all the 
literature reviews that the position has changed in the past few years.  The task 
of building in safety and health at the design stage of new equipment and 
technology still depends on the engineers’, designers’, and decision-makers’ 
perception of their safety responsibility and their technical knowledge of 
ergonomics and occupational health and safety.   
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Chapter Five 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This uncomplicated evaluative tool identified a myriad of future research 
avenues.  The original intent was developed to seek responses from student and 
graduate engineers whether they employ the philosophies of occupational health 
and safety to solving problems.  Especially those philosophies which set 
engineering and environmental controls above behavioural controls.  These 
responses determined how respondents perceived their attitudes and views of 
occupational health and safety and its educational necessity.   
 
The evaluative tool allowed scientific scrutiny of occupational health and safety 
measures in the form of management methodology and the attribution of blame.  
Effective identification of case study accident scenarios required the attribution 
of responsibility so that prevention of future accidents could be avoided.  The 
analysis of hazard identification includes consideration of risk control measures.  
The fact that machinery related fatalities and injuries are substantially due to 
inadequate guarding still occur indicates that there should be no complacency 
on the issue of machine guarding.  The potential gains from ensuring a ‘safe 
workplace’ through engineering design mechanisms must be considered. 
 
This review identified that educational provisions for engineer students and 
graduate engineers have not mirrored the needs of industry, legislative demands 
or the developmental needs of people in the workplace. The IEAust code of 
ethics clearly indicates that there is recognition by the profession to act, 
however, the capacity to act is diminished if engineers do not know their 
legislative safety responsibilities and the vital role they can play in controlling 
risks. Such inclusion of a code of ethics indicates that their professional body 
has identified that engineers must accept accountability and undertake a 
preferred direction of control to safe workplaces. 
 
 120
 
Post-graduate occupational health and safety students placed a much higher 
responsibility of engineers than did any of the other groups. However, 
disadvantages of not having an underpinning of occupational health and safety 
education were exceedingly graphic as VIOSH case studies exposed the ease in 
which engineers blamed their victim.  It is evident that engineers, irrespective of 
their knowledge base, education or experience, do not connect safe place 
concepts or their workplace control as an influence that could cause accidents.   
Analysis of data also indicates that graduate engineers do not consider the 
significance of their professional code of ethics.  
 
It would appear that educational provisions for engineer students and engineer 
graduates have not mirrored the needs of industry, legislative demands or the 
developmental needs of people in the workplace.  Results also indicate an 
unwillingness to accept accountability and undertake a preferred direction of 
control to safe workplaces.   
 
A totally opposite view presented by post-graduate occupational health and 
safety students who placed a much higher responsibility on engineers than 
other groups.  This would be consistent with contemporary educational 
philosophies of occupational health and safety indicating that a degree of 
responsibility was directed towards a design engineering strategy rather than a 
‘safe person’ response. 
 
The results identified that occupational health and safety skills and knowledge 
are required to heighten people’s perception of safety responsibility.  It defined 
that the requirement of many possible interventions (types and sources of 
education and training) to create those skills is vital.  However, the 
disadvantages of not having an underpinning of occupational health and safety 
education were exceedingly graphic as the case studies exposed.   
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In comparison, responses of post-graduate occupational health and safety 
students (coloured yellow in histograms and figures) do employ a philosophy 
that engineers should have accountability and responsibility for inappropriate 
engineering design. This is consistent with the contention that a ‘safe place’ 
solution rather than a ‘safe person’ solution to safety problems.  Therefore, the 
results would imply that occupational health and safety post-graduate students 
are adopting the contemporary philosophy of ‘safe place’ solutions.  Such 
specialised education does influence decision-making and the competence to 
solve safety problems. 
 
Post-graduate occupational health and safety students placed a higher degree of 
responsibility on manufacturers of the products than all other groups.  There is 
significant statistical evidence to identify that engineer students and graduate 
engineers attributed a higher degree of responsibility on the government 
inspectorate than do post-graduate occupational health and safety students. 
 
The various engineer student and graduate engineer groups did not adopt the 
strategy of providing a safe workplace, whereas occupational health and safety 
students perceived that an environmental control procedure would eliminate or 
reduce workplace accidents.  It also indicates an unwillingness to accept 
accountability or undertake a preferred direction of control to safe workplaces. 
 
Inspection of data suggests that in each case study the occupational health and 
safety students continually provided an opposite response to other student 
engineer and graduate engineer groups.  This is unlikely to have occurred by 
chance in all case studies.   This conclusion is supported by strong correlation 
of responses where blame is vigorously transferred to the victim.   The findings 
of this study are thus in broad agreement with the suggestion that there is a 
considerable requirement for engineer’s and engineering student’s performance 
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to be enhanced by specialised occupational health and safety education. Those 
revengeful responses do not indicate quality person management skills or 
knowledge.  Post-graduate occupational health and safety students disregarded 
such a response. 
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Chapter Six 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This thesis investigated major influences impacting on Australian occupational 
health and safety education. A rationale of examining such a diverse array of 
influences was to state the core of the problem that occupational health and 
safety education should be incorporated within existing curricula.  
 
Application of the evaluation to management education: 
 
• This study targeted engineers as an occupational group because they make 
managerial and technical decisions that affect the health and safety of 
Australia’s working community, and because their profession has 
recognised the importance of occupational health and safety in its Code of 
Ethics since 1981. The next challenge should be to research in a similar 
method how managerial education curricula equip future managers in 
occupational health and safety.  
 
• This research identified that engineers are not in a state of eager anticipation 
to hear the message of occupational health and safety professionals. 
Research should be undertaken to determine if including the manager’s 
safety record as part of his/her performance appraisal would encourage 
managers to undertake an active interest in their self-preservation as well as 
the health and safety of others.  Future research should also test if such 
safety management performance appraisal became part of employment 
selection processes would that encourages managers to hear the message of 
occupational health and safety professionals? 
 
• Research should also be undertaken to evaluate if a ‘safe place’ orientation 
of potential new staff could be part of an effective human resource 
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management system for evaluating applicants for key managerial 
appointments. 
 
• Engineering curricula do not appear to have developed occupational health 
and safety understandings and approaches even though Engineering is a 
profession that has acknowledged the importance of occupational health and 
safety in its code of ethics.  One must therefore, question the degree to 
which occupational health and safety will be developed in general 
management education where there would appear to be no equivalent 
explicit pressure from the inclusion of occupational health and safety in 
their code of ethics.  Research should be undertaken to discover why current 
management education curricula do not include occupational health and 
safety.   
 
Application of the evaluation in education of all disciplines: 
 
• Many people argue that inclusion of occupational health and safety core 
principles to differing disciplines could enhance problem solving of safety 
issues. Research should be undertaken to determine whether integrating 
some aspects of occupational health and safety into disciplines would be 
more effective than stand-alone units of occupational health and safety.  
Such integration might overcome the argument that saturated curricula 
cannot accept the study occupational health and safety.  Later research 
should evaluate the effects of such an introduction.  
 
• Overwhelming evidence obtained from the evaluative tool indicated the 
judgment of engineers to blame an injured employee.  Psychologists have 
identified decision-making behaviour of workers in the past, however future 
research should focus more effort on the decision-making behaviour of 
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engineers and managers who blame injured employees rather than exercise 
their ability to shape the environment in which workers operate. 
 
• Although there has been considerable research on the workforce, there has 
been limited research on the behaviour of academics.  Research should be 
commenced on influences that could change the culture of educationalists to 
encourage them to accept occupational health and safety in improving the 
education of their students.   
 
• Early education must be given prominence because it is a decisive means of 
influencing profound and lasting change. Although the principles of 
identification assessment and control and the hierarchy of control have 
evolved in the field of occupational health and safety there is no reason why 
such problem solving skills should be confined to occupational health and 
safety.  Such application to non-occupational health and safety problems 
will benefit primary students because of its ‘solving at source’ nature to 
identify, assess, and control will encourage their problem solving skills. 
Such development of core competency of problem solving with focus on 
control at source not just occupational health and safety could create 
benefits for quality, innovation and productivity. Research should test if 
‘safe place’ orientation could be developed at a very early age alongside 
general primary education as one of their generic skill sets. In addition, 
research should be undertaken to design a variant of this evaluation tool as a 
means of assessing these problem-solving skills at primary level.  
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Application of the evaluation on engineers: 
 
• There are nations as well as companies that have embraced safety 
management as a major agenda over many years.  Research should be 
commenced to test if one nation’s engineers are better at adopting ‘safe 
place’ philosophies than engineers from another country (for example, 
Sweden, West Germany or Finland).  The performance of engineers from 
companies that pride themselves on their occupational health and safety 
accomplishments should also be studied for comparison with the engineers 
in this study (for example, Shell, Orica, Woodside Petroleum or DuPont). 
 
• Data indicated that engineers are much at variance with the approaches that 
occupational health and safety practitioners would wish them to adopt.  
Research must be commenced to determine methods of altering their 
culture.  Such research supported by Institution of Engineers, Australia  or 
the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy should also investigate 
if avenues of penalty, for example, suspension of membership as well as 
legislative threats of prosecution would have any meaningful influence.  
 
• Accidents in highly coupled chemical processes can have catastrophic 
impact on local communities.  Research should test whether chemical 
engineers consequently are more attuned to their safety responsibilities than 
other engineers.  Such research has already commenced with incentives by 
major mining companies now working consultatively with various 
Australian universities. 
  
Safety Orientation of those involved in Education and Training: 
 
• Future research will determine if those who are teaching occupational 
health and safety are developing a ‘safe place’ philosophy.  Following on 
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from that research it would be feasible to rate all occupational health and 
safety teachers before exposing them to students.   
 
Data from this research identified that engineering students were ignorant 
about occupational health and safety philosophies and legislation indicating 
that their curricula had failed to develop such concepts and knowledge. 
Further research should test whether engineering academics have the same 
lack of understanding as graduate or student engineers.  In addition, research 
could be commenced to identify how academics, teaching occupational health 
and safety courses at all levels of education, perform and whether they 
perform differently to academics from other disciplines.  
 
Improving and Using the Evaluative tool: 
 
 
• Studies should be commenced to determine how to improve the case study 
instrument to characterise comparative norms from other occupational 
groups.  It would be beneficial for research if students from other 
disciplines have the opportunity to complete the evaluative tool.  
 
• These case studies should be developed in software format to be used for 
educational evaluation for all State occupational health and safety bodies.  
As in 1999 Australian TAFE implemented commonality with competency 
based vocational training in all subjects taught, these case studies should be 
used as tool for evaluating outcomes of occupational health and safety 
abilities especially with the proposed Category Two and Four Workplace 
Assessor certification, now a compulsory qualification for all TAFE 
lecturers. 
 
• This evaluative tool should be developed to be used as a comparison at the 
commencement and finalisation of a course to assess the extent of learning.  
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Results would identify the quality of teaching as well as whether ‘safe 
place’ preference is being applied.  This would enable the evaluative tool to 
be developed as a tool for testing all occupational health and safety training 
both nationally and internationally. 
 
• The National OH&S Commission’s Education and Training Strategy calls 
for the development of skills in identification, assessment, control and the 
hierarchy of control.  Research should be undertaken to distinguish 
performance of occupational health and safety from one course to another in 
developing these skills.  Such examination would determine which 
occupational health and safety courses were not developing a ‘safe place’ 
approach in their students and trainees.  
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Appendix 1 
THE VIOSH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Introduction: 
 
 
Poor standards of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) in Australia cost the 
community in excess of $9 billion per year.  During 1992, 1.21% of Australia’s non-
farm gross domestic product was expended on workers' compensation claims. 
 
Our engineer graduates of today will be the designers, managers and industrial 
decision makers of tomorrow and will carry responsibility for preventing pain and 
suffering caused by work related accidents and ill-health and for reducing the burden 
on the community.   
As part of my PhD research I am seeking information which will assist in 
identification of the OHS educational needs of undergraduate programmes in the 
engineering disciplines. 
 
You are invited to take part in this study by reading five case studies/scenarios of 
circumstances which have led to injuries in workplaces and then indicating your 
perceptions of who was responsible for the injury and what could be done to prevent a 
recurrence of the event.  
You will be asked to choose between various alternatives and mark your responses on 
the paper questionnaires which will be collected by hand by the researcher Antony 
Thatcher in the lecture room. (Note- alternative wording for postal questionnaires was 
: please choose between the various alternatives and mark your responses on the paper 
questionnaires before posting them in the reply-paid envelope to the researcher 
Antony Thatcher.) 
Reading the scenarios and completion of the questionnaire takes approximately ten to 
fifteen minutes.   
Questionnaires do not record your name or carry any identifiers or other means by 
which your identity can be determined. All analysis will be based on aggregated data 
eg first year, second year or third year students. You are free to withdraw consent and 
to discontinue participation in the study at any time up until the time the data is 
aggregated for analysis. 
It is anticipated that the results will be published in a refereed journal by the 
researcher- no secondary uses or uses by other persons are envisaged. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Antony Thatcher 
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Appendix 1(cont) 
LEVEL ONE: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENGINEERING STUDENTS 
 
 
General Information: 
 
Name of Institution       ................................................................................ 
 
Discipline? Civil, Mech, Mining, Struct, Elect,   ........................................... 
 
Have you read the OH&S legislation in your state?                               Y        N 
 
Where does the OH&S legislation place the major responsibility of OH&S in 
the workplace?  (1) employer: (2) employee: (3) management: (4) Don’t know: 
 
Male or Female                                                                                     M         F 
 
 
************ 
 
Considering the Undergraduate course you are about to commence; do 
you?:- 
 
 
Believe that OH&S education should be included in the curricula?               Y N 
 
Should OH&S be integrated throughout your programme?                          Y  N 
 
Should OH&S taught by a lecturer with OH&S academic qualifications?  Y   N 
 
Should the curricula encompass the directions of the IE Aust code of ethics? Y 
N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*************** 
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Appendix 1 (cont) 
LEVEL TWO: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENGINEERING STUDENTS 
ABOUT TO GRADUATE 
 
 
General Information: 
 
 
Name of Institution          ................................................................ 
 
Discipline? Civil, Mech, Mining, Struct, Elect,     ........................... 
 
Proposed Job Description or title...................................................... 
 
Will you supervise others?                                                                   Y     N 
 
Have you read the OH&S legislation in your state?                             Y     N 
 
Where does the OH&S legislation place the major responsibility of OH&S in 
the workplace?  (1) employer: (2) employee: (3) management: (4) Don’t know: 
 
 
Male or Female                                                                                 M         F 
 
************ 
 
Reflecting on your Undergraduate course do you?; 
 
 
Believe that OH&S education should be included in the curricula?             Y  N 
 
Should OH&S be integrated throughout your programme?                          Y  N 
 
IF NOT: 
 
Was OH&S a stand alone unit?                                                                     Y   N 
 
Was OH&S reinforced by other lecturers on the course?                             Y   N 
 
Should OH&S taught by a lecturer with OH&S academic qualifications?    Y N 
 
Should the curricula encompass the directions of the IE Aust code of ethics? Y 
N 
 
 
 
 
************ 
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Appendix 1 (cont) 
LEVEL THREE: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GRADUATE ENGINEERS 
IN THE WORKPLACE 
 
 
General Information: 
 
 
In what year did you graduate?                                                            19_ _ 
 
Name of Institution       ........................................................................ 
 
Discipline? Civil, Mech, Mining, Struct, Elect,.................................... 
 
Job Description or title         ............................................................... 
 
Do you supervise others?                                                                        Y     N 
 
Have you read the OH&S legislation in your state?                                Y     N 
 
Where does the OH&S legislation place the major responsibility of OH&S in 
the workplace?  (1) employer: (2) employee: (3) management: (4) Don’t know: 
 
Male or Female                                                                                      M     F 
 
************ 
 
Reflecting on your Undergraduate or Postgraduate course; do you:- 
 
 
Believe that OH&S education should have been included in the curricula?  Y N 
 
Was OH&S be integrated throughout your programme?                              Y   N 
 
IF NOT: 
 
Was OH&S a stand alone unit?                                                                    Y    N 
 
Was OH&S reinforced by other lecturers on the course?                             Y   N 
 
Should OH&S taught by a lecturer with OH&S academic qualifications?   Y  N 
 
How often was the IE Aust code of ethics referred to in your course?                     
        Frequently            Never 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148
Appendix 1(cont) 
LEVEL FOUR: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FINAL YEAR POST-
GRADUATE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY STUDENTS 
 
 
General Information: 
 
 
Name of Institution       ........................................................................ 
 
Discipline? Civil, Mech, Mining, Struct, Elect,.................................... 
 
Job Description or title         ............................................................... 
 
Will you supervise others?                                                                        Y     N 
 
Have you read the OH&S legislation in your state?                                  Y     N 
 
Where does the OH&S legislation place the major responsibility of OH&S in 
the workplace?  (1) employer: (2) employee: (3) management: (4) Don’t know: 
 
Male or Female                                                                                      M     F 
 
************ 
 
Reflecting on your Undergrad or Postgrad course; do you:- 
 
 
 
Was OH&S a stand alone unit?                                                                    Y    N 
 
Was OH&S reinforced by other lecturers on the course?                             Y   N 
 
Should OH&S taught by a lecturer with OH&S academic qualifications?   Y  N 
 
How often was the IE Aust code of ethics referred to in your course?                     
        Frequently            Never 
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Appendix 1(cont) 
 
LEVEL FIVE: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FINAL YEAR ENGINEER 
STUDENTS WITH OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 
CONTENT INTEGRATED WITHIN THEIR CURRICLUM 
 
 
General Information: 
 
 
Name of Institution       ........................................................................ 
 
Discipline? Civil, Mech, Mining, Struct, Elect,.................................... 
 
Job Description or title         ............................................................... 
 
Will you supervise others?                                                                        Y     N 
 
Have you read the OH&S legislation in your state?                                  Y     N 
 
Where does the OH&S legislation place the major responsibility of OH&S in 
the workplace?  (1) employer: (2) employee: (3) management: (4) Don’t know: 
 
Male or Female                                                                                      M     F 
 
************ 
 
Reflecting on your Undergrad or Postgrad course; do you:- 
 
 
 
Was OH&S a stand alone unit?                                                                    Y    N 
 
Was OH&S reinforced by other lecturers on the course?                             Y   N 
 
Should OH&S taught by a lecturer with OH&S academic qualifications?   Y  N 
 
How often was the IE Aust code of ethics referred to in your course?                     
        Frequently            Never 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150
Appendix 1(cont) 
THE DARKROOM CASE STUDY  
 
 
SMITH a photographer, was developing negative film in a small darkroom.  
The process required the film to be placed in a mixture of potassium cyanide, 
iodine solution and water.  SMITH had to decant the potassium cyanide powder 
from a forty-litre container into a glass bottle.  This is a dangerous procedure as 
dusts from solid compound can be readily absorbed through the skin and also 
inhaled.  Death can occur.  A ducted air conditioning vent was provided and 
SMITH had been provided with a respirator and protective gloves, but had 
stopped using them several months before because they were ‘hot, sweaty and 
uncomfortable.’  SMITH became confused and collapsed.  Later transferred to 
the intensive care ward, SMITH was only resuscitated by electric shock as the 
heart had stopped.  SMITH later remembered, “I got giddy, but it didn't bother 
me as it happens two or three times a week.” 
 
 
Questions: 
 
 
Who do you think was RESPONSIBLE for  SMITH’S collapse? 
 
Rank the following 1,2 or 3 according to whom you believe is most 
responsible; 
1 the most responsible - 3 the least responsible 
 
a. The engineer who designed the process?                                              1..2..3 
 
b. SMITH for not wearing his protective equipment?                               1..2..3 
 
c. The management for not ensuring SMITH was working correctly?      1..2..3 
 
 
 
Should SMITH be disciplined for working incorrectly?                              Y  N 
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Appendix 1 (cont) 
POWER PRESS CASE STUDY 
 
 
BROWN was a power press operator of a 400 tonnes power press.  The press 
was designed that it was guarded to ensure safe working practices.  Only when 
the machine guard was down could the press be activated by a foot treadle.  
Should the machine guard be raised during the press operation, the die would 
immediately return to the raised position and stop.  BROWN’S hand was 
crushed severely during an operation of the press.  On inspection it was 
discovered that the press could operate with the machine guard up by BROWN 
as the safety microswitch had been tampered with and jammed in the active 
mode. 
 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Who do you think was RESPONSIBLE for BROWN’S injuries? 
 
Rank the following 1,2 or 3 according to whom you believe is most 
responsible; 
1 the most responsible - 3 the least responsible 
 
a. The engineer who designed the process?                                              1..2..3 
 
b. BROWN for not working appropriately?                                              1..2..3 
 
c. The management for not ensuring he was working correctly?               1..2..3 
 
 
What measures could have been undertaken to prevent the accident 
reoccurring? 
 
 
Hold the manufacturer of the press responsible?                                         Y  N 
 
Hold the government safety inspectorate responsible?                                Y  N 
 
 
 
Should BROWN be disciplined for working incorrectly?                           Y  N 
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Appendix 1 (cont) 
WOODWORKING MACHINE CASE STUDY 
 
BLACK was a toolmaker employed in a large foundry. BLACK was making 
repairs afterhours to the family caravan using the company’s carpenter's 
circular saw.  The guard on the saw was too low so BLACK adjusted it out of 
the way.  When pushing a piece of timber through the saw BLACK could not 
locate the pushing blocks so BLACK used his hand.  The hand was severely 
lacerated. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Who do you think was RESPONSIBLE for BLACK’S injuries? 
 
 
Rank the following 1,2 or 3 according to whom you believe is most 
responsible; 
1 the most responsible - 3 the least responsible 
 
a. The engineer who designed the circular saw?                                         1..2..3 
 
b. BLACK for misuse of equipment?                                                          1..2..3 
 
c. The management for not ensuring he was working correctly?                1..2..3 
 
 
What measures could have been undertaken to prevent the  
accident re-occurring? 
 
Eliminate the workers using company machinery?                                       Y  N 
 
Hold the manufacturer of the saw responsible?                                             Y  N 
 
Hold the government safety inspectorate responsible?                                  Y  N 
 
 
 
Should BLACK be disciplined for working incorrectly?                              Y  N 
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Appendix 1 (cont) 
BAKERY ACCIDENT CASE STUDY 
 
 
GREEN was a baker who was filling a sifter with maize for a dough dividing 
machine which would divide bread dough into pre-determined shapes and 
sizes.  The conveyer which housed a spinning drive shaft, had some dough 
flicked onto it.  The machine-guarding had been removed by the bakery 
maintenance staff two days earlier and it had not been replaced.  On reaching in 
to recover the dough, GREEN’S overalls became entangled on a spinning 
hexagonal nut and the drive shaft removed GREEN’S arm. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Who do you think was RESPONSIBLE for GREEN’S injuries? 
 
 
Rank the following 1,2 or 3 according to whom you believe is most 
responsible; 
1 the most responsible - 3 the least responsible 
 
a. The engineer who designed the conveyor system?                                 1..2..3 
 
b. GREEN for reaching in the dough?                                                       1..2..3 
 
c. The management for not ensuring that the maintenance fitters were working 
correctly?                                                                                                  1..2..3 
 
 
What measures could have been undertaken to prevent the  
accident re-occurring? 
 
Replace with a failsafe machine?                                                               Y  N 
 
Hold the maintenance crew responsible?                                                   Y  N 
 
Hold the dough machine manufacturer responsible?                                 Y  N 
 
Hold the government safety inspectorate responsible?                               Y  N 
 
 
 
Should GREEN be disciplined for working incorrectly?                           Y  N 
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Appendix 1 (cont) 
FRUIT PUREE EXPLOSION CASE STUDY 
 
 
WHITE was working on a fruit blanching machine which heats and pulps, or 
purees, the fruit.  At the time of the accident the machine was being cleaned to 
remove burnt fruit.  This was done by filling the machine with water approx 
950 litres and approx 60 kilos of caustic soda flakes.  After the process had 
been heating for 90 minutes the substance exploded and severely burnt WHITE 
and ten workers.  It was discovered that the caustic soda had been delivered ten 
years ago and approx 25% of it was solid, therefore, unable to have been 
distributed and dissolved throughout the water.  The uneven reaction, and 
uncontrolled temperature led to the violent explosion. 
 
 
 
Rank the following 1-9 according to your preferred option; (1 being your first 
option - 9 being your final choice of action). 
 
 
Change the cleaning process?                          
 
Use a different chemical?                             
 
Have the mixture mechanically mixed?                  
 
Use a fail safe temperature gauge?                    
 
Employ a supervisor to ensure safe workpractices?     
 
Train WHITE to test the caustic mix?                  
 
Signpost the danger area in different languages?    
 
Issue protective clothing/equipment?        
 
Implement training to prevent this?         
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Appendix Two 
 Analysis of Respondents’ General Information: 
 
The strategy of providing a safe workplace was not adopted by the various 
engineer student and graduate engineer groups, whereas occupational health 
and safety students perceived that an environmental control procedure would 
eliminate or reduce workplace accidents.  It would appear that educational 
provisions for the engineer students and graduate engineers have not mirrored 
the needs of industry, legislative demands or the developmental needs of 
people in the workplace.  It also indicates an unwillingness to accept 
accountability or undertake a preferred direction of control to safe workplaces. 
 
In the introduction to the questionnaire several responses were sought to 
provide general background.  Rather than reject the answers statistical analysis 
was conducted as on cursory examination many could provide additional 
research themes.  The following tables provide another interesting insight into 
the belief system of the respondents. 
 
Table 2.01 ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING SHOULD OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
AND SAFETY BE TAUGHT BY A QUALIFIED OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
AND SAFETY PROFESSIONAL BY GROUP? 
 
           
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
148 
66.1% 
60
88.2%
22
31.4%
73
85.0%
30 
85.7% 
333
68.9%
No 
% 
76 
33.9% 
8
11.8%
48
68.6%
13
15.0%
5 
14.3% 
150
31.1%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the five groups in whether occupational health and safety should 
be taught by qualified occupational health and safety professionals. Chi-Square 
 
 156
test, 4 groups, 2 options of control, x = 57.8; degrees of freedom = 2; 
probability = <.00001).  
 
Eighty-five percent of post-graduate OH&S students believed that it should be 
taught by a qualified occupational health and safety professional against thirty-
one percent of graduate engineers.  If the reverse was applied here that should 
engineering theory be taught by un-qualified engineers is possible 
consideration for further research.  Such data reinforces a major aim of this 
thesis was to identify critical influences impeding the development of 
Australian occupational health and safety education.   
 
Table 2.02  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING SHOULD OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 
AND SAFETY EDUCATION BE INTRODUCED INTO ENGINEERING 
CURRICULA BY GROUP 
           
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
158 
70.5% 
68
100.0%
36
51.4%
81
94.0%
33 
94.3% 
374
77.4%
No 
% 
65 
29.0% 
34
48.6%
5
6.0%
2 
5.7% 
109
22.6%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the four groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 4 groups, 2 options of control, x = 52.5; degrees of 
freedom = 5; probability = <.00001).  
 
Ninety-four percent of post-graduate occupational health and safety students 
believed that occupational health and safety education should be introduced 
into engineering curricular.  Only fifty-one percent of graduate engineers 
believed that occupational health and safety education should be introduced 
into engineering curricular. 
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Table 2.03  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING WHERE SHOULD OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH AND SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY BE PLACED BY GROUP 
               
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Employer 
% 
28 
12.5% 
6
8.8%
17
24.3%
86
100.0%
5
14.3%
142
29.4%
Employee 
% 
8 
3.6% 
1
1.5%
7
10.0%
5
14.3%
21
4.3%
Supervisor 
% 
1 
0.4% 
23
33.8%
17
48.6%
41
8.5%
Do Not Know 
% 
187 
83.5% 
38
55.9%
46
65.7%
8
22.9%
279
57.8%
Column Total 224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35
7.2%
483
100%
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the four groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 4 groups, 4 levels of responsibility, x = 151.6; 
degrees of freedom = 8; probability = <.00001. 
 
As an indication of the lack of occupational health and safety legislative 
knowledge of final year engineering students only eight percent correctly 
identified that the employer was responsible for safety in the workplace. 
 
In answer to the question ‘are you aware of the occupational health and safety 
legislation in your State?’ first year engineering students responded that 
practically one hundred percent had not.  It is not surprising the postgraduate 
OH&S results as they had received ten units of legal studies from a qualified 
and professional lecturer. 
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Table 2.04  ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING AWARENESS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION IN THEIR STATE BY GROUP 
           
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
1 
0.4% 
3
4.4%
4
5.7%
86
100.0%
5 
14.3% 
99
20.5%
No 
% 
223 
99.6% 
65
95.6%
66
94.3%
30 
85.7% 
384
79.5%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows variation over 
the four groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the engineer. Chi-
Square test, 4 groups, 2 options of control, x = 20.6; degrees of freedom = 2; 
probability = <.00012).  
 
In response to the question: Should the Institute of Engineers Australia code of 
ethics be taught in your course?  Graduate engineers replied only forty percent, 
however, post-graduate occupational health and safety students answered 
ninety-four percent.   Graduate engineers who are working in their profession 
do not seem to consider their ethics, yet more inexperienced engineering 
students and post-graduate occupational health and safety students are more in 
tune with the needs of society today. 
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Table 2.05 
 ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING SHOULD IEAust ETHICS BE TAUGHT IN 
ENGINEERING CURRICULA BY GROUP 
           
 
 
1st Year 
Engineers 
4th Year 
Engineers 
Graduate 
Engineers 
Postgrad 
OH&S 
Engineer 
Students 
with OH&S 
Electives 
 
 
Row 
Total 
Yes 
% 
162 
72.3% 
65
95.6%
28
40.0%
81
94.0%
33 
94.3% 
355
73.4%
No 
% 
62 
27.7% 
3
4.4%
42
60.0%
5
6.0%
2 
5.7% 
114
26.6%
Column 
Total 
224 
46.4% 
68
14.1%
70
14.5%
86
17.8%
35 
7.2% 
483
100%
 
 
Statistic analysis of data summarised on the above table shows significant 
variation over the four groups in the degrees of responsibility attributed to the 
engineer. Chi-Square test, 4 groups, 2 options of control, x = 63.6; degrees of 
freedom = 2; probability = <.00001).  
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Appendix 3 
Degree and Diploma Programmes in Occupational Health and Safety 
(OH&S) offered by Australian Universities and TAFE by 1995. 
 
1. MASTERS DEGREE 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
University of New South Wales 
  Master of Safety Sciences 
  Master of Engineering Science (Industrial Safety) 
  Master of Applied Science (Ergonomics) 1993 
  Master of Applied Science (Occupational Health and Safety) 
  Master of Environmental Science 
University of Sydney 
  Master of Applied Science (Occupational Health and Safety) 
1993 
Cumberland College of Health Sciences 
  Master of Applied Science in Community Nursing 
University of Newcastle 
                      Master of Occupational Health and Safety (1994) 
University of Western Sydney 
  Master of Applied Science (Occupational Health and Safety) 
1993 
University of Technology Sydney 
  Master of Occupational Health and Safety 
University of Wollongong 
  Master Public Health (Occupational Health and Rehabilitation) 
 
QUEENSLAND 
Griffith University 
  Master of Science (Environment and Community Health) 
  Master of Rehabilitation 
Queensland University of Technology 
  Master of Health Science 
University of Southern Queensland 
  Master of Business (Occupational health and safety) 
 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
University of Adelaide 
  Master of Public Health 
 
VICTORIA 
Monash University 
  Master of Public Health 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology 
  Master of Applied Science in Applied Technology 
University of Ballarat 
  Master of Applied Science (Occupational Health and Safety) 
La Trobe University 
  Master in Occupational Health 1994 
  Master of Ergonomics 1994 
Deakin University 
  Master of Science (Occupational and Environmental Hygiene) 
1994 
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Appendix 3 (cont) 
Victorian University of Technology (Footscray) 
  Master of Applied Science 
  Master of Science in Health Hazard Analysis 
 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
University of Western Australia 
  Master of Public Health 
Curtin University of Technology 
  Master of Science (Ergonomics) 
  Master of Public Health 
Edith Cowen University 
  Master Health Science Occupational Health (1993) 
  Master Health Science Occupational Medicine (1995) 
2. GRADUATE DIPLOMA 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
University of New South Wales 
  Graduate Diploma of Safety Science 
  Graduate Diploma in Ergonomics 
University of Sydney 
  Graduate Diploma in Community Health Nursing  
  (Occupational Health) 
  Graduate Diploma in Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety) 
University of Newcastle 
  Graduate Diploma in Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety) 
University of Technology Sydney 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
University of Wollongong 
  Graduate Diploma in Science (Occupational Health and  
   Rehabilitation) 
University of Western Sydney 
  Graduate Diploma of Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety) 
  Graduate Certificate in Occupational Health Nursing 
University of New England 
  Graduate Diploma in Nursing (Occupational Health and Safety 
   Management) 
  Graduate Certificate in Nursing (Occupational Health and Safety 
   Management) 
Macquarie University 
  Graduate Diploma in Risk Management 
 
QUEENSLAND 
Queensland University of Technology 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
Griffith University 
  Graduate Diploma of Occupational Health and Safety   
   Management (1994) 
  Graduate Diploma of Rehabilitation 
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Appendix3 (cont) 
  Graduate Certificate in Occupational Hygiene 
University of Southern Queensland 
  Graduate Diploma in Business (Occupational Health and Safety) 
 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
University of Adelaide 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health  
University of South Australia 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Safety Management 
  Graduate Diploma of Nursing (Occupational Health and Safety) 
   
VICTORIA 
La Trobe University 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health Practice 
  Graduate Diploma in Ergonomics 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health Management 
University of Ballarat 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Hazard Management 
Deakin University 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Hygiene 
  Graduate Certificate of Industrial Hygiene Science 
Monash University 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health 
  Graduate Diploma in Epidemiology and Biostatistics 
Victorian University of Technology (Footscray) 
  Graduate Diploma in Health Science (Occupational Health 
Nursing) 
  Graduate Diploma of Applied Science (Environmental  and  
   Occupational Sample Analysis) 
Swinburne Institute of Technology 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health Practice 
  Graduate Diploma in Risk Management 
RMIT 
  Advanced Certificate in Operations Management 
Victoria University of Technology 
  Graduate Diploma of Engineering (Risk Engineering) 
 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Curtin University 
  Graduate Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
  Graduate Diploma in Ergonomics 
  Graduate Certificate in Occupational Health and Safety 
  Graduate Certificate in Occupational Health Management 
  Postgraduate Diploma in Ergonomics  
  Postgraduate Diploma in Health Sciences 
Edith Cowen University 
  Post Graduate Diploma of Health Science (1993) 
  Graduate Certificate in Occupational Health and Safety  
  Appendix 3 (cont) 
3. UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE 
 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
University of Western Sydney (Hawkesbury) 
  Bachelor of Applied Science (Environmental Health) 
  Bachelor of Commerce (Occupational Health and Safety) 
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  Bachelor of Applied Science (Occupational Health and Safety) 
University of Newcastle 
  Bachelor Occupational Health and Safety 
Wagga Wagga College  
  Bachelor of Health Sciences (Occupational Therapy) (1994) 
University of New South Wales 
  Safety and Environmental Health (Chemical Engineering) 
 
QUEENSLAND 
Griffith University 
  Bachelor of Behavioural Science (Work and Health) 
Queensland University of Technology 
  Bachelor of Applied Science (Occupational Health and Safety) 
 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
University of South Australia 
  Bachelor of Applied Science (Occupational Therapy) 
  Bachelor of Management (minor in occupational health and 
safety) 
University of Adelaide 
  Bachelor of Health Science (Occupational Health and Safety)  
Flinders University of South Australia 
  Bachelor Science (Environmental Health) 
  Bachelor of Applied Science (Occupational Health and Safety) 
1996. 
 
VICTORIA 
La Trobe University 
  Bachelor of Applied Science (Occupational Therapy) 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology 
  Bachelor of Applied Science (Safety) 
 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Curtin University of Technology 
  Bachelor of Science (Environmental Health) 
Edith Cowan University 
  Bachelor of Science (Environmental Health) 
 
 
 
 
 
4. DIPLOMA AND ASSOCIATE DIPLOMA 
 
 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
University of Newcastle 
  Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
  Associate Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
University of Sydney 
  Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
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VICTORIA 
University of Ballarat                                                         Appendix 3 (cont) 
  Occupational Health and Safety Certificate 
RMIT 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety)  
Broadmeadows College of TAFE 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety) 
Phillip Institute of Technology (Bundoora) 
  Associate Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
Victorian University of Technology (Footscray) 
  Diploma of Science in Occupational Health and Safety 
  Associate Diploma of Science in Occupational Health and Safety 
  Associate Diploma in Business Studies     
   (Operational Management) 
Monash University 
  Diploma in Occupational Health 
  Graduate Certificate of Risk Management (1994) 
  Associate Diploma of Engineering (Industrial Management) 
Gordon Technical College for Science and Technology 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Occupational Health) 
Holmsglen College of TAFE 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Occupational Health) 
  Occupational Health and Safety Certificate 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety) 
Swinbourne College 
  Diploma of Business Studies (Occupational Health and Safety) 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Fire Technology) 
Moorabbin College of TAFE 
  Associate Diploma in Business Studies (Operational 
Management) 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Fire Technology) 
Phillip Institute of Technology 
  Associate Diploma of Applied Science (Occupational Health) 
Victoria University  
South East Metropolitan College of TAFE 
  Diploma in Work Safety and Health 
 
 
 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA                                                   Appendix 3 (cont) 
 
 
Curtin University of Technology 
  Associate Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety 
TAFE 
  Associate Diploma in Applied Science (Work Safety and Health)  
  Associate Diploma in Safety Management 
  Diploma of Management (Occupational Health and Safety) 
  Diploma in Safety Management 
  Associate Diploma of Management 
  Associate Diploma in Business Administration 
  Certificate of Secretarial Management  
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QUEENSLAND 
 
TAFE 
  Associate Diploma in Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety) 
  Associate Diploma Workplace Health and Safety 
  Associate Diploma Business and Management (Occupational 
health   and safety)  
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
 
TAFE 
  Associate Diploma of Occupational Health and Safety 
  Certificate in Occupational Health and Safety  
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
 
Canberra Institute of Technology 
  Associate Diploma in Applied Science (Occupational Health and 
   Safety) 
 
5. ELECTED SUBJECTS 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
Charles Sturt University - Subject Occupational Health and Safety to 4th. year 
     students in occupational therapy. 
University of Technology Sydney - Subject Occupational Hazard Analysis to 
     students in Management studies 
      - Subject Data Analysis in Occupational 
      Health and Safety to students in 
Mathematics 
      - Subject Legal Aspects of Occupational 
      Health and Safety to students in Law 
      - Subject People and the Environment to 
      students in Mechanical Engineering 
      - Subject Construction Safety to students in 
      Building Studies. 
 
Appendix 3 (cont) 
 
University of Sydney  -  Subject Occupational Health and Safety to 1st year 
     students in Chemical Engineering 
       -  Subject Occupational Health and Safety to Postgrad 
     Facilities management students. 
Macquarie University     -    Subject  Risk Management dor Financial 
Institutions      Graduate Diploma Banking 
QUEENSLAND  
University of Central Queensland - Subject Occupational Health and Safety 
presented to 2nd. year students in Human Resource Management and 
Nursing.(1994) 
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University of Queensland - Subject Occupational Health and Safety (6 units) to 
    students in Microbiology, Chemistry and Industrial 
relations. 
 
Griffith University - Subject Environmental and Occupational Hygiene to 2nd. 
     year Psychology students 
    - Subject Occupational Health and Safety Law and 
Policy to 3rd. year students in Psychology 
    - Subject Workplace Health Practicum to 3rd. year 
     students in Psychology 
    - Subject Work, Human Biology and Human 
factors to 1st. year students Behavioural Science. 
    - Subject Occupational health and safety to 
Nursing      students  
    -Subject Risk Minimisation to 3rd year Bachelor of 
     Engineering students 
University of Southern Queensland - Subject Occupational Health and Safety 
to      students in Bachelor of Business 
      - Subject Human factors and Corporate 
Occupational Health and Safety and Occupational Health and Hygiene and 
safety Sciences in practice to students in Graduate Diploma of Management (8 
units) and Master of Business Administration (10 units) 
        -  Subject    Health and Safety in the 
Visual Arts, first year Faculty of Arts. 
       -  Subject    Health and Safety Stage 
Management, first year Faculty of Arts.(1996). 
     _Subject  Credit Risk Management 
      Subject  Corporate Occupational Health 
      and Safety   
     Subject Occupational Health and   
      Hygiene 
     Subject  Safety Science in Practice for 
Management 2nd year students 
VICTORIA 
Deakin University Subject - Industrial Toxicology 3rd. year Chemistry 
students. 
      Subject - Occupational Hygiene 3rd. year Chemistry 
     students. 
   Subject - Risk Management 2nd year Bachelor of 
Commerce 
University of Melbourne Subject - Occupational Health and Safety to 3rd. year 
   students in Physiotherapy. 
Appendix 3 (cont) 
 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
Adelaide University - Subject Working Health Care presented to 2nd. year 
students in:- medicine, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, nursing, social 
work, podiatry and health surveying. 
                    - Subject Public Health 3 to 3rd. year students in:- health science. 
                    - Subject Community Health to final year medical students.        
Flinders University of South Australia 
             - Subject Biotechnology 3rd year students. 
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WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
University of Western Australia - Subject Industrial Safety to 4th. year 
students in     Engineering 
           - Subject Laboratory Safety to 1st. year 
students     in Chemistry, Physics, Anatomy, Botany and 
Psychology 
      
- Subject Safety Management to 1st year     
 students Master Business Administration. 
     - Subject Health and Safety to 1st year Oil 
and  Gas Engineering students 
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Appendix 4 
REVIEW OF RELATED HISTORICAL LITERATURE 
 
 Historical Overview of Health and Safety Education: 
 
Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S), while its formal study might be 
comparatively new, is an aspect of human endeavour that stretches back to 
earliest human existence.  Prehistoric man, no less than modern man, was fully 
preoccupied with matters of safety and survival.  A significant and deliberate 
monument to health and safety are ancient cave drawings depicting a hunter 
holding spears standing behind a rock.  While these drawings may be perceived 
as merely an expression of a preoccupation with life and death, the depiction of 
a rock affording protection is a characteristic that distinguishes a previous 
hazardous experience and the application of effective safety management 
control procedures by a key decision-maker. 
 
From the time of prehistoric man until the present, successive generations have 
built upon experience to enhance their knowledge of practices and procedures 
that ensure safety in all aspects of life.  As generations nurtured the building of 
civilisation, safety experiences and discoveries were developed, transmitted in 
a variety of ways and particularly elaborated through the formal and informal 
education of children.  This was an apprenticeship of life.  However, this 
apprenticeship in safety education did not necessarily proceed without error.  
Boyd, (1926) expresses the view that safe behaviour was once controlled by 
magical beliefs and superstitions, many of which, in one form or another, may 
still survive both formally and informally.  With the growth of knowledge and 
development of social institutions such as family and the tribe, information 
regarding individual safe behaviour would have been shared for the common 
good. 
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Breasted, (1935) claims that the age of specialisation in which manual skills 
and technological civilisation were developed as starting with the advent of the 
first calendar in 4200 BC.  This early human record had evident implications 
for education even if it was unconscious education.  Discoveries were made 
and inventions were established historically by trial and error.  When 
occupations became specialised, careful and long-continued training became 
necessary and the need for apprenticeship arose. 
 
 Safety and Survival: 
 
The need to survive precipitated safe hunting or safe work practices.  An 
example of the need for survival affecting social organisation and behaviour is 
the lifestyle adopted by the Spartans.  To combat external threats to their 
existence their lifestyle adopted a rigid militaristic focus.  Prior to this change 
in focus they had what may be termed a typical Greek appreciation, both of 
beauty and sport.  Perhaps this narrowing of interest might be indicated by the 
small number of Spartan names that appear in the lists of Olympian victors.  
Anthropologist Boyd, (1975) expresses a view that the sudden arrest in Spartan 
social development was occasioned by a demand for community safety from 
imperialistic ambitions of aggressive neighbours. 
 
More modern anthropological evidence is available where the environment 
utterly transposed the lifestyle and possibly moral codes of a tribe.  Musgrave, 
(1978) when discussing morality changes identified such evidence: 
“There is a Ugandan tribe, called the Ik, who live in the 
mountains on the Sudan border.  The Ik were formally a hunting 
people, but in 1950 their hunting lands were converted by the 
government into a game reserve.  The Ik refused to move and as a 
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result their way of life no longer matched their physical 
environment.  In their fight for survival they embarked on a code 
of ‘Devil take the hindmost’ and examples were sighted that half 
masticated food would be removed from the mouths of the weak 
and old and eaten by younger, fitter persons.” 
 
Turnbull, (1974) summarised the degradation of the tribe as: 
“That the Ik have successfully abandoned useless appendages, 
those basic qualities such as family, cooperative sociality, belief, 
love, hope and so forth, for the very good reason that in their 
context these mitigated against survival.” 
 
The abandonment of all of society’s refinement and culture demonstrates that 
social organisation takes an inferior role when basic survival needs dominate.  
During precarious times, from the earliest phase of human development, our 
ancestors considered their vulnerability.  Innate characteristics of human 
behaviour were ‘programmed’ by the way the environment shaped lifestyle.  
Whereas, religion, philosophy and, more recently, psychology are attempts to 
explain both nature and development of personality, nothing shaped the nature 
of people’s work or hunting methods more than seeing their companions 
slaughtered and maybe butchered as a food source by the very animals they 
were hunting. 
 
It was this same necessity of protection from northern barbarians that caused 
Rome to develop weapon training schools.  After the destruction of the Roman 
Empire, the Roman church commenced its claim of secular education.  In early 
Italian universities the subject of prime interest was law.  The development 
from the law of the jungle in which natural consequences provided the penalty 
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to law, in which the penalty had to be provided by society, was slow.  Here, 
sophisticated survival is supported by legislation.  Ward, (1935) in his 
historical research of English education recognised that knowledge of law had 
become necessary to be able to survive in medieval times seven hundred years 
before the industrial revolution of Europe.  
 
 Hygiene and Health Development:  
 
As church law dominated primordial laws and customs organised religion 
encompassed safety control measures, as is confirmed in Deuteronomy 23, 
verses 9-13 Moses (15th-13th Century BC) instructed followers to:  
“Go outside the camp to relieve yourselves.  Carry a stick to dig 
a hole and cover it up.” 
 
Early English health and safety control measures, as evidenced by what may be 
defined as occupational health and hygiene education, are apparent throughout 
English history.  Boyd, (1926) reported that scholars such as Aldhelm in the 
seventh century and Bede and Alcuin, in the eighth demanded sanitation away 
from their classes.   
 
While Danish invasions may have interrupted English educational progress in 
this field, Edey, (1972) noted that Viking warships were designed with toilet 
holes in the bow of vessels. HMS Endeavour, built in 1764 in which Cook 
(1728-79) discovered Australia had two open bow toilet holes for his crew.  
Known as the ‘heads’ the salt water continually washed them down, ensuring 
controlled hygienic conditions. 
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Boughton (1991) noted that the English king, Alfred (849-c.900), encouraged 
the founding of education schools, and a testimony to his endeavours was 
furnished by AElfric, a teacher in 1000, who produced the first English school 
book.  However, as King Alfred the Great is remembered by generations of 
English students as the King who in 878 burnt the East Anglian villagers’ cakes 
because of his negligence, it is appropriate that he be disregarded as a possible 
patron to safety.  
 
The history of occupational disease may be considered as old as the written 
word. Benison, (1985) observes the Egyptian scribe Sellier Papyrus commented 
on dangers within the workplace.  These observations were echoed by writers 
such as Xenophon (431-355 BC), Diodorus Siculus, Lucretius (96-55 BC) and 
Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD) who wrote tellingly of the dangers of manual 
labour.  He continues that Ulrich Ellenbog’s brief pamphlet Von Den Giftgen 
besen Tempfen und Reuchen  (On the Poisonous and Noxious Vapours and 
Fumes of Metals) written in 1473 was probably one of the earliest works to 
specifically deal with health problems associated with these enterprises. 
 
 Early Educational Contributions in Occupational Disease: 
 
Throughout medieval times there appear to have been no significant 
contributions to the study of occupational disease.  It was not until the middle 
of the sixteenth century that Wright (1964) and Hunter (1975) record the 
writings of two remarkable men, Agricola and Paracelsus on the subject of 
miners’ diseases and, at the close of the seventeenth century, the classical work 
of Ramazzini brought the subject of occupational disease into prominence. 
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Agricola’s works, the twelve volumes of ‘De Re Metallica’ deal with every 
aspect of mining and with the associated smelting and refining of gold and 
silver.  His sixth book covers at some length the diseases and accidents 
prevalent among miners and the means available to guard against them.  While 
his account lacks precision it is nevertheless possible to distinguish the 
conditions: silicosis, tuberculosis, and carcinoma of the lungs in his description 
of disease symptoms.  He observed, 
“On the other hand some mines are so dry that they are entirely 
devoid of water, and this dryness caused the workmen even 
greater harm, for the dust, which is stirred and beaten up by 
digging, penetrates into the windpipe and lungs, and produces 
difficulty in breathing and the disease which the Greeks call 
asthma.  If the dust has corrosive qualities, it eats away the lungs, 
and implants consumption in the body.  In the mines of the 
Carpathian Mountains, women are found who have married 
seven husbands, all of whom this terrible consumption has 
carried off to a premature death.” 
 
To protect the miners against dust Agricola (1494-1555) advised purification of 
the air in the mine by ventilating machines and by the use of loose veils over 
the faces of the miners. 
 
Like Agricola, Paracelsus (1493-1541) was a physician with a deep working 
knowledge of the mining industry.  While, to the modern reader, some of his 
theories border on the absurd, he did recognise the poisonous effects of various 
metals and differentiated acute and chronic forms of poisoning.  In his second 
and third books of ‘Von der Bergsucht’ he described quite clearly the diseases 
of smelter workers and metallurgists (Benison, 1985). 
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The third of these historical figures, Ramazzini is, regarded as the ‘Father of 
Occupational Medicine’.  His classic work ‘De Morbis Artificum Diatriba’, 
published in 1700, is an exact and accurate description of occupational 
diseases.  Ramazzini's deep concern for the well being of workers is well 
illustrated in his writings.  The following passage is an example of this concern. 
“Medicine, like jurisprudence, should make a contribution to the 
well-being of workers and see to it that, so far as possible, they 
should exercise their callings without harm.  So I for my part 
have done what I could and have not thought it unbecoming to 
make my way into the lowliest workshops and study the mysteries 
of the mechanic arts.” 
 
In the course of his investigations Ramazzini inquired into the conditions of 
work and industrial diseases from the broad occupational field of ‘cheese 
makers and corpse carriers to cleaners of privies and cesspits.’ 
 
Wright (1964) summarises that in the absence of any knowledge of 
microbiology it is perhaps not surprising that Ramazzini attributed diseases to 
trades which were merely offensive to the sense of smell.  It is also remarkable 
that many of his recommendations would today fall into the realm of welfare 
rather than that of medicine.  For instance, he recommended rest intervals in 
work of prolonged duration and dwelt on the need for exercise and change of 
posture, being convinced of the importance of faulty posture in producing ill 
health in many trades.   
 
Some of these control measures are only being detected as OH&S issues in 
recent times, i.e. truck drivers/fatigue and occupational overuse syndrome, 
emphasising the need for those key decision-makers to have the capacity to 
 
 175
identify and then control safety issues..  He condemned want of ventilation and 
unsuitable work temperatures and urged that workers in dusty trades should, in 
default of any known exhaust system, work in spacious rooms with their backs 
to the draught and should wash their faces, rinse out their mouths with water, 
and quit work in such trades immediately symptoms of respiratory disease 
show that the lungs are threatened. 
 
Of the pronouncements made by Ramazzini one in particular stands out and has 
stood the test of time: 
“When a doctor visits a working-class home he should be content 
to sit on a three-legged stool, if there isn't a gilded chair, and he 
should take time for his examination; and to the questions 
recommended by Hippocrates, he should add one more. What is 
your occupation?” (Wright, 1964). 
 
So far this brief review has indicated that throughout history various 
governments of the day neglected, or were unaware, of the need for 
intervention into workers’ deaths.  Three hundred years elapsed and it was not 
until the 1800’s that progress was made and the development of occupational 
medicine and the accompanying government services commenced in western 
nations and focussed on safety control measures by the decision-makers. 
 
An Overview of the Evolution of Industrial Medicine: 
 
Wright, (1964) in describing life of Greek miners stipulated that they were 
almost always slaves; their lives both brutal and short.  The poor condition of 
miners and the low esteem in which they were held is well documented in 
Greek and Roman literature.  In Greek mythology Hephaestos the God of fire 
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was the divine smith and patron of craftsmen.  Curiously, he is portrayed as a 
pathetic figure, lame and unkempt in appearance.  Vulcan the Roman God of 
iron, brass and devouring flame was also ugly, misshapen and lame as were the 
Scandinavian Volundr, lord of the elves and the Teutonic Wieland the smith.  It 
would be tempting to speculate that these human perceptions assigned to the 
Gods closely paralleled the physical realities of the times. 
 
In his writings, Socrates (469-399 BC) revealed an attitude of prejudice, which 
existed in ancient Greece towards those citizens who plied a mechanical trade.  
This attitude to manual labour led to a decline in the social status of the manual 
labourer, which to the day accompanied the growth of civilisation.  He stated, 
“What are called the mechanical arts, carry a social stigma and 
are rightly dishonoured in our cities.  For these arts damage the 
bodies of those who work at them or who have charge of them, by 
compelling the workers to a sedentary life and an indoor life, by 
compelling them indeed, in some cases to spend the whole day by 
fire.  This physical degeneration results also in deterioration of 
the soul.”  (Benison, 1985). 
  
The social division in ancient Greece between the citizen and the worker was 
very real and partially explains the apparent neglect of the working man in 
ancient medical practice and the ignorance of occupational diseases in medical 
science. Wright, (1964) observes the medical writing of Hippocrates (c 460-
375 BC) and his colleagues was essentially the work of citizen doctors for 
citizen patients.   Hippocratic medicine rested on the concept of balance 
between the living organism and its environment.  It regarded sickness as an 
effort to restore a disturbed equilibrium and the duty of the physician was to 
cooperate with nature’s efforts to secure a readjustment.  Unfortunately, it is 
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now understood that this particular philosophy neglected what may be 
considered as the most important element in the environment from the point of 
health and safety, and that was the occupation of the victim and who was 
controlling their safety.  
 
Though they developed and preached occupational medicine as essentially a 
preventative discipline, the great figures in medical history - Bernadini 
Ramazzini (1633-1714) in Modena, Charles Thackrah (1795-1833) in Leeds, 
Alice Hamilton (1869-1970) in U.S.A; Sir Thomas Legge (1863-1932) and 
Donald Hunter (1898-1978) of London were all clinicians; yet they all believed 
in visiting workplaces and observing work.  Ramazzini stated, 
“I have not thought it beneath me to step into workshops of the 
meaner sort and study the obscure operations of the mechanical 
arts; all the more that nowadays (1713) medicine has been 
converted into mechanical art.” 
 
Meiklejohn (1957) translates Thackrah, 
“Not the casual surgeon, nor as an industrial toxicologist, he was 
a good general practitioner and clinician, keenly observant of the 
effects of work and social factors on the health not only the 
masters and the workmen - but the whole community from 
childhood to old age.” 
 
Hamilton, originally a clinician then a pathologist, became famous for her 
insistence on inspecting places of work associated with the industrial disease 
that she recognised (Hamilton, 1943). 
 
Donald Hunter known to generations of medical students for his text, with 
Hutchinson on clinical methods, combined his skills as a physician with those 
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of a great inquirer into conditions of work and their effect on disease (Dobson, 
1969).  Hunter (1975) stressed the need for decision-makers to have the ability 
to control safety by noting Sir Thomas Legge insightful statement, 
‘Unless and until the employer has done everything, and everything 
means a good deal, the workman can do nothing to protect himself.' 
 
Early medical practitioners applied occupational medicine to a limited extent in 
their ordinary practice.  In the nineteenth century, legislation on workers in the 
dangerous trades placed an onus on the employer to provide medical 
supervision, usually provided by the local practitioner.  Progressively, 
enlightened employers introduced medical services into the work environment.  
In 1982, in the United Kingdom, of three thousand physicians in industry, two 
thirds were part time appointments the rest general medical practitioners.   This 
statistic indicates a slow progress to provide ‘on site’ medical services. 
Meiklejohn (1957) translates Thackrah (1831) when speaking of accepted 
tolerance stated, 
“Evils are suffered to exist, even when the means of correction 
are known and easily applied.” 
 
Ramazzini and Thackrah were not passive observers of the potentially injurious 
nature of the workplace.  Their grim litany of diseases had great impact on their 
contemporaries who demanded that the sacrifice of health and vigour cease. 
 
The British Medical Association (NSW branch) fostered the first organised 
professional development of OH&S with the formation of its section of 
occupational medicine in May 1952.  A similar action in Victoria commenced 
four months later.  The Australian Society of Occupational Medicine founded 
in 1969 was renamed ANZSOM in 1972 and formed state branches.  
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Australia, having lagged behind the rest of the world in regard to OH&S 
quickly caught up in the organisation of speciality occupational physicians.  
The Australian College of Occupational Medicine, formed in 1983, was not 
long in incubation behind the Royal College of Physicians in London 1978. 
 
Development of Government Services in Western Nations: 
 
In 1853, in the United Kingdom, the first occupational physician was appointed 
in the Post Office. The Factory Medical Inspectorate, however, was not formed 
until 1898.  The first appointee in America was in 1868 for the Southern Pacific 
Railroad Company, and it was not until 1914 that the United States commenced 
the Division of Industrial Hygiene in the Health Service.  This action was 
followed by the American Association of Industrial Physicians in 1915, and the 
first degree course in industrial hygiene commenced at Harvard in 1918 (Munk, 
1982). 
 
Australia has not played a prominent role in the development of OH&S.  This 
is not surprising in view of the youth of the country and the nature of early 
convict Australian society.  There were, however, some early references to 
occupational health practices.  George Cook Attfield a Surgeon General in 
Western Australia from 1854-1879 observed:  
“Taking into consideration the importance of the works carried 
out in the neighbourhood of Fremantle during the past year, 
(1866) especially in the making of Fremantle Beach and in 
clearing the Bar at the mouth of the Swan, it is not a little 
remarkable how very few accidents have occurred serious 
enough to require admission to hospital.” 
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The number of injuries in the workplace does not support his somewhat 
positive response to OH&S at the time.  In fact it was a classic case where 
safety measures were not controlled by key decision-makers.  For example, in 
the records of the ‘Imperial Surgeon’ it is recorded that five cases of burns, 
three of fractures and fifty-four of wounds, contusions, excoriations and sprains 
were admitted to hospital. 
 
Early colonial health departments were not under any jurisdiction to perform to 
the medical standards of today.  Hansford-Miller, (1993) in his study of 
medical practices in early Australian colonial days noted that a Doctor Stuart 
(was the first person to become legally qualified under the 1839 NSW Medical 
Qualification Act) in the village of Parramatta in New South Wales, caused a 
child’s hair to be dyed to change it from red to black as his safety control 
prescription against racism. 
 
Benevolent medical practices also occurred in Western Australia, where the 
importance of alcohol as a prescribed medical treatment was given great status 
as a health control measure.  A condensed explanation by Wingate, (1980) is 
that the total ration was 13.5 times (405 grams) the 1995 limits allowed for 
motorists before they infringe traffic legislation.  Beer or Porter was the main 
fluid intake, and high temperatures (40 degrees Celsius are not uncommon) 
would have made even greater demands on the consumption of liquids.  
Ramson, (1988) calculated that such recommended daily intake was 11.52 
pints, that is an equivalent to 28.63 Australian ‘Middies’  (Appendix 2). 
 
John Ruskin (1819-1900) an influential Victorian critic who examined the 
relationship between British workers and their employer maintained that the 
employer had a duty of care to the nation to provide for the worker.  He 
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maintained that safety education would motivate workers to prevent damage 
and injury.  Ruskin’s, (1893) critical stimulus in an era when human life was 
not at the forefront of merchant’s aspirations was not well accepted and it is 
only in retrospect that his calls for a duty of care are now repetitious in all 
occupational health and safety legislation.  He deserves a place in occupational 
health and safety history. 
 
Outstanding physicians such as Hunter and Legge who devoted themselves to 
the problem of occupational diseases and injuries noted that safety control 
measures must commence at the design stage.  Legge stood by his convictions 
by resigning his appointment as His Majesty’s Senior Medical Inspector of 
Factories when he disagreed with control measures being advocated by his 
government that could not foreseeably protect the worker. (Hunter,1975)  He 
stated, 
‘If you can bring to influence to bear external to the workman (that is 
one that he has no control) you will successful; if you do not or cannot 
you will be unsuccessful.’ 
 
The first medical officer in an Australian industrial organisation, the Sydney 
Water Board, was appointed in 1891 to deal with public health aspects of the 
service.  Organised concern over occupational hazards, especially continued 
pneumoconiosis at various times, commenced a series of royal commissions 
and inquiries, from the 1890’s to the 1920’s into lead at Broken Hill (1893) and 
Port Pirie (1910), the clothing trade (1920) and the printing trade (1924).  
These investigations, recorded by Robertson, (1985), produced excellent 
medical analysis which contained matters of considerable importance to the 
field of occupational health and safety. 
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Significant also in this regard was the Conferences of the Commonwealth and 
the States on industrial hygiene in 1922 and 1924.  At these conferences an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to institute uniform hygiene standards and 
statistical collection throughout Australia.  The first Australian government unit 
to be established in this field was the Division of Industrial Hygiene in the 
Commonwealth Department of Health, initiated in 1921 by J.H.Cumpston.  
 
The then Director D.G.Robertson was responsible for a remarkable series of 
investigations into the health of teachers, taxation, postal and railway workers, 
and various private industry groups, before the division closed in 1932 during 
the depression.  In 1923, a division started in New South Wales (NSW) and in 
later years in other states, but the federal unit was never reinstated until the 
1985 major initiative of the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission Act.  In 1980 Sydney University celebrated its fiftieth anniversary 
of its School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine and changed its name to 
the Commonwealth Institute of Health remaining today as a national 
information resource centre. (Young, 1984) 
 
A survey by Munk, (1982) of medical practitioners in 1925 revealed only eight 
full time physicians in five industrial establishments (four government, one 
private) and thirty part-time appointments.  In 1936 the Commonwealth 
Munitions Medical Service commenced and is still operational. 1942 saw the 
commencement of the Occupational Health and Safety Committee of the 
National Health and Medical Research Council.  This was a great achievement 
considering it was developed during the ‘darker’ days of World War Two.  The 
opening of the Occupational Health Unit at the University of Sydney followed 
in 1948. 
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 Summary: 
 
This study has referred briefly to occupational health and safety historical 
origins as it is considered necessary due to the newness and changing 
characteristics of occupational health and safety to place the study in a clearer 
perspective.  Modern safety education is a product of these observations.  It is a 
combination of inherited contributions of knowledge shaped by the 
environment in that people live and work.  The preceding review of the 
literature has not attempted to provide an exhaustive historical account but 
rather to indicate the breadth of concern that was expressed for the workers of 
yesteryear and that safety control was created by those in charge.   
 
This examination indicates that the topic of solving occupational health and 
safety problems has been given considerable thought since Medieval times and 
it is of interest to observe that these ancient operators of medical practice 
considered the work environment rather than attempting to protect the worker.  
Their perception of their safety responsibilities was enhanced by knowledge 
and they constantly refer to the responsibility of factory owners to be in control 
of safety as they were the decision-makers. 
 
Centuries have passed, however Blyth (2001) noted when reviewing Australian 
occupational health and safety training, 
‘The biggest limitation in Australia’s safety training framework is that it 
is mechanistic.  It is driven by people saying we have to do it, rather 
than an embedded understanding of what they need to do…a change is 
needed from “competency”- based training to “mastery” - based 
training’.  
 
This appendix offered a macroscopic historical summary of occupational health 
and safety.  The following appendix establishes why there is broad support for the 
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view that non-specialists students need to be educated in occupational health and 
safety so they as future decision-makers may understand control measures.  
Prevention principles now underpin approaches taken by most occupational 
health and safety regulatory authorities in Australia.  It will demonstrate why 
engineers are an ideal subject group to study and that their educational curricula is 
not producing the competencies/approaches that they need.  The hierarchy places 
greater value on engineering controls that rely on removing or controlling 
hazards at source rather than those, which rely on behaviour modification of 
people exposed to hazards. 
 
The role of the national commission (National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission) and the Australian Federal Government and Australian trade 
unions initiatives in occupational health and safety will now be examined.   
 
The appendix will identify National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission’s corporate objective in education and training to provide national 
leadership in the development of high quality, cost effective safety education is 
allowing students the capability to identify and problem solve safety issues by 
utilising a safe place philosophy rather than the control measure of changing 
the worker’s method of operation.  Despite difficult economic stringency and 
the need to improve Australia’s industrial base to be competitive, Emmett, 
(1992), the Chairman of National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
had noted that Australia’s poor occupational health and safety performance is a 
matter of concern and debate that cannot be dismissed.  In 2002 the 
Commission announced its first national strategy 2002-2012 to bring about 
short and long term occupational health and safety improvements. 
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Appendix 5  
CHALLENGE OF TURNING WORTHY INTENTIONS INTO 
ACTION 
 
Introduction: 
 
Turning the aspirations of the previous chapter into reality in Australia it is 
necessary to interpret the complexity of factors that influenced occupational 
health and safety by examining governing bodies that influence, administer and 
enforce occupational health and safety.  These governing bodies received 
strong criticism from the 1995 Australian Industry Commission Report and this 
criticism was supported by Betts, (1995) who stated, 
 “The current institutional arrangements must carry much of the 
 responsibility for our nation’s poor performance in preventing 
 occupational  injuries and diseases.” 
 
This appendix will also focus on mechanisms that operate nationally, however 
are not reflected in university’s professional level of engineering curricula. 
 
 The Australian Federal Government Administration of 
Occupational Health and Safety Legislation: 
 
Australia is a federation.  It comprises a central government that has certain 
law-making powers, and a number of States and Territories that also have law-
making powers.  This is in contrast with the unitary legal system of England 
from which much of Australian legislation originated.  Various Federal and 
State departments administer occupational health and safety legislation 
throughout Australia.  This administration also includes enforcement provisions 
of the Acts and also implies that advice and assistance is available.  Persons 
employed in enforcement agencies often administer advice.  Enforcement 
refers to those statutory procedures that are used to command compliance with 
respective legislation.   
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The following description outlines the structure and operations of governing 
agencies that influence OH&S in Australia. 
 
 National Occupational Health and Safety Commission: 
 
The Australian Federal Government is served by the National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) which is a "tripartite" body 
established by the Federal Government to develop, facilitate and implement a 
national OH&S strategy.  Its mandate includes standards development, 
research, training, information collection and dissemination and the 
development of common approaches to OH&S legislation.  The Commission 
comprises representatives of peak employer bodies and unions, as well as the 
Federal, State and Territory Governments.  In addition, in line with the 
Commission’s philosophy of participation, standing committees and working 
parties are basically tripartite in nature, but also include persons with specialist 
knowledge and representatives of groups with special needs.  The chairman 
Emmett, (1992) announced that the Commission’s corporate plan was to reduce 
the number and cost of OH&S injuries and to facilitate the improvement of 
OH&S performance in Australia. 
 
The Federal Department of Employment and Industrial Relations is concerned 
with industrial health and safety through its Working Environment Division.  
One of its responsibilities is to oversee implementation of the Code of General 
Principles on Occupational Health and Safety in Australian Government 
Employment.  The Department also provides advice and prepares publications 
and research into occupational health matters.  Its central administration office 
is in Canberra with regional offices in all states with exception of the Northern 
Territory. The two organisations mentioned above have primary roles within 
occupational health and safety. In addition, the following Federal departments 
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operate Australia-wide and are advisory agencies for the many disciplines that 
OH&S encompasses. 
* Department of Community Services and Health has responsibilities for 
therapeutics, health research and service matters including international health.   
* Industrial Relations Bureau administers Federal awards dealing with 
occupational health and safety of Commonwealth employees. 
* Department of Administrative Services offers advice on technical 
matters relating to construction safety and the performance of building 
materials.   
* Department of Transport and Communications is responsible for 
investigation of all aircraft safety and develops analysis of data for safety 
enhancement purposes.   
* Office of Road Safety is responsible for all road safety, including road 
traffic and vehicle engineering and human factors in road safety.   
* Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation has 
research allocations in the field of occupational health and industrial safety.   
* Maritime Services Advisory Committee has a mandate to oversee all 
maritime safety and aspects of search and rescue.   
* Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Safety Review 
is a successor to the Atomic Energy Commission which assesses all standards, 
practices and procedures relating to radiation and laboratory safety.   
* Finally, the Commonwealth Fire Board enforces regulations concerning 
fire safety in commonwealth owned and operated buildings. 
 
 Australian States and Territories Administration of OH&S 
 Legislation: 
 
All Australian states and territories have various departments governing the 
administration and enforcement of OH&S provisions, they include 
Departments of Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare to Departments of 
Mines, Health, Labour and Industry, Work Health Authority, Industrial Affairs 
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and Industrial Relations.  This is a potentially confusing array of government 
agencies, each with jurisdictions that often duplicate inspection, enforcement 
and administration.  Braithwaite and Grabosky, (1985) when reviewing 
Australian government occupational health and safety enforcement agencies 
reinforced this view and recorded one hundred and eleven government 
authorities with OH&S regulatory responsibilities. 
 
A fundamental role of OH&S legislation in Australian States relates to those 
persons with safety obligations to others, for example, employers, employees, 
manufacturers, owners and occupiers of premises, suppliers of plant and goods, 
self-employed persons and the Crown.  Gunningham, (1984) observed in his 
research on the role of law that this legal objective originated from the Roben’s 
Report, (1972) which placed a low reliance on law enforcement as a regulatory 
strategy, and a heavy reliance on voluntary industry initiatives.  The main 
approach of government agencies in the field of occupational health and safety 
is to react to serious accidents.  All states have power to conduct random 
surveys of industry without notice in order to identify and intercept potential 
hazards.  The resources of these agencies, however, are generally consumed 
through activities dealing with complaints, thereby reducing their effective 
advisory services.  Indeed, Braithwaite and Grabosky, (1985) identified that a 
distinctive feature of Australian legislation is the offending employer has to 
notify the inspectorate when they have offended in the case of a serious 
accident. 
 
In October 2003 the ACT Legislative Assembly premeditated industrial 
manslaughter laws, could see negligent bosses jailed for twenty-five years and 
fined up to $5million, if workers are killed at work. The move will see 
industrial manslaughter placed in the Crimes Act, making it a criminal offence. 
Company directors or board members could be jailed if an employee is killed at 
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work or if the employer was found to have been negligent in contributing to the 
death. ACT Industrial Relations Minister, Katy Gallagher, reports, 
‘… the government intends to have the legislation passed by November. 
We take this very seriously. We're sending a clear message to 
employers.  Where there is gross negligence they deserve to be 
charged.’  
  
As previously indicated numerous government administrative agencies 
complicate occupational health and safety compliance and legislation.  Such 
compliance deteriorates when the extent of legislation is analysed.  Table 6.0 
illustrates the extent of OH&S legislation in New South Wales.  Table 5.1 lists 
the Acts and Regulations that impact solely on chemicals and their use in 
Queensland.   
 
Each jurisdiction has penalties for self-employed persons, manufacturers, 
suppliers of substances.  These have not been listed however, as they are too 
numerous and too specific.  As a benchmark to massive prosecution changes 
since 1995, the Western Australian government on 1st Jan 2005 increased the 
maximum fine from $200,000 to $500,000 for breaches to occupational health 
and safety legislation.  New penalties and expansion of duty of care obligations 
also came into effect on 1 January 2005, while changes to the powers of safety 
and health representatives and the establishment of a safety and health tribunal 
will occur from 4th April 2005.  (http://www.safetyline.wa.gov.au) 
 
 Standards Australia: 
 
Standards Australia, established in 1922 is a non-government organisation. It 
operates under a Royal Charter of the Standards Association of Australia and is 
internationally recognised as the peak standards body through a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Commonwealth Government.  
Table 5.0 
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EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATION WHICH IMPACTS AT THE 
WORKPLACE LEVEL 
 
Aerial Spraying Control Acts 
Carcinogenic Substances Regulations 1978 
Clean Air Act 1961 
Clean Waters Act 1970 
Coal Mine Regulation Act 1982 
Construction Safety Act 1912 
Consumer Protection/Trade Practices Acts 
Dangerous Goods Act 1975 
Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act 1983 
Factories Shops and/or Industries Acts 
Hazard Communication Legislation 
Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 
Liquefied Petroleum Act 1961 
Local Government Acts 1991 
Major Hazard Acts 
Mines Inspection Act 1901 
Mining Act 1973 
Noxious Trades Act 1902 
Occupational Health and Safety (Committees in Workplace)1984 
Occupational Health and Safety (Asbestos Dust)1984 
Occupational Health and Safety (Inspectors Notices)1988 
Occupational Health and Safety (Asbestos Removal)1988 
Occupational Health and Safety (Pest Control)1988 
Occupational Health and Safety (First Aid)1989 
Occupational Health and Safety (Confined Spaces)1990 
Occupational Health and Safety (Notice of Accidents)1990 
Occupational Health and Safety (Floors Passages Stairs)1990 
Occupational Health and Safety (Manual Handling)1991 
Occupational Health and Safety (Plant Safety)Draft 
Occupational Health and Safety (Hazardous Substances)Draft 
Pesticide and Allied Chemical Act 1978 
Petroleum Act 1955 
Poisons Act 1966 
Public Health Act 1902 
Radiation Control Act 1992 
Therapeutic Goods and services Act 1972 
Waste Disposal Act 1970 
Workers Compensation Act 1987 
 
 
The above is a representation of the numerous Acts and Regulations which administer 
and enforce Occupational Health and Safety legislation in New South Wales alone. 
Source: Occupational Health and Safety and the Law, Winder, 1993. 
 
Table 5.1 
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PRINCIPAL LEGISLATION COVERING MANAGEMENT OF 
CHEMICALS IN QUEENSLAND. 
 
Department of Vocational Education, Employment, Training and Industrial 
Relations: Workplace Safety and Health Act, 1989. 
Department of Environment and Heritage:  
Clean Air Act 1987 and Regulations 
Clean Waters Act 1971-1982 and Regulations 
Pollution of Waters by Oil Act 1973 and Regulations 
Queensland Marine (Sea Dumping) Act 
Department of Health: 
Health Act 1937-1989 
Hazardous Substances (Placarding) Regulations 1988 
Pest Control Regulations 1977 
Poisons Regulations 1973-1985 
Refuse Management Regulations 1977-1978 
Radioactive Substances Act 1958-1978, and Regulations 
Department of Housing and Local Government: 
Building Act 1975-1984 and By-laws 
Local Government Act 1936-1985 
Flammable and Combustible Liquids Regulations 1990 
Department of Primary Industries: 
Agricultural Chemicals, Distribution Control Act 1966-1983 
Agricultural Standards Act 1952-1981 and Regulations 
Chemical Usage(Agricultural and Veterinary) Control Act 1988 
Queensland Marine Act 
Sewerage and Water Supply Act 
Department of Resource Industries: 
Coal Mining Act 
Explosive Act 1952-1981 
Gas Act 1965-1990 and Regulations 
Mineral resources Act 1989 
Mining Act 1968-1983 and Regulations 
Department of Transport: 
Air Navigation Act,  Railways Act 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road Act 1984 and Regulations 
Sea Carriage of Goods (State) Act 
Department of Police and Emergency Services: 
Fire Safety Act 1974-1984 and Regulations 1976, 1985 
Fire Services Act 1989 
Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1990 
Contaminated Land Act 1991 
Dangerous Substances Act 1992 
 
Source: Pratt, (1993) University of Queensland.  
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The purpose of the ASA operation is to bring together individuals and 
organisations committed to a common objective.  That is to establish Australian 
Standards as national benchmarks for products and services so as to enhance 
the quality of life and industry efficiency. Australian standards mirror the 
distinctiveness of international standards and have the characteristic of not 
having originated as legislation.  Such standards, including international 
standards, generally lack legislative force and serve only in an advisory 
capacity.  Australian legislatures have incorporated some Australian standards 
in legislation.  This makes observation of the standards compulsory.  An 
example of this is the Australian Standard Hearing Conservation Code, AS 
1269-1979 which is incorporated in the N.S.W. Factories (Health and Safety 
Hearing Conservation) Regulation, 1979 (CCH Australia 32,101). 
 
 International Organisation for Standards: 
 
Another non-government body, which has extensive impact on the enforcement 
and administration of Australian OH&S, is the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO).  ISO was formed in 1946 to advise the United Nations 
on issues of incompatibility in health standards.  Australian participation in ISO 
has been limited because of the industrial and commercial diversity between 
Australia and Europe.  The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
was formed in 1906 in London, and is affiliated with the ISO, although it still 
preserves its autonomy.  In effect, it is the electronic engineering division of 
ISO.  Australia has stronger ties with the IEC with its secretarial 
responsibilities and working parties with hydraulic turbine safety committees. 
 
 Influence of Australian Higher Education Council and the 
Department of Employment, Education and Training: 
 
Australian inter-governmental relations played a significant role in influencing 
occupational health and safety educational changes.  The Australian Higher 
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Education Council (HEC), established in 1936, consists of six State Ministers 
for Education, and since 1972, the Commonwealth Minister for Education and 
Science.  Reynolds, (1974) in his study of Australian education development 
reports the most consistent function of the HEC has been as a medium for 
consultation and exchange of information plus the prioritising of educational 
policy among States.  A prime example is in 1994 the HEC researched, with 
the Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET), the 
allocation of Commonwealth education funding until 2001. 
 
Safety educational demands arose out of changes in Australian society.   The 
nation’s participation in two world wars, effects of the depression of the 1930’s 
and changes in population structure had a strong impact in changing of 
attitudes of workplace safety.  Coupled with shifts in financial balance between 
the Commonwealth and States, which limited State Government’s ability to 
plan effectively for rapid changes in the safety education field, they forced 
State Ministers to look increasingly to the Commonwealth for financial 
assistance. 
 
Given composition of this group, opposing ministers with different political 
ideologies and agendas do not always reach unanimous conclusions.  This lack 
of consensus became much more apparent when Director Generals of 
Education were replaced by Chief Executive Officers, who are not generally 
qualified educationalists and who now directly implement government policy 
without a personal exposure to the difficulties of education.  
 
Such possible discord is also influenced by a need to broaden education to the 
community and future demands for credible quality assurance procedures to 
compete with neighbouring countries.  A policy statement “Higher Education: 
Quality and Diversity in the 1990’s” was released by DEET to emphasise the 
changing pattern of Australian post-secondary education needs and the 
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potential for extreme changes in policy making.  Such extreme changes were 
not slow in arriving.  By 1993 TAFE enrolments had increased as the 
population changed its perception of the value of a TAFE credential.  In 1994 
the Federal Minister of Education Beazley stated the main focus of 
Commonwealth post-secondary educational funding would be directed at 
where educational performance could be assessed.  The pressure that 
performance appraisal is going to be used to assess standard of Australian 
education will guide many institutions to establish targets of excellence. 
 
Higher Education Council: 
 
HEC has acted as a bargaining group by attempting to stimulate Federal 
financial aid for State educational systems, and to guide that aid into specific 
areas of priority within State education.  This emphasis neglected the lament of 
Australian unions and international occupational health and safety 
professionals for the introduction of OH&S education into secondary, post-
secondary and tertiary educational system.  This is not surprising when it must 
be accepted that various State governments also failed to consider the 
community impact of poor occupational health and safety management until 
the late 1980’s. 
 
The nature of any political system is such that the ability of interest groups to 
create a climate of public support for their claims constitutes a major source of 
potential influence.  Harman, (1972) when investigating Australian educational 
political groups defines pressure groups as: 
“ Any group of individuals which seeks to influence the course of 
public policy by making claims on decision making authorities.  It 
is distinct from a political party in that it is not prepared to 
govern; that is it seeks to influence policy but not to control and 
take responsibility.” 
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In common usage the term pressure groups often has derogatory overtones as it 
has the implication that the group is self-seeking.  Reynolds, (1974) depicted 
the role of the HEC as self-seeking in a sense that its members pursued aims of 
their representative governments.  He notes that they were altruistic in that they 
sought outcomes for the benefit of others.  Many individuals in positions of 
public authority act as pressure groups.  The Premiers of the Australian States 
act this way when they confer in Canberra for the Premiers’ Conference 
(Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers) to articulate their States’ 
requests to the Prime Minister.  In much the same way a Prime Minister will 
exert policy pressure on the States to be in line with what may be seen as the 
national interest. 
 
 Post Second World War Progress of Education Demands: 
 
Onset of the Second World War underlined necessity for a sophisticated 
technical education system, and the Commonwealth realised that States could 
not provide such a system.  With the Whitlam reforms in the late 1960’s 
community needs were emphasised in educational changes.  Teacher and parent 
organisations seized on these educational initiatives as further indications of 
Federal education intervention.  The Australian Labour Party used them as 
successful ammunition to discredit the Liberal-Country Party coalition before 
the 1972 election.  Other organised groups that had interests in the standard of 
education, such as trade unions and employers’ associations, only lobbied 
governments occasionally in matters of educational deficiencies. 
 
In the 1960’s an Australian secondary student knew more about Britain’s 
industrial revolution and European wars than Australian settlement and its 
Asian neighbours.  British culture and institutions dominated school curriculum 
to such an extent that the 1960 New South Wales English Leaving Certificate 
examination required students to critique a British Sunday newspaper editorial. 
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Apathy of Australians to consider further education was weakened as a result 
of developments following World War II, as participation in warfare 
guaranteed educational opportunities for service personnel to compete for jobs 
with younger people who had received training whilst they were away 
defending their country.  Hyams and Bessant, (1972) in their studies of 
education and the Australian community observed that the significance of these 
developments was that they severed financial barriers, which for many people 
made education beyond statutory leaving age improbable.  This guarantee 
broadened the educational base of the population, which in turn cultivated their 
job opportunities and therefore, created anticipations that their children could 
expect similar academic accomplishments. 
 
Since 1979 at The University of Ballarat, (pre 1993 The Ballarat College of 
Advanced Education), occupational hazard management students undertake 
subjects in human factors, risk psychology, risk engineering, statistics and 
modelling, accident phenomenology, law, and hazard management. Wooley, 
(1984) describes this specialised course as providing knowledge and skills for 
safety persons to be able to argue, coherently justify and implement solutions 
for health and safety problems.  This course offers a sound broad based core of 
practical and theoretical study thereby changing their perception of where 
safety responsibility lies which attracts engineers, medical practitioners, 
scientists and business graduates from Australia and its Territories. 
 
In 1986 the Victorian Post-Secondary Education Commission approved a 
course work masters’ programme at Ballarat University College to meet the 
needs of students who required specialist training in OH&S.  The year 1987 
saw the commencement of a Graduate Diploma in Risk Management at 
Swinburne Institute of Technology.  At the University of New South Wales, 
safety science students also learn the essence of other disciplines to understand 
the language and methodology of physicians, engineers and financial managers.  
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Cross, (1991) reported that once these subjects are completed the student has an 
opportunity to specialise in areas of interest such as ergonomics, safety 
engineering, biomechanics, health education and occupational hygiene.   
 
In 1985 the University of New South Wales commenced an undergraduate 
course in the area of occupational health and safety.  Cross, (1991) in 
describing this development states, 
“In many ways this is an encouraging development since it is an 
indication of the extent to which health and safety management is 
becoming truly professional.  Yet it also raises problems for the 
tertiary institutions who must compete for a market which is 
reaching a plateau, and for the student who must try to 
distinguish between the many courses now available.  The task of 
distinguishing between these is not easy as course details are 
able to describe the topics taught, but not how they are taught or 
to what depth.” 
 
Mathews, (1993) records that New South Wales commenced its commission in 
1984 and the following year Western Australia followed suit and was one of 
the first States to involve workers to developing their own protective 
measures.  In 1985 TAFE in Western Australia commenced its first 
educational certificate courses in Safety Management and Occupational Health 
and Safety.  The growth of occupational health and safety education in 
Western Australia, led by educationalists from Curtin University, has escalated 
into many different educational disciplines i.e. management, business, human 
movement, nursing, engineering and arts. 
 
Pisaniello & Brooks (1999) reviewed the growth and emergence of 
occupational health and safety education in South Australia especially the 
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introduction of key skills and knowledge required by those who undertake the 
courses.  With an emphasis on quality management systems. 
   
Table 5.2 
Courses in OH&S: Associate Diploma to Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 1980 1992 
New South Wales 1 18 
Victoria 4 12 
Queensland 0 5 
South Australia 0 4 
Western Australia 1 9 
ACT 0 1 
Total 6 49 
        
Source: Draft Guidance Notes for Courses in OH&S. National Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission 1993. 
 
The National Board of Employment, Education and Training created the 
Employment and Skills Formation Council (ESFC) in 1991 to debate and guide 
future provision of quality management in all enterprises in Australia, 
[Management Training Provisions in Australia 1991)].  This mandate attempted 
to identify critical issues of Australian management.  The ESFC was proposed 
in 1989 to report on strategic education initiatives that would enhance 
Australian management.  The issues paper published in 1991 made no mention 
of occupational health and safety responsibilities.  This lack of commitment is 
incredible when it is considered that the board comprises members of the  
Australian Research Council; The Higher Education Council and the Schools 
Council where they would be an expectation that safety standards would have 
been considered. 
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Such lack of consideration was quickly reversed when the findings of the 
Karpin Report in May 1995 identified educational shortages in frontline 
management.  Best practice management required upgrading to ensure 
Australia’s international competitiveness and this management had to include 
occupational health and safety in accordance with national standards.   
 
 Influence of Australian Council of Trade Unions  on Occupational 
 Health and Safety  Education: 
 
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) adopted a policy in 1985 that 
influenced development of OH&S initiatives throughout Australia.  The 
following extract from the ACTU’s education and training policy emphasises 
this commitment to occupational health and safety:  
Education and training in accident prevention and occupational 
health needs to assume much greater importance in schools, the 
workplace, the nursing and medical professions, the community 
generally and trade union training.  Therefore, government 
sponsored action developed in conjunction with trade union 
movement, is required to provide information and educative 
processes to ensure: 
(i) in-service training for teachers to provide safety and 
occupational health courses in the school curriculum; 
(ii) an occupational health and safety component in all trade 
school and tertiary education courses; 
(iii) general education of the working population as to 
occupational hazards, and attitudes to health and safety, including 
multi-lingual services for migrants. 
 
As mentioned earlier the nineteen eighties saw a dominant role played by the 
ACTU in enhancement of occupational health and safety education was 
acknowledged by the advent of nation wide OH&S legislation.  To emphasise 
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the extent of progress touching all the working community Yaager, (2003) 
reports in October 2003 the NSW Attorney General and Minister for Industrial 
Relations, the Hon Jeff Shaw, launched a workplace safety resource kit for high 
schools produced by the Labour Council’s YouthSafe Committee. Unions and 
the government have produced a new kit that aims to empowering young 
students who are in or joining the workforce to understand their rights about 
workplace safety.  
 Influence of the Trade Union Training Authority on Occupational 
 Health and Safety Education: 
 
The Trade Union Training Authority (TUTA) is a Federal statutory authority 
established by the Trade Union Training Authority Act 1975.  TUTA’s main 
role was the development and coordination of training trade unionists in 
Australia.  To achieve this TUTA provided safety courses at local and national 
levels, advised unions on any training programmes which they ran themselves.  
TUTA was often the only accredited OH&S education course for elected 
OH&S workplace representatives.  Therefore, as all Australian State legislation 
dictated that OH&S workplace elected representatives are to receive education 
and training (for example, Sect 19 WA OH&SW Act) many attend TUTA 
OH&S education packages.  TUTA’s influence diminished in the late 1980’s 
and the role of training occupational health and safety representatives was 
passed  to individual unions and trade and labour councils in the various states 
 
 Technical and Further Education: 
 
In 1948 the first Australian safety course was conducted at the Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology named Industrial safety and Accident 
Prevention.  TAFE has a unique function in Australia in providing occupational 
health and safety education by part-time certificated courses that acknowledge 
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limitations in students’ previous educational standards, and permits second 
chance education which has direct benefit for the community. 
 
An important consideration in this thesis is that an increased knowledge of safe 
and healthy work procedures coupled with safety management principles at the 
design stage would assist in eliminating workplace injuries.  The Federal 
Government’s swift response to the Karpin report recommendations will see a 
national management-training programme commence before 1996.  This 
proposed programme will offer a National Certificate in Workplace Leadership 
which will be aimed at increasing competence for workplace managers.  This 
upgrading of management skills involves two semester long components of 
occupational health and safety and workplace issues. 
 
The Australian TAFE system is partially Federally funded but is controlled and 
mainly funded by the appropriate individual State Departments.  Section 3.3 
refers to the turbulent administrative confusion within numerous Federal and 
State governing agencies.  Such complexity may explain why TAFE has 
experienced administrative limitations and why questions have been raised 
about its effectiveness by students and staff.  In March 1992, the Australian 
Government conducted a review of the administrative aspects of TAFE.  In 
1994 the review’s research coordinator Professor Richard Sweet reported: 
“In 1992 Australia faced a potential disaster within the training 
industry, now an enormous amount of innovation and experimentation 
has identified a need for new management techniques.” 
 
In July 1992 TAFE enrolment in vocational courses throughout Australia 
exceeded one million.  Unfortunately, the complexity of qualifications makes it 
still possible to qualify as a tradesperson in one state, yet not have that 
qualification recognised in another. The 1994 Australian Committee for 
Training Curricula’s annual report indicates that most apprenticeship courses 
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and an overwhelming majority of associated diplomas and advanced 
certificates remain unique to States and territories.  The only exceptions being 
NT, ACT and to a lesser extent Tasmania which offer a significant number of 
courses developed by differing States.  The National Board of Employment 
Education and Training (NBEET) July 1992 reported that vocational training, 
once the preserve of the TAFE sector, can be now provided by Universities and 
funded from Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS).  The Federal 
government had deemed it necessary to broaden access to higher education for 
many reasons, including social ones. TAFE was seen as having the potential to 
increase the skills and flexibility of the Australian workforce. 
 
 The NOHSC vision is to have Australian workplaces free from injury and 
disease, and its mission is to lead and coordinate national efforts to prevent 
workplace death, injury and disease in Australia.  To achieve its vision, 
NOHSC has developed the National Occupational Health & Safety Strategy 
2002-12, which has been endorsed by the members of the Workplace Relations 
Ministers Council.  The strategy will guide Australia’s OHS efforts over its ten 
year life.  
  
 A key element of the Strategy is the development of OHS skills in the 
Australian workforce, which, among other things, will improve the capacity of 
business operators and workers to manage OHS effectively. (National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 2004) 
 
 Cultural and Language Barriers: 
 
An important role for TAFE is its ability to reach out to migrants with 
simplified language courses. Research indicates that migrants have more 
serious occupational accidents than Australian born workers.  The ABS 
Handicapped Persons Survey, (1991) indicated that migrants from certain 
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countries (Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia) were substantially more likely to be 
handicapped as a result of a work injury.  In all 10.6% of Australian born were 
injured, whilst 30% of Italians identified their condition as a result of work 
injuries.  Migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB) were 
significantly over-represented among compensation claims.  In particular, 
Turks, Lebanese and Yugoslavs were over-represented.  Gender differences 
were also marked.  The survey for instance showed that NESB women were 
more likely to appear in hospitals than any other section of the workforce. 
 
This survey was a landmark in that it revealed that countless unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers, who are a major source of labour in Australia’s post 
World War Two economy, formed a disproportionate number of those injured 
within the workplace. This pattern for migrants resident in Australia is now 
being reproduced once again amongst newly arriving European, Asian and 
Middle East migrants.  Recent research by Coulton et al (1990) attributes the 
varying levels of English competency as a cause.  This is a dilemma that the 
effective communication curricula within the TAFE field could significantly 
resolve. (See Table 6.2). 
 
Various studies by Bergman and Krause, (1968); Beauchamp, Fadden, Wallace 
and Walters, (1982); Ellis, (1991) have identified another element that would 
have a direct impact on the profitability of an organisation, that members of 
ethnic minorities had significantly high turnover rates of employment because 
of limited promotional opportunities caused by language and cultural obstacles.  
Such high turnover directly relates to increased recruiting, selection and 
training costs.  Notwithstanding the disruption to effective production and 
knowledge lost of previously valuable performers, such continued commercial 
and industrial disruptions are yet another waste that influences Australia’s 
economic growth. 
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The occupational health and safety ramifications of poor literacy skills amongst 
workers is not confined to immigrant employees.  Western, (1992) whilst 
studying the effects of poor literacy skills in Australian industry, identified that 
five hundred thousand Australians with English as a first language could not 
read or write to an acceptable standard.   The magnitude of this disclosure 
impacts greatly on safe working practices, for example, chemical hazard labels, 
MSDS, safety signs, are just a small part of everyday working life that half a 
million Australians cannot interact within.  If people cannot understand or 
identify a hazard or understand their safety responsibilities, their well-being is 
at risk. An extension of TAFE education is the promise of many post-graduate 
courses throughout Australia which specialise in OH&S and which offer 
special provisions for experienced non-graduates.  One course, at the Kuring-
gai State College of Advanced Education, Lindfield, New South Wales, 
provided OH&S courses specially designed for primary and secondary high 
school teachers.  This college was closed in 1990. 
 
A central topic of this thesis is that an increased knowledge of safe and healthy 
work procedures coupled with safety management principles at the design stage 
would assist in eliminating workplace injuries.  The TAFE system offers a 
broad spectrum of courses specially designed to offer ‘second chance’ 
education, not only to failed high school students, but to adults who have 
migrated to Australia for a ‘second chance’ at life.  If language were an 
identifiable influence in causing workplace injuries and disease then it would 
not be an unreasonable assumption to contend that increased TAFE funding 
would seem to be appropriate. 
 
Language may be the most obvious indicator of a cultural background, 
however it is not of sole importance and needs to be considered with influences 
such as religious beliefs, gender, level of education and previous work history.  
In addition, present workplace should be assessed if cultural and literacies 
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interrelate and if workers are given opportunity to demonstrate their own 
potential and contribution to Australia’s well-being. 
 
 The Australian Trainee System: 
 
The Australian Traineeship System (ATS) was designed in 1988 by Western 
Australian TAFE to provide a combination of occupational health and safety  
education that was to be enhanced by employers providing quality on-the-job 
safety training.  The programme placed emphasis on awareness of rights and 
responsibilities of employers and employees, awareness of trade unions and of 
equal employment opportunity.  In commenting on the ATS system Jones, 
(1988) observed that it comprised of five modules accompanied with handouts, 
activities, lectures, exercises and video material.  Importance was placed on the 
regulatory powers of various state inspectorates and use of improvement, 
prohibition notices and penalties.  This educational approach broke new ground 
even though its emphasis was directed towards protection rather than 
consultative prevention. 
 
 European Community Law and it’s Influence on Australian OH&S 
 Education: 
 
In 1851 several European nations signed a convention regulating various 
quarantine laws.  This accomplishment led in 1907 to establishment of the 
International Office of Public Health.  In 1945 this organisation merged 
responsibilities with the United Nations Organisation and created new health 
standards for the world to exchange and value. 
 
Before existence of the Australia Act 1988, which severed many of the 
legislative allegiances with England, the European Communities Act 1972 
influenced formation of a great deal of Australian OH&S legislation.  For 
example, section 2 directed that the Treaty of Rome was to be a paramount 
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source of law in the United Kingdom that gave priority over any other British 
rule (Harrington and Gill, 1992).  This directive determined that the British 
Government take steps to convert their laws to European standards.  These 
standards were soon to be the base for European quality management standards 
ISO 9000 that were transplanted into Australian Standard AS 3900 series, (now 
known as AS 9000).  This was commencement of policy determining quality 
management where safety was strengthened by strict safety legislation. 
 
An indication of transformation to a multi-cultural society in Australia is 
apparent in table 5.3 that details the number of Australians who were born 
overseas. Their arrival also admitted different expectations of safety standards, 
legislation and education. 
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Table 5.3 
Recent statistics of Australian population demonstrating the continued 
need for English language competency. 
Australia’s Total population       1991 16,850,540 
 
Females        1991 8,487,725 
Males         1991 8,362,815 
Born Overseas             1991 3,755,554 22.0% 
Born Overseas                  1986 3,247,381 20.8% 
Born in Europe       1991 2,302,154 61.3% 
Born in Europe       1986 2,221,208 68.4% 
Born in Asia        1991 687,266 18.3% 
Born in Asia        1986 412,417 12.7% 
Born in Middle East       1991 266,644 7.1% 
Born in Middle East       1986 230,564 7.1% 
English spoken at home      1991 3,102,087 82.6% 
English spoken at home      1986 2,734,294 84.2% 
Italian spoken at home      1991 567,088 15.1% 
Italian spoken at home      1986 649,476 20.0% 
Greek spoken at home                1991 379,310 10.1% 
Greek spoken at home                1986 495,733 13.2% 
 
Education and Trade Qualifications: 
 
Employed population                 1991 7,107,867 15.0% 
Employed population                 1986 6,513,515 17.1% 
University degree       1991 1,679,243 12.8% 
University degree       1986 560,162 8.6% 
Trade qualification       1991 1,775,871 13.5% 
Trade qualification       1986 638,324 9.8% 
Without any qualification      1991 7,996,839 61.1% 
Without any qualification      1986 3,921,136 60.2% 
 
Leaving School: 
 
Population over 15 yrs.      1991 13,085,240 
Left school before 15 yrs      1991 1,964,848 15.0% 
Left school 15 yrs to 18 yrs      1991 8,579,740 65.6% 
Never attended school                1991 122,713 0.9% 
 
 
* Migrants to Australia 01 January -01 August 1994 increased 14.5% to 42,910 
from the corresponding period 1993.  To highlight the continued need for language 
education as a priority the bulk of the non-English speaking arrivals were: USSR 
(2280), South East Asia (1150), Oceania (980), North Africa (910), Southern Asia 
(660), Middle East (540), Africa (380). 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1994. 
 
 
 208
The European Community is a supranational organisation that works towards 
economic integration among its member nations.  Created in 1951 it merged 
with the Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1967.  Member nations 
having relinquished some of their individual sovereignty to a central authority 
for economic integration also accepted inter-governmental safety standards.  
On December 31st 1992, the United States of Europe was created.  There are 
335 million people in the twelve nations - Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom that make up the European Community.   
 
Before 1992, they had border patrols, taxes, subsides, nationalistic policies and 
protected industries.  Now they are a single market.  Gone are national barriers 
to travel, employment, investment and trade.  In their place is a free flow of 
money, workers, goods and services.  Such a framework of foreign safety-
policy cooperation was enhanced by stability in the European Parliament which 
adopted many proven strict safety legislation.  The main legal institution is the 
Court of Justice which administers its important regulatory powers especially 
in coal and steel industries.  Comprising of thirteen judges on a six-year term 
they uphold the law of member nations.   
 
 International Labour Organisation: 
 
Another important origin of international OH&S legislation is that which 
emerged from the International Labour Organisation (ILO).  The ILO was 
founded in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles and consists of representatives 
of national governments, employers and worker organisations for the purpose 
of improving labour conditions.  Its aim is to provide international labour 
standards, including those for OH&S.  The ILO issues guidelines which, if 
ratified by a state, may be treated as accepting its provisions and 
recommendations.  These guidelines on OSH management systems have been 
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developed by the International Labour Organization according to 
internationally agreed principles defined by the ILO's tripartite constituents. 
This tripartite approach provides the strength, flexibility and appropriate basis 
for the development of a sustainable safety culture in the organization.  The 
ILO has therefore developed voluntary guidelines on OSH management 
systems which reflect ILO values and instruments relevant to the protection of 
workers' safety and health.  The ILO-OSH 2001 system is geared towards 
reducing and preventing accidents and accident-related loss of lives, time and 
resources.  ILO-OSH 2001 can be applied to any type of business, organization 
or industry that wishes to manage its risks for Health & Safety in the work 
place. 
 
Marquardt, (1992) in his review of quality standards noted that the European 
Community have adopted quality standards as a means for assuring safety 
standards across borders.  Such quality management will ensure that companies 
engage safety management as an integral part of their strategic management.    
Whilst not automatically legally binding, such international approved standards 
are taken into account by Superior Court judges when making their decisions 
on quality and safety.  This commonality of safety legislation will impact on 
Australia through its importation of goods and services. 
 
 The Complacent Behaviour of Employers to OH&S Legislation in 
 Australia: 
 
Until the 1980’s Australian statutes in the area of occupational health and 
safety related to specific work circumstances or hazards. Limitations of such a 
precise approach became increasingly apparent.  Those limitations discouraged 
employers and employees from resolving problems constructively through 
consultation and many workplaces (for example, administrative offices) were 
excluded from safety regulations. 
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An objective of current Federal and State occupational health and safety  
legislation is to place responsibility for preventing occupational injury and 
disease on those who create occupational risks and those who are exposed to 
them.  In terms of volume, regulations are a most important source of OH&S 
law.  Regulations can only be made under power granted by an Act of 
Parliament, usually to a Government Minister.  These are not debated by 
Members of Parliament, and are tabled for comment after being drafted by 
consultants with necessary expertise.  Regulations can be held to ridicule by 
OH&S professionals who criticise the usage of OH&S legislation.   
 
A historical example is under the Tasmanian Mines Inspection Act 1968 the 
maximum penalty for causing death is $500.00; the use of obscene language or 
engaging in unseemly conduct (Sect.48.) also has the same $500.00 penalty.  
Tasmania was the second State to introduce occupational health and safety 
legislation in 1977 and in 1982, Mathews, (1993) reports, the State produced 
the first comprehensive occupational health and safety regulations in Australia. 
 
Shapiro & McGavity, (1987) argued that they were not convinced that in 
Britain the Health and Safety Commission was any more successful than 
OSHA in the USA in regulating the health hazards of the working environment.   
For in the USA regulation promulgated by various commissions was dwarfed 
by the amount of new hazards since the agencies were created.  Earlier in this 
research it was argued that weak protection standards cannot keep pace with 
the speed of technology or confirmed or suspected carcinogens, to mention just 
one hazard.  The Roben’s legislation proved you can not police technology. 
 
An alternative to seeking legislative compensation for occupational injuries and 
deaths can be enacting civil liability.  Civil liability is the circumstance where 
persons injured or diseased by their conditions of work can sue the person 
responsible as a breech of duty of care.  These duties are personal by the 
employer and cannot be delegated.  Employers can be held liable for the 
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negligence of their employees who have injured others in ‘the course of their 
employment’.  This is called vicarious liability. 
 
Minimum compliance with safety regulations by employers without regard is 
recognised by Braithwaite and Grabosky, (1985) who believe that law breakers 
of occupational health and safety legislation are often perceived as to go 
unpunished in comparison to the severity of an incident.  Even in cases of 
repeated offences and prohibition notices from relevant inspectorates the 
ensuing fines, if any, are deplorable.  Public conscience and the escalating 
financial impact have diminished this apparent complacent behaviour on the 
part of employers. In commenting on these matters Mr Justice Olsson as 
President of the South Australian Industrial Commission stated in 1982: 
“The statutory legislation has expanded in such a dramatic 
fashion to ensure reasonable steps are undertaken to provide 
industrial safety...and penal sanctions have been imposed to 
compel compliance.  Neither have eliminated the basic cause of 
injuries.  Even where statutes operate they often merely spell out 
a broad principle, leaving the courts to put flesh on the skeleton.  
It is the precedent value of judicial decisions which is the 
lynchpin of common law.” 
 
Interesting to note that two decades later in August 2004 a forum was attended 
by NSW Minister for Industrial Relations John Della Bosca MLC, NSW 
Attorney General Bob Debus MP and the architect of the failed Victorian 
manslaughter/safety legislation David Moody from Slater and Gordon who 
spoke at the Australian labour Party’s Employment and Industrial Relations 
and Law Reform and Constitutional Processes Policy Committees. 
(http://unionsafe.labor.net.au) 
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Merritt, (1983) observed whilst investigating safety legislative deficiencies 
between government enforcement agencies that almost every other method is 
used to demand compliance except that of prosecution.  He comments: 
“Safety law has failed in its preventative aim, not just with ineptitude 
and indifference but because of economic pressures.  Sophisticated 
compensation legislation attracts not only legal analysts but media 
coverage.  Discussion concerning legislation surrounding OH&S 
standards  must include an end product which is workers’ 
compensation.” 
 
Government agencies dealing with occupational health and safety have the 
same if not greater power than respective police forces.  For example, they do 
not need warrants to enter premises, nor do they have to show proof of 
complaint or waste valuable resources tracking down offenders across the 
country. Braithwaite and Grabosky, (1985) identified that historically in 
Australia occupational health and safety regulatory agencies are loath to use 
their legislative powers to reduce injuries and disease in the workplace.   
 
 Advent of Workers’ Compensation  Legislation: 
 
One consequential action, taken to compensate the perception that law was 
failing and employers not caring, was that workers contributed to the upkeep of 
local hospitals which were used to treat their injuries.  Coulton, McCullock and 
Nobel, (1990) observed that societies such as the ‘Grand United Order of 
Oddfellows’ and the ‘United Ancient Order of Druids 1840’ survive today and 
play an important role in accident and sick pay provision as well as funeral 
benefits.  This response was to further protect workers from abuse when 
prescriptive law was deemed to be ineffective. 
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Merritt, (1984) supports such diffidence in safety legislation when he observes 
that it was the stern social climate of 1837 England and Lord Abinger’s 
doubtful judgement in which the first case of an employee attempting to gain 
acknowledgment of his employer’s liability for his injuries caused whilst 
working was dismissed (Priestley v’s Fowler).  Munkman, (1979) clarified in 
the case of Priestley v’s Fowler there was a denial of obligation by the 
employer to the employee and it was forty-three years before legislation such 
as The Employer’s Liability Act 1880 was adopted.  However, the Act had 
many limitations and was repealed within seven years and judicial debate 
continued for another decade. 
 
Injudicious health and safety findings predetermined pressure to legislate for an 
equitable injury compensation system.  Munkman continues by noting in 1902 
the rules of the Amalgamated Miners stated: 
“If necessary, take steps to obtain compensation for accidents 
where the employer is liable.” 
 
Passing of the Workers’ Compensation statute in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 
1897 influenced legislators in Australia.  Coulton et al, (1990) illustrated in 
their studies of the impact of occupational health and safety in society that U.K. 
legislation shifted some part of the cost of an accident at work onto the 
employer.  The employer passed on this cost onto the consumer by way of 
increased prices. (National Committee of Inquiry: Compensation and 
Rehabilitation in Australia, 1974). 
 
Stewart, (1986) in his overview of Australian workers’ compensation put 
forward a view that another way of looking at the significance of the 1897 
legislation was that a worker no longer had to prove through Common Law that 
an employer was negligent before gaining payment of compensation.  
Advances in legislation such as the Workers’ Compensation Act 1995 allowed 
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that rehabilitation was more easily facilitated and that there was less delay for 
payment.  The strategy where the employers pay for a separate scheme with a 
premium calculated for each injury occurring to criteria is the formula practiced 
in Australia.  
 
 A Failure of Workers’ Compensation Legislation: 
 
It is worth noting however, that the Chair of National Occupational Health and 
Safety Commission, Emmett, (1989) revealed that three hundred thousand 
Australians were injured at work each year yet the statistics did not include 
diseases such as occupational cancer and ‘other problems that are hard to 
measure.’   Mathews, (1993) is even more revealing in true estimates of costs 
when he researched that many workers are self-employed, and many 
occupational diseases are not included,  
“ ... especially cancer agents, which conservatively account for five to 
fifteen percent of all deaths due to cancers.  Therefore, fifteen hundred 
to four and a half thousand Australians die each year from work related 
cancer, mostly uncompensated.” 
 
In the introduction of NOHSC occupational health and safety strategy 
document 2002-2012 there is an estimate of 2000 deaths per year from past 
occupational exposures to hazardous substances.  Australian society suffers 
from continual inconsistencies in its appreciation of what the country really 
needs for its industrial health and safety.  Most Australians fail to understand 
that they contribute to their own exploitation. Such behaviour was also 
recognised by Roper, (1976) who simplified such inconsistencies by 
identifying:  
“That the general public demands lowering of taxes which means 
less public expenditure and then complain about inadequate 
provisions at schools.” 
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Such apathy and complacency is not confined to employers and employees, a 
decision by the Premiers’ Conference in November 1991 was ‘...national 
uniformity in OH&S legislation and standards had to be achieved by the end of 
1993.’  A translation of such judicious commitment was the fact that it took 
virtually twenty years, South Australian OH&S Act 1972, to be recognised by 
the present day leaders and opposition of the Australian Government. 
 
To emphasise this complexity of differing government agencies, education 
authorities, pressure groups and the inability to have commonality in vocational 
standards it is interesting to note the large audience that Australian education 
has to face and could influence with sound safe management.  The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics in June 1993 announced there were 3,040,284 children 
aged five to sixteen attending primary or secondary school.  Also there were 
235,000 children between three and five attending pre-school on a non-
mandatory basis, accounting for 31% of all children in this age bracket.  In 
2002, 3.3 million students were attending primary and secondary schools, 
comprising 2.3 million (68%) in government schools and 1.0 million (32%) in 
non-government schools. Between 1997 and 2002, the number of students 
attending government schools increased by 28,100 (1.3%) while the number of 
students attending non-government schools increased by 103,900 (11.0%).  The 
safety of all these Australians and their future descendants is the nation’s 
responsibility. (ABS, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004). 
 
 Distinct Influence on Academics: 
 
Higher educational expertise is created by academics proud of their own 
triumphs, however, OH&S is still rejected as a necessity within their various 
disciplines.  Flavin, Cobbin and Dawes, (1995) who examined occupational 
health and safety content of undergraduate chemistry curricula noted that in 
1993 the Australian Chemistry Industry Council had alerted the Australian 
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Vice-Chancellors Committee that graduates from engineering and science were 
entering the workforce with inadequate understanding of occupational health 
and safety and its practical application.  
 
Thatcher, (1995) also reported to the Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee 
that this group not only had limited knowledge of occupational health and 
safety issues and relevant legislation but actually attributed blame for accidents 
to the victims and their government inspectorate.  Even though his 
identification that academics’ perception of the responsibility of safety was 
deplorable no long term study was initiated.  The 1995 Karpin report which had 
been endorsed by the Department of Employment, Education and Training 
(DEET) was aimed at improving the quality of Australian university 
management had galvanised the government into additional financial support to 
initiate the change of inappropriate management culture.  The world of 
academics and their administration is unique and to clarify some of the 
influences that surround the domain of universities it is important to have an 
understanding of this anomaly, coupled with some techniques that occupational 
health and safety professionals can adopt against academics’ reluctance to 
assist change. 
 
 Influences affecting academic thought: 
 
The terminology ‘academic freedom’ derives from a medieval intellectual 
tradition that once guaranteed autonomy of the Church.  The degrees of the 
synod of Ingelheim, in 948, enact that, 
‘The holy synod be not harassed or interrupted by any assault of 
layman.’  
 
To emphasise previous disputes between Church ruling and the State, Popes 
Gregory VII (1020-85) and Boniface VIII (680-755) ended their lives in 
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military captivity and Russell, (1993) adds that Archbishop Thomas Becket 
(1118-70) was not so fortunate.  Academics, because their privileges were 
originally ecclesiastical and guaranteed by a Pope, could perceive that their 
rights to free speech are inextricably intertwined with their right to run their 
own affairs.  The necessity for academics to have this independent sphere of 
judgement is in confrontation with present day government, which creates 
OH&S legislation and regulations that conflict with academic’s perception of 
their safety responsibility and duties.  The 1995 Hoare Report commissioned 
by the Australian Government identified that university managers were chosen 
for academic rather than management ability and criticised: 
“Australian universities are not contemporary workplaces and not 
keeping pace with the profound societal and economic changes affecting 
the sector.” 
 
Universities naturally react defensively when faced with change dictated to 
them by external government action.  Internal safety inspections, for example, 
are far more effective than outside scrutiny.  Academics could perceive that 
such control is ineffective.  After bitter disputes in 1988 and 1993 concerning 
award-restructuring a large number of academic institutions sought to introduce 
compulsory systems of staff appraisal.  Maslen, (1994) reports that in 1991 the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission handed down a decision that all 
institutions were to participate in academic staff appraisals.  As will be later 
discussed this direction was ignored. 
 
Academics are like all professionals, they must have standards.  If those 
examples of integrity and honesty are ever sacrificed then without them, both 
grounds of self-respect and utility to society disappear.  Many of those 
standards that can be scrutinised are interpreted by various staff appraisal 
schemes.   Yet academics are protected by a tenure system of employment that 
guarantees permanent jobs.  The Australian Federal Education Minister Crean, 
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(1995) stated that tenure allowed a reduction in the acceptance of management 
responsibility and that risk management should be adopted at the highest level. 
In 1998 Dr Kemp, Minister of Education, Training and Youth Affairs admitted, 
“It is true that universities have been less than fully responsive to the 
diverse needs of their students and somewhat insular from the real 
world where their students are working or seek to work.” 
 
By 2004 responses to the needs of industry and commerce heralded change.  
The University of Ballarat and IBM Global Services have a close collaboration. 
IBM helps guide curriculum development, participates in research and 
development projects, provides training and part-time work for students and 
sponsors a Chair in Information Technology.  In return IBM Global Services 
gains access to the university’s resources and expert personnel and has the 
opportunity to recruit graduates from courses in which the company has had 
influence.  The University of Western Australia has contracted with the large 
engineering company ASEA Brown Boveri to set up a dedicated education 
facility to service ABB employees.  The facility will deliver leadership, 
management, finance and marketing programmes to the company’s employees, 
tailored to the specific needs of the company and delivered through its Intranet.  
  
When contentment within a society is disrupted, the population will enforce 
change.  In the years 1967-1972 the then Australian leader of the opposition 
Whitlam (1930-) transformed the political and social agenda of Australia by 
creating a significant period of change and reform.  As Neil Armstrong (1930-) 
landed on the moon Whitlam’s proposal for a school commission, where the 
Federal government accepted responsibility for the funding of all schools, was 
accepted.  Welfare of the Australian nation became the government’s primary 
concern above responsibilities such as defence and communication.  Australia 
had very few revered models.  Most accolades went to overseas war-time 
media heroes such as America's General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) and 
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Britain’s Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965).  As an example of such 
reverence; on the announcement of Churchill’s death, all British 
Commonwealth radios sounded the first four notes of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony.  Three short and one long: V in Morse code - that letter which he 
had made particularly his own.  V for victory.  All flags in Europe, United 
States of America and the Commonwealth were lowered at half-mast.  
Brennand in his 1965 contemplation on the death of Churchill remarked, 
 “The world stood still.” 
 
But the era of the nineteen-sixties saw Australians endorse different champions.   
By 1973, Whitlam’s reform programmes, including occupational health and 
safety changed the conceptual thinking of the nation.  By relying on Section 96 
of the Constitution which took responsibility away from the states Whitlam’s 
government provided a wide range of community services.  Australians as a 
united people took notice of what government was accomplishing, and this was 
emphasised when eighty-one percent of the electorate voted to remove the 
government at the following election (Whitlam, 1985).   A feat which has not 
been surpassed to date. 
 
The brusque environment of business and management studies dismissed as 
peripheral by the academic concerns of philosophers and artists is evident that 
after twenty years of scrutiny the Australian Government, finally in 1995, took 
action in identifying flawed university management. Restrictions on 
educational funding, pressure on more research and current accountability for 
better performance have slowly changed institutional structures. 
 
Natural sciences and mathematical developments of this century have eclipsed 
the sum of contributions of many preceding centuries.  Social sciences have 
changed from traditional studies of history and philosophy to the development 
of political science, economics, archaeology, anthropology, sociology, 
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psychology and industrial relations.  With all these changes, many of which 
could not be predicted even by the most perceptive, such as the advent of the 
computer, the academic role has also transformed into one with administrative 
and guardianship functions for academic standards. 
 
Prioritising of an academic’s own needs and wants that compete with a 
university’s objectives, burdened by external agencies, could further frustrate 
research orientation of scholars.  Such frustration could again contribute to a 
protective nature for their discipline, or even an over exaggeration of their 
discipline’s importance which could result in refusal to accept the necessity of 
occupational health and safety.  
 
Academia has looser boundaries in where loyalty to an organisation is difficult 
to define as there is not a single organisational objective but normally a series 
of educational missions with different leaders.  One reality is that change to an 
academics’ perception of occupational health and safety is going to require 
extraordinary levels of motivation.  Schein, (1992) in his review of leadership 
and culture stated that motivation must be accompanied by the inevitable pain 
of learning and change until it becomes an accepted part of life.  Occupational 
health and safety professionals will have to elicit the academic’s participation 
as learning and change cannot just be imposed on staff especially just through 
legislative regulations. 
 
If limited management expertise is evidence then it is not surprising that few 
university heads of department are familiar with the nature, content and 
intention of occupational health and safety practices and this could be reason 
why they consequently allocate them a lower priority than teaching or research.  
Such inappropriate management were agenda issues at the 1991, 1993 and 
1995 Australian Vice-Chancellor’s Committee OH&S Conferences.  As a 
consequence, few comprehensive OH&S educational programmes are 
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undertaken; development of the administrative and logistic operation of a 
department takes precedence over the introduction of hazard management, 
irrespective that the potential risks to effective management are considerable. 
 
 Strategies to assist educational curricula change: 
 
Occupational health and safety professionals wishing to introduce OH&S into 
educational curricula at any level will need to use diverse strategies to sensitise 
academics to change.  Academics cultivate knowledge and it has been argued 
that there is a risk of conformity that abandons serious engagement with the 
emerging science of OH&S and may not accept that change is necessary.  If 
legitimate OH&S government dictates are being ignored by academics two 
persuasive groups who can activate change are the Academic Board or the 
student body.  Both play significant decision-making roles.   
 
One condition of the 1995 Australian academic enterprise bargaining is that 
academics will accept development of appraisal on their teaching and research 
is necessary.  Students should be viewed as clients who are seeking quality 
education for a charge.  Irrespective of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission decision in 1991 that all universities were to participate in staff 
appraisals schemes, it was reported in 1994 by Alan Lonsdale the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor of Deakin University, chairing the national steering committee that 
half of Australia’s universities refused to comply and stated: 
 “With few exceptions there is little evidence of staff development activity 
 and outcomes resulting from staff appraisals...There is no evidence of 
 performance improvement.” 
 
If such staff appraisal were attached to academics’ incremental increases then 
self-preservation may be an alternative influence to facilitate sound and safe 
management practices.  A defective characteristic of having limited knowledge 
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or experience in administration and management does not mirror the expected 
professionalism that is practised within an academic’s elected discipline.  
Coupled with these limitations academics are expected to perform at a high 
level in an area which may have unexamined traditions and conflicting goals 
and values. 
 
To ensure that possible introduction of occupational health and safety into an 
existing curriculum is palatable for academics it is important OH&S 
professionals adopt a reasonable approach and prepare, without ignominy, to 
adopt many replacement plans within their strategy.  A searching evaluation of 
specific needs of a department must be undertaken before change is even 
mentioned.  A study of the organisation and its long-term goals will contribute 
to the successful implementation of OH&S procedures and problem solving. 
 
It seems appropriate to conclude with Kerr’s, 1963 summary of Whitehead’s 
(1861-1946) prophetic words on the place of intellect, 
“In the conditions of modern life, the rule is absolute: the race 
which does not value trained intelligence is doomed.  Not all your 
heroism, not all your social charm, not all your wit, can move 
back the finger of fate.  Today we have maintained ourselves.  
Tomorrow science will have moved forward yet one more step, 
and there will no appeal from the judgement which will be 
pronounced on the uneducated.” 
 
 Dilemma of Saturated Curricula: 
 
The world’s population grows at an unprecedented speed and is coupled with 
greater proportions of the population gaining the privilege to be educated.  
Ritter, (1966) in his research into Australian educational growth and change 
noted,  
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“That the growth of opportunity has been more than matched by 
increased  aspiration and expectation.  The aspect of higher 
education is only part of the quality of life... the body of 
knowledge grows fatter and fatter.” 
 
A need for occupational health and safety knowledge takes on greater 
significance when the Australian Federal Minister for Science Jones, (1993) 
when emphasising the significance of educational growth identified that 
approximately thirty-two thousand scientific writings are being produced each 
working day.  He questions that,  
“Of these two hundred thousand mathematical theorems are published 
each year.  As the number published is greater than can be surveyed, 
who can be judged to state what is important?”  
  
Jones’s study also identified a 12.3% annual increase in engineering documents 
from three thousand articles in three specialised periodicals in 1946 to thirty 
thousand articles in forty-two specialised journals in 1966.  Such an impetus of 
the need for engineer knowledge emphasises the rationale of selecting 
engineers as a target occupational group for the questionnaire. 
 
Print, (1993) in his study of curriculum change noted that curriculum is an idea 
of society, a statement of what society values.  Consequently decisions by 
government legislation, public instrumentalities, special interest groups and 
employer and trade unions all contribute to what determines curriculum.  Each 
of these pressure groups became change agents of their own who influenced the 
unique culture of academic staff who by the very nature of their craft are 
sceptical of easy answers and will seek alternative ways to escape perceived 
autocratic control.   
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As evidence that curriculum is an idea of society, and society will change its 
values in 2001 the Queensland University of Technology commenced a 
combination of health/science engineering (ergonomics) course to provide for 
students undertaking distance education. (Dawes, Boles, & Maeder, 2001). 
 
 Summary: 
 
This appendix examined major Australian, international and State governing 
bodies which influence, administer and enforce occupational health and safety 
and workers’ compensation legislation. OH&S responsibilities and 
accountabilities were delegated to various state and territory legislators who 
generated complex statutory agencies which attempted to meet demands for 
OH&S knowledge and skill in the workplace.  Unfortunately such advice and 
assistance was administered by those persons employed in enforcement 
agencies which defeats the concept of self-regulation and consultative 
prevention that is the backbone of the Roben’s legislation. 
 
Australian taxpayers support eight separate educational systems and their 
subsequent bureaucracies.  Therefore, a national political commitment to 
agreed training reforms is intricate.  Coupled to such administrative complexity 
is the reality that when Federal and State politicians are changed either by 
elections or transferred to different portfolios the public servants, who are there 
to interpret their mandates, are encumbered by short-term policies.  Public 
servants are then continuously reacting to changing external environment. 
 
Having a reformist Labour Government in power for most of the 1980’s and 
into the 1990’s provided a proactive attempt to improve occupational health 
and safety throughout industry.  Their objective was to minimise the drain on 
the economy that occupational injuries and deaths were having on Australia.  
The aspect of consultation with the workforce and their unions became 
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reciprocal as the partnership became not only to improve their performance 
they had to change their safety standards to be able to compete.  For the first 
time in Australia’s industrial endeavours employee decision-making was being 
accepted without a history of confrontation.  Employees were no longer willing 
to be passive observers in their workplace.  The capacity to consult and 
contribute became legislation. 
 
Notwithstanding its mandate, National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission has developed common approaches to OH&S education and 
legislation.  It was influenced, however, by various powerful international 
organisations which created world standards that did not necessarily equate 
with Australia’s unique needs.  Another significant influence was the global 
insurance industry that is appraised in Appendix Eleven.  The Federal 
Government compounded such legislative complexity by creating a confusing 
array of agencies, each with incompatible occupational health and safety 
jurisdictions that duplicated inspection, enforcement and administration.  
Government agencies did not apply the legislative power that they were given.  
Their limited resources were consumed in persuasion techniques and in safety 
education projects.  Any fines resulting from prosecutions were minor and 
offenders were envisaged to have escaped substantial punishment. 
 
Intergoverment relations also played a significant role in influencing OH&S 
educational changes with the HEC failing to acknowledge pleas of international 
safety educationalists and Australian unions for introduction of OH&S 
education in secondary and undergraduate curriculum. 
 
A limitation of Australian Federal and State occupational health and safety 
legislation was that because safety law was so specific it discouraged 
employers and employees from resolving problems constructively through 
consultation.  Despite its acceptance in society, Common Law had been 
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ineffectual with OH&S issues, as it was perceived as a social or statutory 
legislative matter.  This situation of inequity in justice was perceived by OH&S 
professionals as incongruous as the Australian penal system incarcerates many 
transgressors whose crime equals the magnitude of non-compliance to OH&S 
regulations which result in death, injury and disease. Imprisonment as a 
solution is a final remedy to protect any community from a criminal, yet, the 
judicial system has still not provided a deterrent to failing to obey OH&S 
legislation. 
 
Employers not comprehending the value of OH&S education were content to 
allow insurance to cover legal liability and just observe the minimum dictates 
of safety legislation.  These offenders of OH&S legislation are not devoid of 
responsibility to save lives, the paltry fines awarded were a discredit to the 
enforcement agency and the community they serve. 
 
Lack of command of the English language may be an explanation why a 
disproportionate number of non-Australian born workers claimed 
compensation, a situation that TAFE could significantly resolve.  An increased 
knowledge of safe and healthy work procedures could eliminate or reduce 
workplace injuries. 
 
The following appendix will argue the necessity for specialised occupational 
health and safety education so that decision-makers of tomorrow are going to 
exercise moral choices then they should be controlling the workplace 
environment rather than to modify behaviour. 
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Appendix 6 
ATTITUDES, SOCIAL CHANGE INFLUENCES AND THE 
ADVENT OF AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
 
 Introduction: 
 
Previous appendices investigated some influences that impacted on or impeded 
the growth of occupational health and safety (OH&S).  Each influence, either 
with unique strength or combining with other economic or social factors, 
hindered the advancement of OH&S.  A form of control mirrored each 
influence.  That control, mechanical, personal or managerial, specified required 
behaviour.  This appendix will discuss bridges between such controls and 
social change, plus the historical growth of trade unions that instigated 
industrial relations change.  
 
 Attitudes and Social Change: 
 
The attitudes towards safe behaviour are positively changing in Australia.  
Huge steps have been undertaken to prevent injuries and death in the 
workplace, however, daily within our region constant media attention fails to 
cease tragedies. Within three days of October 2003 safety inspectors are 
conducting an investigation into the death of a two-year old child who died 
from blunt head trauma after being struck at the rear of a dustbin wagon in 
Patterson Lakes understood to be in the service of waste disposal group J J 
Richards & Sons, servicing the Kingston City Council area in southeast 
Melbourne.  A court in Narrogin, 100 miles southeast of Perth, Australia, has 
fined Nomel Holdings, trading as McDougall Weldments, $10,000 for 
supplying inadequately guarded machinery that led to a farmer losing three 
fingers. (Safetynews.uk.co 23 Oct 2003). 
 
The farmer from Hyden, east of Narrogin, had placed a hand too close to 
rotating parts in the grain cleaning machine which had been supplied by the 
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company apparently with no operator’s manual.  In the wake of the injury to 
this farmer safety authorities issued warnings of potential hazards of rotary 
milking platform systems. 
 
A Southland Wendon farmer died after becoming trapped by a device which 
removes cups from cows on a rotary milking platform and a stationary rail 
which prevents them withdrawing during milking.  The relatively innovative 
system involves an automatic cup removal system, an anti-backing bar on the 
rotary platform and a stationary rump-rail support frame.  There were no 
engineering counter measures to prevent operators being trapped. 
 
Disciplines of psychology, sociology and political science have historically 
attacked problems involving attitudes and perceptions in characteristically 
different ways.  Orlansky, (1970) whilst reviewing relevant literature on public 
opinion noted that explanations of conflict were due to disparities between 
expectations and achievements.  King and McGinnies, (1972) when studying 
influences of safety decision-making and public opinion observed that it is 
group attitudes that energise behaviour.  All psychologists do not share this 
interpretation, that attitudes have drive or motivational force.   
 
Triandis, (1971) was implicit in his explanation that group attitudes ‘cause’ 
social behaviour.  People do something first, then adapt their attitudes in line 
with their behaviour.  This idea is easily recognised in accidents.  Irrespective 
of severity, a remarkable and instant change occurs to all persons involved in 
an accident.  The solution to many accidents is a memory of an incident that 
reinforces the drama and necessity of eliminating recurrence.  This ability of 
people to examine their own behaviour to adjust to future decision-making 
behaviour is an example of short-term feedback.  Trial and error approaches to 
resolve accident trends will later be transferred to other generations of 
employees unless the perception of safety responsibility is enhanced. 
 
 229
 Social and political pressures affecting change: 
 
Such trial and error approaches fail to reduce the extensive loss to the working 
community by occupational deaths, disease and injury.  For those who survive, 
their only income is often pensions or government welfare benefits.  Lipton and 
Herberg, (1993) note in their research on safety developments of organisations 
in the overwhelming majority of cases this population exists on the verge of, or 
beneath, the threshold of poverty.  Social and political pressures also ultimately 
determine attitudes to safety in the work place.  A classic example is the case of 
when Lloyd George (1863-1945) was appointed British wartime Minister for 
Munitions.  In 1915 he quickly conceded to the suffragette leader Pankhurst 
(1858-1928) that women would be allowed to work in ammunition factories 
because of the effort needed to support the war.  These factories already had an 
employee mortality rate of thirty percent from poisoning from 2,4,6-
Trinitrotoluene which Hunter, (1975) notes can enter the body by skin 
absorption, ingestion and inhalation. Atherley, (1978) remarks: 
“... in this case the vulnerable were not excluded from the workplace as 
it was not in the national interest, nor would it have been politically 
acceptable.”  
 
Some contemporary workers are affected by specialisation within their 
workplace that requires a minimum of workers’ involvement with creative 
work.  As a consequence, the worker is disaffected in an area of life considered 
vital to an individual.  This alienation was researched by Faunce (1965) who 
contended that such alienation also develops in the workers’ family, their 
community and society.  This frustration can manifest into an inability to 
associate with the community, or the opposite, and compensate by developing 
close-knit relationships with family or social organisations.   
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Pressure for social organisation can be traced to English medieval times 
through such bodies as the church and local government boroughs that required 
organisations with some umbrella of legal characteristics to protect them.  The 
first commercial organisations were the guilds who attempted to protect 
themselves from imposters by excluding outsiders from their particular trade.  
Lipton and Herzberg (1993) note that many of these guilds gained Royal 
Charters.  Therefore, they represented the first corporations.  With the 
expansion of foreign trade, Royal Charters were conferred with enthusiasm 
with the objective of conferring monopolies over territory.  By the end of the 
eighteenth century these trading companies declined as the State assumed their 
role of administering foreign territories.  Such management by the government 
prohibited dangerous projects that had been tolerated by corporate 
organisations where the worker had few rights or privileges. 
 
One such social organisation that was available for workers for protection was 
their respective trade union. Workers who were agitated towards their 
employment or employer were a catalyst for unions to nurture. Such a receptive 
work related group unfortunately may have hidden political agendas to run. 
This creation of trade unions by English Freemason lodges and guilds were 
change agents to meet the challenges of industrialisation and to combat inferior 
work standards.  This was the birthplace of participative-management 
techniques. 
 
Students being educated in all departments of any behavioural and social 
science class throughout the world, including those new faculties of business, 
management, education, nursing and public health are examples of change 
agents.   Students in these faculties graduate then function as agents of social 
change.  One practical challenge students face is that the workforce with all its 
behavioural inconsistencies may be unable to change even with all the 
intellectual knowledge gained.  Bennis, Benne and Chin, (1969) believed that 
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to fight past changes is futile and that society must be quick to recognise 
change and learn what resources they have.  Although such an astute 
observation has merit, there is a vast difference between creating policy and 
management controlling and monitoring policy. 
 
 Main Types of Management Control: 
 
Adam Smith, (1937) theorised in 1776 on the divisions of labour management.  
Since that era extensive changes have been witnessed in industry, technology 
and science, nevertheless the classic principles to guide managers to make 
organisational decisions remain.  Woodward and Reeves, (1970) developed the 
best example of types of managerial control.  They identified: personal control 
through direct supervision; development of managerial hierarchies; mechanical 
control embedded in machinery and production processes; and administrative 
control based on more impersonal rules specifying required behaviour.  Gospel 
and Litter (1983) reviews these types of managerial and engineering control 
and suggests that, within constraints, management has a choice as to the course 
of action it adopts as they are the primary decision-makers.  These plans of 
action in the 1990’s have further constraints mostly from safety and 
environmental legislation and management is now subject to negotiation and 
accommodation with workers’ organisations. 
 
A parallel with the above observations was the study of nineteenth century 
labour management by Edwards, (1980) who identified similar employer 
strategies such as foreman control over unsophisticated piece-work systems; 
technical control via machines and methods of work organisation; bureaucratic 
control systems where employers seek to develop elaborate rules and 
procedures. 
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It is these very management control systems that were eroded as occupational 
health and safety legislation became extremely prescriptive in its specific 
regulations.  As the working population gained knowledge from being educated 
into the futility of workplace deaths and injury, elaborate rules and regulations 
were devised to dictate the very work procedure that was to occur.  The 
delegation to the foreperson/supervisor type person had advantages in being 
able to promote responsibility for workers’ safety.  However, with their new 
independence, these forepersons now had the influence to develop safer work 
practices.  These people played an important role in the development of labour 
management and safe-working conditions as their decision-making gained 
authority.  This dilemma of lost authority ushered growth of employer 
organisations so they could formulate collective bargaining arrangements with 
the unions.  Gospel and Litter (1983) identified that employer organisations 
multiplied from 336 in 1895 to 2403 in 1925. 
 
Previous industrial management models primarily called for staff that was very 
focused, structured, analytical and action-orientated.  With the extraordinary 
growth of commerce and industry in the 1980’s and the development of the 
information age, management changed into an integrated style of multi-focus 
thinking.  Industry and commerce improve by competition.  Even though jobs 
may vanish, work will persist and be completed by individuals hired for a 
specific purpose or project.  When the task is complete the team will disband 
and an individual will go on to seek another project.  Such a nomadic 
occupation will demand that the individual must be constantly scanning the 
market to identify what distinctive service he or she can offer to the perspective 
employer.  So that these managers can continue to offer value in the job market 
as decision-makers they will need knowledge of occupational health and safety. 
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 Technical pressures affecting change: 
 
As industry grew from its eighteenth century origins the markets demanded 
specialised managers who have the power of knowledge in diverse 
management areas.  Sociologists such as Hambrick and Mason, (1984); 
Niehoff, Enz and Grover, (1990) and Trice and Beyer, (1991) in their research 
into the impact of top management on employees noted the decision-making 
actions of senior executives have a major impact on any organisation from 
assessing whether risk taking is desirable to the organisation’s ability to rival 
competitors.  To achieve this power, executives must have extensive diverse 
knowledge base and technical competency to reach a network for advice.  
 
The advents of electronic networks now create a world marketplace and 
dependency of staying with a single organisation for a lifetime is antiquated.  
The 1990’s have witnessed the personal notebook which could be a virtual 
intimate office, communicating by personal fax, pager and electronic mail 
throughout the world.   2003 witnessed mobile phones that could take 
photographs plus receive and send electronic mail.  In some industries such as 
shipping, automobiles, telephones the rate of change has not been spectacular 
but the manufacturing process has.  Every engineering facet of production is 
under constant review to maintain a stream of improvements.  The old 
fashioned hierarchical corporations will be better informed, faster moving and 
technologically intelligent.  Such a revolution will allow data to cross nations 
on fibre-optic cables and into homes and offices.  Medical practitioners will be 
able to consult specialists in other countries sharing medical records, even x-
rays.  However, the work force will still have to be productive and continued 
industrial injuries limit efficient production.  Specialist managers will still have 
to control risks with wisdom and humanity, therefore, the manager and 
engineer’s analytical OH&S skills will not only have to remain but be 
important.   
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The Welsh entrepreneur Owen, (1825) had recognised that introducing 
specialised safety management practices was the best investment for profit.  As 
workers of the next century will be required to solve technical problems there is 
a necessity for a broader education.  Every Australian Federal and State 
occupational health and safety legislation emphasises employer and 
supervisory control over the workplace, its workforce and material resources.  
This control will demand an understanding of hazard and accident causes and 
the manager’s role in eliminating those risks. 
 
Ability in eliminating those risks will become part of the selection process.  
More open and competitive economic and business environments are making it 
more important to maximise the productivity of employees and their 
contributions to company objectives.  Rivalry throughout industry and 
commerce will demand advantages are continually maintained over 
competitors.  As direct and indirect employee costs are often the major cost of 
an organisation, to remain viable, managers and engineer designers will have to 
submit to performance appraisal.  One effective approach would be to include 
the manager’s safety record as part of that performance appraisal.  Such 
motivation and publicity would encourage managers to undertake an active 
interest in self-preservation as well as the health and safety of others. 
 
Such motivational tactics are not new.  Carroll, (1992) reports that in 1991 John 
F. Akers, the Chairman of IBM, suffered along with shareholders, massive 
losses to the company when his wage was decreased by one million dollars.  
Carroll continues; 
“Such pay for performance should not be restricted to senior 
managers”. 
 
Two modern examples where employees have accepted responsibility for 
quality safe performance and greater productivity were the Shepparton 
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Preserving Company in Australia, and staff at the sixty Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co (A&P) supermarkets in America, who demonstrated motivation in a 
classic economic response to poor management performance (Business Week, 
1986).  In both cases inappropriate decision-making by management coupled 
with restrictive union demands were leading both organisations to a brink of 
financial ruin.  The employees, faced prospects of long term unemployment, 
undertook to work for lesser wages and longer hours as long as they governed 
the management decision-making.  When both organisations finally returned to 
financial prosperity the workers were compensated for their sacrifices. 
 
The above examples are models of intrinsic rewards where workers have 
received for themselves the satisfaction and results of their quality management 
as well as income.  Such an effort in job enrichment surpasses that of 
compensation by increased pay.  The reward not only encompasses an 
opportunity for personal growth through their own decision-making as 
encouraged earlier by Bradley, (1988) as motivational elements, but includes 
greater responsibility, freedom and discretion in safe management work 
activities.  
 
Employee Organisations (Trade Unions): 
 
The Roman diplomat, orator and historian Tacitus (AD 55-120) sneered at the 
workers as: 
“Indolent and debased people, who as sordid plebs, hang around 
the circus and theatres have only two interests, bread and the 
games.” 
 
Africa, (1965) offers a more sympathetic comment by noting that members of 
the senatorial class who had negligible affinity for their workers wrote the 
history of Imperial Rome.  However, those craftsmen and workers with 
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grievances to expose generated the civil riots that continued until AD 68.  
These workers were not dealt with by pioneers of jurisprudence, but by the 
creation of three urban cohorts of Praetorian guards, a thousand-strong army.  
There was no arbitration. 
 
Central years of the sixteenth and seventeenth century saw a growth of 
intellectual and social change.  This was the era of Reformation under Martin 
Luther (1483-1546) and Desiderius Erasmus (1469-1536).  The creativity of 
Spenser (1552-1599), Marlow (1564-1593) and Shakespeare (1564-1616) 
cultivated growth of great composers of the time, and philosophers who opened 
the realm of thinking and questioning.  At the commencement of British 
industrialisation skilled labour tended to be in short supply and competition for 
jobs was negligible.  This scenario gave workers a great deal of job security 
and power over employers dependent on their skills.  Consequently, most 
employers paid an equitable wage.  However, horse drawn transportation 
methods that were unreliable, concentrated many workers close to the cities.  
As transport methods improved the population migrated to rural commercial 
areas.  With this mobility came the interaction between agriculture and 
manufacturing. Galvani (1737-1798) developed electric current, nine years 
later Volta (1745-1827) made the first battery and Trevethick (1771-1833) 
invented the steamboat.  (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2004).   
 
New sources of energy, petroleum and electricity and perfection of the internal 
combustion engine allowed a flexibility of expansion away from the static 
confines of the steam engine.  Employers extended their businesses by 
standardising jobs, increasing the numbers of employees and creating semi and 
unskilled positions for labourers.  This led to a lowering of wages and created 
an economic gap between the working class and the employer.   
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The birth of unionism: 
 
This disparity led to disputes and groups or societies were formed specifically 
to address a grievance.  This was the birth of unionism.  The landed gentry and 
persons of high birth were yielding to growing forces of merchant wealth.  It 
was an age of optimism and excess.  This was the period of satirist Hogarth 
(1697-1764), who in his drawings and etchings depicted mercilessly the 
hypocrisy of wealth amid the squalor and misery of alcohol affected people.  
The troubled times of 1717 in England followed repressive measures of Oliver 
Cromwell (1599-1658) and his son Richard (1626-1712) and the enlightened 
age of commerce and science by Charles the Second (1630-1685).  1714  
witnessed the Hanoverian monarchy succession (1714-1901) which lead into 
1715 with the first of the Jacobite rebellions.  This became an age of 
enlightenment.  Craftsmen whose skills had been abused collaborated to 
discuss their tribulations and in 1717 they joined their lodges under a single 
master to resolve their issues. 
 
English masonry had its first charter presented in AD 926 by Prince Edwin of 
York who received the charter from King Athelstan (AD 895-939).  In 1717 
there were only four craft lodges in London, those that met at the Goose and 
Gridiron in St Paul’s churchyard; the Crown Hotel in Drury Lane; the Apple 
Tree in Covent Garden and the Runner and Grapes at Westminster.  On St 
John’s day (24th June) the Grand Lodge was duly constituted and the ancestry 
of English craftsmen joined to protect the integrity of their trades and seek 
improved working conditions (Carver, 1983). 
 
The first permanent union in America was founded in 1794 by craftsmen from 
the shoemakers of Philadelphia, The Federal Society of Cordwainers.  
Montgomery, (1976) described conditions that existed as: 
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“Little groups stitched in lofts and were driven to despair.  They 
had to bribe their foremen, and were subject to frequent 
reductions in piece rates.” 
 
Learning from early mixed results of failed strikes and drawing public attention 
to working conditions the union movements throughout Western society 
became professional in their administration and organisation.  This evolution 
from early secret societies of local craftsmen to well established national 
unions grew from a response to economic, social, unacceptable working 
conditions, repeated deaths, injuries and political forces.  Cahn, (1976) 
identified that craftsmen dominated these early unions because of their 
commonality of interests and the need to protect the integrity of their trades.  
Later predatory unions with semi and un-skilled membership demanded 
reforms that alienated their own membership and the general public support. 
However, irrespective of economic and political activities of trade unions, the 
fostering of health and safety of union members was a benefit to the whole 
community. 
 
This aspect of control is also a social process in the organisation of work and 
was first labelled work relations to give such a process a title, but now is 
known internationally as industrial relations.  Industrial relations has distinctive 
characteristics, one is its institutionalised structure for dealing with conflict.  
Whereas OH&S was imported legislation from the UK and Europe, it gained 
credibility as the community became alarmed with industrial injuries and 
disease as their perception of safety responsibility developed.  It is a separate 
domain where conflict of interest should not enter negotiations.  Industrial 
relations and OH&S have natural qualities, however, there are distinct 
ideological separations.  Marxist economists such as Braverman, (1974) 
correctly observed that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
employers reorganised work so as to avoid workers with unique skills.  In this 
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way employers controlled the labour process and suppressed any form of 
arbitration.  Mechanisation and automation, as controlled by employers and 
engineers created workplace deaths and injuries without fear of prosecution.   
 
For the following two centuries this control over technology and production 
was not a key factor because as technology and communications accelerated so 
did the safety educative process.  In addition, as technology improved so did 
skill levels of employees and profit motivation arrived.  Attewell, (1987) 
argued Braverman’s analysis by observing that dermatologists and 
neurosurgeons are clearly not less skilled than a medical practitioner.  Not all 
workers seek complex and sophisticated tasks, yet they are interested in their 
health and safety even though they had little education or training in the 
problem.  Internationally, an important step forward was achieved with the 
adoption by the ILO (140) Paid Leave Education Convention, 1974 because 
trade union education had extensively focused on safety and health matters.  As 
early as 1929 the ILO Prevention of Industrial Accidents Recommendation (No 
31) recommended the attendance of safety committees to conferences thus 
sharing decision-making.  Trade unionism has moved beyond national 
boundaries to the international level: there exist at present three massive 
organisations with wide affiliations: The World Federation of Trade Unions, 
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the World 
Confederation of Labour.   
 
Even the USSR, pre 1991 when it controlled all Russian republics, had a trade 
union called the All-Union Council of Trade Unions that researched facilities 
into OH&S education.  Whilst the first concern of collective bargaining has 
been wages and hours of work, the toll of accidents and industrial disease on 
their members inevitably brought these subjects to the sphere of union activity.  
At first the unions role was seeking compensation and or danger money, 
however, from the 1970’s their role changed from protection to prevention and 
 
 240
the authoritarian control of the work environment changed masters (ILO, 2197-
9,1985). 
 
Now skilled workers control production process and decision-making.  With 
this newfound knowledge came awareness of responsibilities of occupational 
health and safety. 
 
 Australia’s industrial endeavours:   
 
History abruptly taught Australian employers that an alienated worker became 
disaffected and this estrangement festered within the worker’s community.  In 
1888 the Australian Shearer’s Union was attempting to build a unionised work 
force in order to push for a pay increase and improved working conditions. 
Most of the New South Wales squatters opposed the formation of an 
employers’ organisation, because it was anti-individualistic.  They preferred to 
fight their own battles.  Within a year, about 80% of New South Wales 
shearing sheds were unionised and paying over 20% more for labour.  Yet 
Cirkovic, (2003) reports only three years later the tables were turned.  In 
response to the 1890’s depression, which brought ruin to many businesses 
throughout the Colonies and led to mass unemployment, the Shipowners 
Organisation had organised itself and taken the offensive.  They unilaterally 
reduced wages by over 25% and there was no industrial action for twenty-three 
years.  
 
Workers have learnt how to obtain prestige, status and financially rewarding 
positions by changing traditional behaviour to a more ambivalent one and 
recognising that expertise and multi-skilling is a pre-requisite.  Arduous tasks 
were not accepted as being equitable with death, disease and injury.  Workers 
were not gladiators who had to face death just so their families could survive.  
There was no classical strategy of changing a working populations’ attitude, 
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rather an alternative approach to rearranging the working environment was 
adopted. 
 
As evidenced by a proud brass plaque on its portals Australia’s first Council of 
Conciliation and Arbitration met on October 13th 1892 at 47 Phillip Street, 
Sydney.  Even as a fledgling group of states, yet to acquire Federation as a 
nation, Australians were struggling to rearrange the working environments of 
its population.  These struggles combined with the adoption of modern 
technology and communication changed certain attitudes, opinions and habits.  
This social change was brought about by necessity and the revolution of rising 
expectations of safety.   
 
The breaking down of an old order of aristocracy and rising strength of the 
bourgeoisie coincided with freedom of thought and expression.  The part 
played by the humbler Freemasons in commencing clubs that were educational 
as well as political formed the basis for a need of a moral and ethical society 
against the lapses of merchants and industrial gentry.  Even Marxian analysis 
with all its emphasis on conflict, inevitable class struggle, and radical 
intervention, occasionally at the price of human freedom, failed as it could not 
keep pace with the accelerated change of technology.  The age of privilege had 
commenced its decline as pioneers of Australia were forced to work together to 
defeat not only the land and climate, but a legacy of harsh militaristic 
management. 
 
Having a reformist Labour Government in power for most of the 1980’s and 
into the 1990’s provided a proactive attempt to improve occupational health 
and safety throughout Australian industry.  The objective was to minimise the 
drain on the economy that occupational injuries and deaths were having on 
Australia.  The aspect of consultation with the workforce and their unions 
became reciprocal as the partnership became not only to improve their 
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performance they had to change their safety standards to be able to compete.  
For the first time in Australia’s industrial endeavours employee decision- 
making was being accepted without a history of confrontation.  Australian 
employees were no longer willing to be passive observers in their workplace.  
The capacity to consult and contribute became legislation. 
 
 Summary: 
 
Safety problems that aggravated dissatisfaction with employers now have the 
legislative support of Australian Federal and State governments.  Consequently 
it is now unacceptable that an employee be diseased or injured irrespective of 
severity of suffering.  Occupational health and safety could be accepted as part 
of a manager’s and engineer’s employment in the same way as other decision-
making duties. This demand for independent critical action could direct that all 
educational curricula be given capacity to include occupational health and 
safety problem solving as a method of cost effectiveness. 
 
Specialist managers will still have to control risks with wisdom and humanity, 
therefore, the manager’s analytical OH&S skills will not only have to remain 
but be emphatic.  As workers of this century will be required to solve problems 
there is a necessity for a broader education at all levels.  The manager’s control 
over the workplace, its workforce and the material resources will demand an 
understanding of hazard and accident causes and the manager’s decision-
making role in eliminating those risks is being assessed. 
 
Ability in eliminating those risks will become part of selection processes.  
More open and competitive economic and business environments are making it 
more important to maximise productivity of employees and their contributions 
to the company’s objectives.  Rivalry will demand that advantages are 
continually maintained over competitors.  As direct and indirect employee costs 
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are often the major cost of an organisation, to remain viable managers will have 
to submit to performance appraisal.  
 
Expanding global markets have serious implications for management practice 
and engineering design as complacency and apathy in health and safety will be 
ruin for business organisations.  One deterrent to apathy of occupational 
injuries is formal health and safety education that will emphasise the demands 
of quality decision-making and risk taking.  Such exposure will not only reduce 
or eliminate management problems of today but can meet the challenges of 
tomorrow.  Professionalising of the workforce in a post-industrialised society 
demands a broader range of capabilities.  Better informed people with 
knowledge of their safety responsibilities will be not only able to maintain self-
esteem and achieve their personal goals, they will be able to change the future. 
 
This appendix identified the historical growth of craft groups who became trade 
unions that instigated industrial relations against unfair management strategies.  
Various controls were intertwined with social changes of the day.  However, 
those judgements were determined by the need for elimination of unsafe work 
practices by sharing decision-making.  Again, it is evidenced that a comparison 
between international occupational health and safety professionals of  2000 and 
these oppressed eighteenth century workers demonstrate that it was control of 
the work environment not a change to the worker that was desired.  These 
controls were generated by a sense of unfairness that workers of the day were 
unprotected.   
 
The following appendix examines the interactive influence that Australian and 
British insurance industry’s credit resources impacted on governments of the 
day.  
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Appendix 7 
HOW INSURANCE INDUSTRY RESOURCE CONTROLS 
IMPACT ON OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 
 
 Introduction: 
 
Previous appendices discussed various influences that have impacted on growth 
of occupational health and safety in Australia.  Many of those influences were 
generated from society’s intolerance of disease and injury.  Although emotion 
and awareness may trigger change it is the catalyst of the dollar that instigates 
governmental change.  Government change is assisted by society’s perception 
to hazards whether they are military, environmental or industrial.  However, 
society must have the capacity to identify hazards; whereas insurance 
companies provide profits for their shareholders by analysing risks and hazards 
continually. This appendix will examine the origin of two global insurance 
companies and the interactive influence that Australian and British insurance 
industry’s credit resources impacted on governments of the day. 
 
The Economic Influence of Insurance Companies: 
 
In September 1967 the Life Insurance Association of America promised one 
billion dollars to the American Government under the Presidency of Lyndon 
Johnson (1908-1973) to bring housing to the nation’s urban slums.  Orren, 
(1974) when studying the history of corporate life insurance noted that the 
congratulations of an American population were disproportionate as at that 
time insurance companies were guaranteeing two hundred thousand million (a 
fifth of the pledge) on every working day.  Such corrupt generosity also raises 
the prospect that corporate business may be the only institution today that is 
able to formulate policies and enforce decisions that have frustrated 
government at all levels. 
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As was discussed earlier the subject of pressure groups, corporate insurance 
groups through campaign contributions, lobbying activities, the lending of 
personnel to public agencies have succeeded in influencing governmental 
decisions.  Shonfield, (1965) in his research into corporate power tells a great 
deal about government but it fails to reveal the true financial influence of the 
insurance corporations as ‘private governments.’ (See Table 7.1). 
Table 7..1 
PERFORMANCE OF AUSTRALIA’S MUTUAL INSURERS 1991 
 
AMP = Australian Mutual Providence Society 1960 
NML = National Mutual Life Society (now known as AXA Asia Pacific Holdings, March 2000) 
CML = Colonial Mutual Life Society 
 AMP NML CML 
 1991 (m) 1991 (m) 1991 (m) 
Policyholders Funds 37,800 16,000  
Premium  Income 5,135 3,654 1,259 
Investment Income 2,451 1,246 619 
Portfolio Value 45,386 20,900 10,044 
The table above demonstrates performance of three major Australian mutual societies whose combined 
annual asset base exceeded $A76.3 billion dollars.  Such lucrative reserves, although not an accurate 
report of their profitability, identify a solvency which is the Mutual’s strength.   
 
Source: 1991 Annual reports, except CML statutory life fund report to ISC. 
 
Business politics from the Mafia to a political party have relations with the 
economy.  Where there is a blend of welfare and economics there is 
competition.  Epstein, (1969) identifies corruptness of the relationship where 
there is a common activity, for example the administration of justice and 
protection of the populous and property to the divisible and tangible self-
protection activities of insurance companies.  Common goals to protect 
community wellbeing are not the main objective of insurance companies. 
 
The insurance industry has a vested interest in society’s financial security and 
its economic behaviour.  Multinational insurance giants rely intensely on risk 
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assessment prior to any financial or logistical decision-making.  Maintenance 
of status within the insurance industry is vital; not only for its own 
socioeconomic progress but for its ability to control and protect its own 
privileges and power.  It could be prejudicial to presume that insurance 
companies have scant regard for the public’s interest, as a proportion of that 
very public is their policy and shareholders.  In fact insurance companies need 
interest groups, such as minorities, consumers, equality, women, environmental 
and OH&S to lay demands at the feet of government and to use such political 
manoeuvrability to make decisions on issues such as plant location, availability 
of housing, land purchase.  Such high finance consolidates the insurance 
industry’s status and identifies its impact on social change.  The resources of 
the insurance industry with its capital, organisation, technical and scientific 
expertise and political experience are well adapted to influence bureaucracy.   
 
Foreign owned companies could affect national bureaucracy, for example, in 
March 2000 National Mutual, the second largest Australian policyholder 
owned insurance giant, became fifty-one percent owned by French insurance 
conglomeration AXA Asia Pacific Holdings.  AXA reported in its 2003 annual 
report that it is the largest insurer in the world in terms of insurance premiums 
in-force.  It has A$1,000 billion assets under management and operates in more 
than 60 countries.  (AXA Asia Pacific Holdings, 2004). Galbraith, (1967) 
predicted that powerful corporations would attach themselves to their 
government’s goals in return for the State’s support to achieve their own 
agendas. 
 
History overflows with illegitimate private interference with government from 
the Italian Renaissance to violations of property rights of peasants by the 
Church and unscrupulous wealthy Barons.  Modern insurance companies have 
the power of credit.  It is this creation of purchasing power that allows people 
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from the homebuyer to the entrepreneur to purchase their needs.  Veblen, 
(1967) when studying ownership and business enterprise stated, 
“Whoever controls credit has the legal right of sabotage.” 
 
The Australian self-regulation guardian against inefficiency and corruption is 
the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC) which acts under 1945 
legislation.  Director of ISC, Keith Chapman, reported that changes are 
proposed to be announced in the 1993 federal budget that will bring accounting 
and reporting standards closer to those standards applying to Australian 
companies (Maher, 1993).  A disadvantage identified with self-regulation is 
that it relies on the very bodies it is supposed to be watching for its financial 
support.  An example is a recent suggestion by the Victorian (Australia) 
financial institutions to limit the power of their State ombudsman whilst he was 
overseas (CCH, 1993). 
 
 Unpretentious Beginnings: 
 
The emergence of persons selling risk insurance to reduce normal gambles of 
life was inevitable as the average home dweller and worker had observed 
disaster befall others and did not seek a similar occurrence.  It was an effortless 
sell, “...pay me a limited amount each week and I will protect you when 
something goes wrong.”  Unscrupulous sales persons and their companies 
flourished as their pockets filled.  Honere de Balzac (1799-1859) the French 
novelist wrote, 
“I do not regard a broker as a member of the human race.” 
 
Daniel Defoe (1660-1731) also deprecating the practice of insurance wrote, 
“I will have nothing to do with it, however, in Italy as stabbing 
and poisoning is so much in vogue, something may be said for 
it.” 
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Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940) is remembered for his catastrophic attempt at 
appeasement with Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) also bequeathed another 
indiscretion when he wrote in 1932 about the necessity for insurance, 
“It is quite beyond the capacity of ordinary citizen to solve daily 
problems.” (Cohen, 1932) 
 
During the height of British Victorian prosperity the Civil War in America 
forced the American government to issue paper currency not converted into 
gold.  This brought a rush of the precious metal to Europe for investment.  
Continued British demand for railways and products forced the expansion of 
industries.  These factors created the need for more capital equipment.  This 
unfettered commerce allowed British expansion to all parts of the globe and the 
births of organised insurance companies partnered every step the endeavours 
took. 
 
 A British Birth of a Global Insurance Company:  
 
It was the combination of a fire and anger at government apathy, assisted by 
nepotism, which brought about the birth of the largest corporate insurance 
companies that dominated the world throughout the Twentieth Century.  In 
1861 a famous fire chief of the London Fire Engine Establishment, Scots born 
James Braidwood, perished when attempting to extinguish the Great Tooley 
Street fire that was the largest conflagration London had experienced since the 
Great Fire of 1666.  Braidwood formed the world’s first municipal fire brigade, 
organising men and machines.  He was the first to promote entering burning 
buildings to fight the seat of a fire.  (The Gazetteer for Scotland, 2004) 
Braidwood died during the destruction of five huge wharfs at London’s 
dockside.  The fire was so intense its radiant heat set fire to and sunk four 
sailing ships in the River Thames.   
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Liveing, (1961) in his historical review of the time noted that financial 
repercussions from the fire were in excess of two million pounds (in Australian 
2004 terms that is nearly 1.7 billion dollars).  The multitude of borderline 
insurance companies now realising they could not cover the massive costs and 
responsibilities demanded by London’s population raised their insurance tariffs 
and requested that the British Home Secretary establish a fire brigade.  Faced 
with such decision-making, (as was discussed in chapter five), the government 
quickly fell back on the recourse of appointing a select committee to 
investigate such a service.   
 
This massive rise in insurance tariffs promoted the merchant and commercial 
population to petition the Lord Mayor of London Sir William Cubbitt.  Cubbitt 
was known as he invented the prison tread wheel, installing the first one in 
Bury St Edmunds Gaol in 1819.  The hostile community demanding action and 
distraught at losing their favourite fire chief were met with a deaf ear and curt 
dismissal of their claims.  Liveing, (1961) reports it was Sir William’s own 
contracting firm that had built the wharf complex for his fellow Alderman John 
Humphrey, whose two sons had happened to marry two of Sir William’s 
daughters. 
 
A wine and spirit merchant and a wholesale grocer disenchanted with the 
unjust proceedings raised the necessary capital issue, quickly announced a 
prospectus and thus was born an independent insurance company named 
Commercial Union.  Commercial Union became the forerunner of global 
insurance and later transformed into a formidable complex of interests that 
touched on all fields of human enterprise. 
 
Norwich Union began as the Norwich Union Society for the Insurance of Lives, 
Granting Annuities, and Endowments of Children in 1808.  This company had 
grown from a fire insurance society owned by a ‘modest’ wine and spirit 
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merchant named Thomas Bignold.  Partnered with the Mayor of Norwich 
Starling Day they had wisdom to note a high mortality rate in the horrendous 
Norwich winter of 1807-8 could be opportune for the founding of a life 
insurance company.  Its pretentious title was soon shortened, however, not 
before it had purchased the oldest known insurance company the Amicable 
Society for a Perpetual Assurance Office founded in 1706.  Blake, (1958) when 
studying records of the Amicable discovered that it had been founded by a 
bookseller who had the Bishop of Oxford, William Talbot as a friend who had 
the ear of Queen Anne (1665-1714) who granted the royal charter.  For seventy 
years the Society failed even to operate a bank account and its cash and 
securities were kept in an iron trunk.  One of the receipts recovered noted one 
thousand pounds (Sterling) in failed prize-winning lottery tickets. 
 
Between 1790 and 1810 there were some twenty insurance companies in 
Britain and Blake (1958) notes that many were disreputable and practised a 
profitable form of fraud.  The law failed to reduce these fraudulent enterprises 
because firstly, there was no police force until 1829 and secondly, nepotism of 
the proprietors was flagrant and their power base was private Acts of 
Parliament whose process were an easy matter in those days. 
 
The British Government was tardy in recognising the financial value of 
insurance and it was not until 1911 that Lloyd George’s (1863-1945) scheme 
for National Health Insurance commenced on a contribution and compulsory 
basis.  Cohen, (1932) records that contributions were three pennies a week 
from the employer, a male worker paid four pennies and a female three pence.  
There was no remedy at Common Law in the case of a fatal accident with 
exception of the Fatal Accident Act 1846 (UK) which demanded that first you 
had to prove that if the deceased had lived then he/she would have brought 
action. 
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In 1897 the Workers’ Compensation Act (UK) was finally passed for persons 
working in various dangerous trades.  In 1900 this limitation was abandoned to 
allow agricultural workers within the scope and in 1906, common sense finally 
prevailed, when the government of the day accepted that all workers would be 
included and their dependents could include illegitimate children. 
 
The British government had attempted industrial insurance in 1865 when it set 
up the Post Office Life Insurance to supplement the Post Office Savings Bank.  
It failed in 1928 due to absence of the weekly collection of premiums.  Cohen, 
(1932) continues that a review of insurance companies instigated by Lord 
Parmoor in 1919, with exception of the Prudential Company, which was 
perceived as being honest and not examined, that from a total of 9,322,336 
policies 6,426,313 had lapsed within ten years.  Initial payments remained as 
direct profit with the insurers.  Over forty-four percent of monies collected 
were absorbed in administration costs and the rest was returned to the assured 
in benefits.  Such information supports the foundation that insurance companies 
place great reliance on risk assessment.  As a conclusion to the British 
government’s restrained involvement in insurance it also protected the British 
people by offering to imprison any false insurance collector for three months 
with hard labour. 
 
 The Birth of the First Australian Insurance Company: 
 
British insurance companies in the colony of Australia had loyalty and financial 
obligations to the mother country.  British patriotic fervour was aroused as 
General Pollock of the Bengal Staff Corps was leading a Punjab Frontier Force 
against the Jowakis of Afghanistan; Kaffir wars were raging in Africa and the 
residents of New South Wales were getting ready to send their sons to a foreign 
death whilst punishing the Mahdi for murdering General Gordon (1833-1885) 
at Khartoum.  Liveing, (1961) reports many of these insurance companies were 
 
 252
being governed from England and failed.  Whilst this rush of patriotism seemed 
noble and much of the Australian population still held ‘Old World’ 
expectations, there was a vital and continuing need for institutions in which 
local inhabitants could put their trust. 
 
Mayfield’s, (1978) contribution to recording the centennial of Mercantile 
Mutual Insurance noted that in 1878 the Mercantile Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company opened for business after three mates finished a state cricket game 
and developed a plan for an insurance company. 
 
It is interesting to note that although Mercantile Mutual became a massive 
influence in Australia the British Commercial Union arrived in the same year 
and commenced purchasing smaller companies, it never handled life insurance 
because the Australian government had been operating a powerful state 
assurance organisation since 1869.  It was not until Commercial Union 
purchased the Australian Mutual Fire Insurance Society in 1920 that its 
activities widened.  This included marine underwriting, building trades and the 
giant wool broking and pastoral agencies such as Dalgety and Co. and Elder 
Smith and Co. Ltd.  The very control of the agriculture and commerce heart of 
the nation was now connected to the Commercial Union. 
 
 The Culture of Insurance: 
 
Insurance is an invisible shield to which many people contribute to its 
maintenance so that its protective power remains at its optimum.  A normal 
policyholder after begrudging paying an annual sum forgets the protection they 
have just purchased.  To make mistakes is a human characteristic, as is the 
tendency to gamble.  Spickett, (1992) when debating the reality of risk noted 
that human fallibility and the propensity to take risks are significant factors in 
many accidents.  Such perception is supported by Guthrie, (1997).  Over the 
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world there have been many inquests, there are libraries full of laws and 
regulations, codes of practice and standards all designed to help prevent 
accidents.  Inside a casino, gamblers do not like losing but they do like 
gambling.  Outside the casino gambling and losing is called having a 
misfortune. 
 
Risk is pervasive in society and within business enterprises.  Green and 
Serbein, (1983) debated the importance and measurement of objective and 
subjective risk and its role in decision-making.  Without such an evaluation, 
risk control, as a function of effective management, would fail.  Insurers are 
virtually the only professional risk takers in international business society. 
 
Risk is not a new word and probably originates from a Greek word, or Italian 
word rischio.  Originally the word was related to hazards of sailing near rocks 
or cliffs especially in swirling tides.  Spickett also establishes that risk is 
present in all aspects of life and the management of risk is a major concern for 
society as people have a poor perception of their safety responsibility.  All 
people, whether at work, at home or engaged in a leisure activity, spend some 
time considering the risks they are taking, the significance of risks, the 
acceptability of risks, and how they can be guaranteed of reducing them.  The 
answers to all their questions are often not available and hence provide a 
weakness in the decision-making process which can lead to a protracted 
decision-making period or indecision, inconsistencies, dissatisfaction and even 
possibly a sense of injustice. 
 
In addition, Spickett analysed levels in risks and noted that some occupations 
traditionally carry a higher risk of injury and premature death than others.  For 
example, fishing at sea, underground mining and off shore gas and oil 
industries have provided history with considerable mortality.  Individuals 
accept this higher risk that is often associated with financial reward.  The 
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concept of ‘danger money’ has only just been discarded but was a common 
feature of industrial society insurance for many years.  Whether risk due to 
industrial hazard is more acceptable if it is borne by workers partly insured by 
higher pay, than if it is borne by the general public will have advocates on both 
sides. 
 
 Managerial Responsibility for Risk 
 
Jaques, (1989) whilst discussing leadership and organisational structures wrote, 
“There is little doubt that formal authority is one of the most 
effective means to ‘get things done’ in organisations.  If such 
source of power is used it must come from the very top of the 
organisation.” 
 
Kasperczyk, (1990) argued that most organisations have already demonstrated 
their ability to create unique social cultures to enforce certain norms and 
demand adequate performance of their assigned duties.  Betts, (1990) agrees 
and points out there is no room for risk takers in places of employment as legal 
liability for accidents and diseases in the workplace can depend on whether 
adequate precautions had been assured to prevent their occurrence.  In fact, 
Regulation 375 to 382 of the Tasmanian Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare 
Act (1977) demands the proof of establishing a certain level of expenditure 
necessary to provide a safe and healthy workplace.  So there are numerous 
methods of seeking compliance of safe work practices. 
 
Management responsibility also entails the consequence of failing to insure 
their workforce from harm, the same risk process that they insure material 
items.  To neglect the real needs of the workers is to gamble and Emerson, 
(1990) when analysing safety management takes the opinion, 
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“Any work that is considered not worthy of human effort must be 
relegated to robots or eliminated.” 
 
Atherley, (1978) had noted one hundred and fifty years earlier that an English 
Dr Knight in 1844 was worried that the average life expectancy of a Sheffield 
pottery worker was only twenty-nine years and this was attributed to inhalation 
of dust.  Yet it was another twenty-three years in 1867 before powerful mine 
owners were legislated to ventilate the workplace and another thirty years, in 
1895, before medical practitioners were required as a statutory duty to note 
cases of workplace deaths to the Chief Inspector of Factories.  By 1940 the 
annual rate of four hundred deaths per year in the British earthenware industry 
had been reduced to four. 
 
Extents of insuring the wellbeing of the workforce has taken even a greater 
significance when one corporate barrier to immunity from serious injury to a 
worker was recently dismantled in America.  In the Michigan State Supreme 
Court July 3, 1989 in State of Michigan v’s P. Hegedus 83601 Justice Boyle 
stated, 
“While the OSHA (USA) is concerned with protecting citizens 
from specific safety and health hazards, this State is concerned 
with protecting employees as citizens from criminal conduct.” 
 
That is a prime indication of dissatisfaction with safety legislation and a move 
to criminalise the offences brings greater need to insure protection at the 
highest level.  Chipman, (1990) highlights another liability of employers that 
has remained dormant, that of their responsibility to the environment.  If 
continued defiance of legal obligations because of the costs is rejected it may 
be that attention be given to the legislation concerning the environment.  In 
Victoria (Section 59E- Environmental Protection Act 1970) penalties of five 
hundred thousand dollars or five years imprisonment is a choice.  Many 
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insurance companies, observing their profit priority, may well put this type of 
risk as ‘unobtainable insurance.’ 
 
 Why is Australia So Much at Risk? 
 
“Australia's industrial health and safety figures are appalling.”  Cross, (1990) 
after researching the 1985 statistics and complaining that was the last date such 
information was available commenced her research with that statement. She 
continued the average incident of injuries causing more than three days off 
works in Australia was 55%.  In the United Kingdom equivalent figures was 
7.7% and in Japan 5.5%, that is an inexcusable ten fold difference.  In Australia 
the fatality rate was 6.05 per 100,000 workers.  In Japan equivalent figures 
were 2.0 and in the United Kingdom the rate was 1.9. 
 
Supporting Spickett’s earlier comments about some occupations having 
traditionally higher risks Cross notes that although Australia is dependent on 
agriculture, mining and construction which are high risk industries this is not a 
plausible explanation.  Within the construction industry, there were 10 fatalities 
per 100,000 in the United Kingdom (UK), whereas in New South Wales 
(NSW) alone there were 20 per 100,000.  In the UK manufacturing industry 
there were 2.9 deaths per 100,000 and in NSW there were 10 per 100,000.  The 
UK agriculture industry death rate was 8.8 per 100,000 and in Australia the 
fatality rate was 30 per 100,000.   
 
These figures indicate a human devastation that the population of Australia can 
rarely comprehend; yet the insurance industry is not as ignorant.  Every 
premium rate paid by a policyholder is designed to protect the insurance 
company’s shareholders.  Worse news continued as Cross’s research indicated 
that since 1985 in Japan and the United Kingdom the injury and fatality rates 
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are falling, in Australia they were increasing.  By 2003 this trend had been 
reduced to 5.5 per 100,000 workers. (ABS, 2004) 
 
Cross and Emerson join in calling for safety management training in tertiary 
institutions to insure against the lack of control in Australian industry.  The 
need for executive management to support specific safety goals requires formal 
education that will alleviate expensive insurance premiums.  Such cost-
effective management will allow resources to be used in other areas.  It may be 
that Australia’s mangers have not considered that complacency displayed by 
the Australian workforce might to connected to many workers are working less 
than they are capable of?  There are many misconceptions that people in a team 
demonstrate the tendency to work better together.  This research has identified 
that that misconception is authentic. 
 
This observation is supported by extensive research in the 1980’s by Jones, 
(1984); Albanese and Van Fleet, (1985); Kravitz and Martin, (1986); and 
Harkins and Szymanski, (1989) who when researching group workplace 
behaviour discovered that responsibility is dispersed when individuals are 
placed in a group.  This implication has great humanistic and commercial 
significance when the health and safety of many may be the responsibility of 
that group.  Research could be undertaken to determine if the complacency 
displayed by Australians is a contributing factor to the phenomenon of the 
nation’s unacceptable workplace injuries and death rates. 
 
Financial Reality Influencing Politics of Occupational Health and Safety: 
 
There is not always a natural identity of interest between legislators and 
workers in the area of OH&S.  The financial nature is well illustrated by the 
history of asbestos.  Asbestos was recognised in 1918 by the Prudential 
Insurance Company of New York that indicated it would not issue life 
insurance policies to asbestos workers.   Medical effects were detailed in the 
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British Medical Journal in 1920 and in 1930 the International labour 
Organisation (ILO) recommended an urgent study of asbestos.  These dangers 
were also legally recognised in 1933 when the British Parliament granted 
compensation for affected asbestos workers and their dependents.  So British 
companies moved their operations overseas to the Pilbarra region of Western 
Australia and South Africa where workers were often recently arrived migrants 
who were transient, unorganised and without employee or legislative support.  
Biggins, (1988) observes that Americans followed suit by moving their unsafe 
industries to Mexico and the largest British asbestos mine is now in India.  
These disclosures are not new, the ILO Convention No 155 in 1974 stated that 
a worker has the right to stop unsafe work.  Without specialised safety 
education to identify hazards the knowledge and perception of safety 
responsibility is not there to stop work. 
 
Australia did not have the more equitable and effective representation of 
workers on policy making and standard setting bodies which existed in 
Sweden.  Navarro, (1983) in his research on Swedish social values also 
highlights a fact that Australia did not have legal provisions for direct 
involvement by workers.  Australia, since 1985 is now served by NOSHC 
which directed its emphasis to research rather than the provision of 
information.   
 
To galvanise reforms the peak trade unions must accept that technical and 
scientific bodies are the appropriate groups to find solutions.  They could also 
be scientifically and politically neutral which would make challenging their 
observations difficult.  However, care must be given to those scientific bodies 
that have justified financial decisions like the judgements on Australian 
asbestos workers who were allowed to continue their work towards death 
without government protection until 1966. 
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 Summary: 
 
This appendix has offered a cursory examination of the influence of corporate 
insurance with social change.  It identifies unseen business statesmanship that 
is practised and the unpretentious beginnings of a few insurance companies 
whose growth and power dominated the industry and therefore, the very people 
it purported to serve.  Insurance companies have kept autonomous control of 
their assets and continued protection of their shareholders.  The dimension of 
power being corrupted in government operations is not the objective of this 
research, however, it is clear that there is a strategy of dealership with 
governments. 
 
These observations have implications for occupational health and safety policy 
makers as most plans and programmes will have the need to discuss resourcing 
and the availability of credit.  One limitation may be ‘Do the dreams of the 
OH&S professional coincide with those of the money lenders?’  The insurance 
industry has demonstrated its ability to preserve autonomy and its profits which 
are for use at the company’s discretion. 
 
The opening commentary noting the American insurance industry considered 
presenting the American Government a billion dollars has the flavour of social 
responsibility, however, this author questions the right of unelected private 
management to impose their interpretations on what is good for the right of the 
people. 
 
Governments can change the rules of business by public regulations, minimum 
wages, laws against discrimination of hiring etcetera, however, commercial 
giants operate within their economic limitations.  Political order could be 
questioned if it is perceived that health and safety of the population could be 
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jeopardised because of corporate business having the economic control of 
credit resources. 
 
Eminent occupational health and safety professionals join in calling for safety 
management training in tertiary institutions to insure against the lack of control 
in Australian industry.  The need for executive management to support specific 
safety goals requires formal education that will compensate expensive 
insurance premiums and allow that financial resource to be used in other areas.  
The reliance of insurance for protection is dangerous as it has the potential to 
remove or decline management skills to make the decisions to remove risk 
from the workplace and not just protect workers.   
 
For executives to consider efficient safety management to combat problems 
will only be accomplished by exposure to specialise occupational health and 
safety education.   It is evident that insurance companies make their decisions 
on premiums after elaborate investigation of facts.  Such examination requires 
specialised hazard management knowledge and experience.  Yet, this 
specialised safety knowledge to problem-solve safety issues is not taught at 
engineer or management levels. To analyse those skills, forms of knowledge, 
attitudes and values and to argue for the need for quality occupational health 
and safety education to control hazards at the design stage rather than modify 
behaviour it is necessary to investigate by use of a questionnaire.  The following 
appendix identifies the research procedures and instrumentation used to evaluate 
responses from an evaluative tool.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
